

THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMACY OF BRAZIL

B.F. Martynov | A.Y. Borzova

The image features a large, stylized representation of the Brazilian national emblem. It consists of a dark blue shield with a white banner across the top containing the motto "ORDEM E PROGRESSO" in green capital letters. The shield is filled with white stars of varying sizes, arranged in a pattern that represents the Brazilian states and Federal District. The emblem is set against a background of the Brazilian national flag's colors: green and gold.

ORDEM E PROGRESSO

B.F. Martynov
A.Yu. Borzova

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FOREWORD

Foreign policy is one of the most traditional fields of study within International Relations, as it deals with the interactions and decisions that states make in the international arena. In Brazil, the study of foreign policy has helped to shape and develop the discipline, as the country's unique geopolitical position and historical trajectory have led to the development of distinct foreign policy traditions. Brazilian foreign policy is frequently analyzed through a domestic lens, as it reflects the country's political, economic, and social priorities. However, it is also occasionally examined through an American perspective, given the close relationship between the two countries. Nevertheless, it is crucial to view Brazilian foreign policy through a global lens, and in this regard, the insights and perspectives offered by Russian scholars can provide a valuable contribution to our understanding of this complex field.

Russia and Brazil have been compared as middle powers due to their similar positions in the international system, characterized by a mixture of regional and global interests, limited military power, and diverse foreign policy priorities. This comparison has been particularly relevant during periods when both countries were striving to assert their influence in the international arena, and sought to establish themselves as key players in

their respective regions. While Russia has experienced a resurgence in recent years, reasserting its influence on the global stage, Brazil has faced challenges in maintaining its role as a regional leader. Despite having one of the world's largest economies, Brazil's foreign policy has been limited by domestic political instability and economic challenges. As such, an analysis of Brazil's foreign policy through the lens of Russian scholarship could offer valuable insights into how the country can navigate these challenges and achieve its foreign policy objectives.

This book on Brazilian Foreign Policy written by Professors Alla Borzova, from the People's Friendship University of Russia, and Boris B.F. Martynov, Professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Affairs (MGIMO), provides a comprehensive overview of Brazil's foreign policy, exploring its evolution from the imperial period to the military dictatorship era and beyond. Professor Borzova's and Professor Martynov's analysis, as Russian scholars of International Relations, brings a unique perspective to the study of Brazilian foreign policy, with a focus on the role of great powers, global governance, and the changing dynamics of the international system. This perspective could help Brazilian policymakers to better understand the challenges and opportunities presented by an increasingly multipolar world, and to develop more effective strategies for pursuing the country's foreign policy objectives. Fundamentally, an analysis of Brazilian foreign policy through a Russian lens contributes to the development of a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the country's role in the international arena, and offers valuable insights into how Brazil can navigate a rapidly changing global landscape.

The study of International Relations provides a theoretical framework to understand how states interact with each other in

the international system. The book makes use of this framework to analyze the formation of Brazilian foreign policy and diplomacy, tracing the changes and innovations that occurred during different historical periods. The book reaches for the foundations of a Brazilian Foreign Policy in Rio Branco, the so-called *Golden Chancellor*, and a crucial figure in the formation of a Brazilian diplomacy. As an experienced diplomat, he understood the complexities of international relations and the importance of military power in supporting diplomatic efforts. Despite his idealistic aspirations for peace and cooperation among nations, he recognized the potential for aggression from imperialist powers. The 1902 aggression by Great Britain, Germany, and Italy against Venezuela, and the 1909 ultimatum received by Chile from the United States, underscored the need for Brazil to have a strong navy to support its diplomatic efforts. Rio Branco's leadership in spearheading extensive reforms in the Brazilian army and navy, as well as Brazil's decision to acquire powerful dreadnoughts and other ships from England, brought Brazil's naval capabilities to the level of major sea powers. Rio Branco's approach to foreign policy, which recognized the role of military power in supporting diplomatic objectives, is consistent with the realist theory of international relations, which emphasizes the importance of power and the pursuit of national interests in shaping foreign policy decisions.

From the stagnation of the "First Republic", the book moves on to the foreign policy of Getulio Vargas, who served as the President of Brazil from 1930 to 1954. The period of Vargas' presidency saw significant changes in Brazilian foreign policy. His rise to power marked the end of the oligarchy republic and the beginning of a new era in Brazilian politics. One of his key objectives was to strengthen the foundations of pan-Americanism, an initiative that sought to promote cooperation

and solidarity among the countries of the Americas. This was reflected in Brazil's support for the Allied powers during World War II and its participation in the creation of the United Nations. The government of Dutra, which succeeded Vargas, continued to build on these foundations, emphasizing Brazil's role as a leader in the region. However, this attempt to return to traditions under hegemony was short-lived, and Vargas was once again elected president in 1951. His second term was marked by what the authors name a tragedy with a glimmer of hope, as he committed suicide amidst a political crisis, but his policies continued to shape Brazilian foreign policy in the years to come. Vargas' presidency marked a significant shift in Brazilian foreign policy, as the country sought to assert itself as a regional and global player, and cement its position as a key player in the international community.

One should pay particular attention to Professors Borzova and Martynov scrutiny of Vargas' attempt on Pan-Americanism, and the eventual choice for a strategic partnership with the United States. Their approach offers a different perspective from the traditional Brazilian one, which is focused on pragmatism, on the recognition of the political and economic weight of the US power, embodying, an "unwritten alliance" between the Brazilian and American governments. (Burns, 2003). The Pan American operation would be brought back by president Kubistchek. The book once again offers a very particular perspective, although agreeing with Brazilian authors such as Vizentini (2006) that Brazil went through an accelerated path of social and political development and maturation by this period, they reckon that this more or less independent initiative boiled down to the need for the United States to recognize the imperatives of the development of Latin American countries with a simultaneous increase of its role and importance in international affairs.

Although not unique to Brazil, the “automatic alignment” with the United States based on the anti-communist approach of the military regime is yet another important topic covered in the book. The regime’s foreign policy underwent significant changes during this period, moving from the doctrine of “ideological borders” to “universal diplomacy.” A very particular analysis from the Professors show that the close alliance with the United States during the war years provided Brazil with a valuable opportunity to acquire essential military knowledge and experience. This experience inspired Brazilians with the hope that in the post-war years, the United States would aid Brazil in its pursuit of great power status, on the condition of close cooperation in the international arena. This optimistic outlook is understandable, given the strategic importance of Brazil’s participation in the war effort and the crucial role it played in ensuring the success of the Allies. However, the idea that the United States would unconditionally support Brazil’s aspirations for great power status was ultimately an unrealistic expectation. While the United States certainly valued its relationship with Brazil, it had its own strategic interests and priorities in the post-war era, which did not always align with Brazil’s.

As the book moves on, it will face the *left turn* of Brazilian foreign policy, specially under Lula. As pointed by Leite (2011), the understanding of the foreign policy adopted by Lula requires an understanding of the changes that occurred in Brazilian diplomacy after the end of the Cold War. Although it might seem like a total rupture, there are a lot of continuities on Lula’s term, when compared to his predecessors (Cervo, 2006); yet, the increasing partnership with countries such as China and Russia, as understandably highlighted by the authors, showed that those were new days.

One final remarkable contribution is the author's analysis of what they label Jair Bolsonaro's Anti-Diplomacy. The foreign policy of Jair Bolsonaro's administration is still relatively new, and as such, there has been limited analysis of its objectives, strategies, and outcomes. However, given the increasingly prominent role that Brazil plays in global affairs, particularly in the context of regional politics and trade, a nuanced understanding of its foreign policy is crucial for policymakers and scholars alike. The approach of these Russian authors towards the Bolsonaro administration's foreign policy is particularly insightful, as it offers an alternative perspective that can help to broaden and deepen our understanding of Brazilian foreign policy. The contributions of Russian scholars to the study of Brazilian foreign policy are commendable, providing valuable insights into this complex and dynamic field of study.

This book provides an exceptionally valuable contribution to the study of Brazilian foreign policy, offering a detailed analysis of its historical evolution and key drivers. The book presents a comprehensive and insightful history of Brazilian foreign policy and diplomacy from a unique perspective. The authors' critical analysis, supported by their profound knowledge of Brazil's history, politics, and culture, offer a fresh approach to this important area of study. The alternative view provided by Professor Borzova and Professor Martynov will undoubtedly contribute to a deeper understanding of Brazil's foreign policy and its impact on the global community. Their work sets an example for the potential for productive academic cooperation between Brazil and Russia, and I hope this book will be the beginning of a fruitful dialogue between scholars from both countries. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in Brazilian foreign policy, international relations, and the fascinating intersection between

politics, culture, and diplomacy. I congratulate Professor Borzova on this outstanding work and commend it to all those who seek a deeper understanding of Brazilian foreign policy.

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INTRODUCTION

The history of Brazilian foreign policy and diplomacy is not well known in the world outside the Latin American region, in comparison with the foreign policy history of the leading European countries, the United States of America. Meanwhile, this largest Latin American country, ranking 5th in the world in terms of territory and 6th in terms of population, confidently included in the top ten largest economies in the world, can rightfully be proud of the traditions of its diplomacy, which were laid down at the beginning of the last century, and its practical achievements.

Brazil's Foreign Ministry, Itamaraty^{1*}, enjoys great prestige in Latin America, and its cadres, whose forge is the Rio Branco Institute, occupy prominent places not only in the diplomatic field, but also play a significant role in the leadership of the country.

The famous Brazilian diplomat and statesman Rubens Ricupero in the introduction to his major work «Diplomacy in the construction of the Brazilian state 1750 – 2016» wrote, that

1 Initially (before the transfer of the capital of Brazil from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia in 1961), the Brazilian Foreign Ministry was located in Rio de Janeiro in the palace that once belonged to Baron de Itamaratú.

very few countries owe as much of their diplomacy as Brazil. And the point is not only in preserving its territorial integrity. At many critical stages in the history of our country, external relations played a decisive role. Through its attainments and mistakes, diplomacy contributed to the achieving independence and the abolition of slavery, entry into the outside world, developing trade and encouraging immigration, participating in the formation of the Brazilian nation and its consolidation, fighting the separatism of the southern states, promoting industrialization and the all-round growth of the country.

Brazil is a multidimensional country in all respects, which cannot be said about the traditional principles and foundations of its foreign policy, the main of which are peacefulness, respect for the sovereignty of its neighbors, the principle of peaceful resolution of international disputes, observance of the principles of international law and the UN Charter.

Brazil is a consistent supporter of a polycentric world order, which does not prevent it from defending its national interests, both in the Western Hemisphere and in the world as a whole.

Of course, over the more than 200 years of Brazil's existence as an independent state, there have been exceptions to this rule. However, by no means these short-term historical periods determined the traditional course of Brazilian diplomacy in the international arena. Their very presence testified, perhaps, of only one thing: having copied in the 19th century North American political institutions, Brazil, as well as other Latin American states, for a long time shared the illusion of Pan-Americanism, nourishing hopes for equal and mutually beneficial cooperation with the United States.

At the same time, in solving the traditional Brazilian dilemma about what can serve as a guarantee of all-round development:

national identity or copying someone else's model, Brazilian diplomats, as a rule, favored "identity", which earned them respect at home and abroad. The "diplomatic caste" (this definition is used in Brazil) is rightfully ranked among those domestic political actors who, along with entrepreneurs and the military, exert a serious lobbying influence on the authorities.

Entering the 21st century, Brazil is facing new challenges in the international arena. Brazil's political and economic weight in the Latin American region objectively pushes it to a leadership position, while the post-Cold War realities of the surrounding world impose new demands on the quality of such leadership. The aggravated old and constantly emerging new global problems force us to rethink many of the established political stereotypes in conditions when the international situation in the region and in the world as a whole can hardly be called predictable.

Finally, the political structures and public opinion of this country are no longer as tolerant as before, to relate to such historically and culturally conditioned phenomena as, for example, corruption or "abuse of power", which seriously affects the international positioning of the country and its conduct of responsible foreign policy course.

The relationship between domestic and foreign policy in Brazil in recent years has become quite clear, despite the fact that even in the conditions of an unprecedented drop in its diplomatic activity in the period from 2016 to 2022 this country has not ceased to be a regional leader and has not abandoned its applications to join the solution of many global problems. Brazil's continued participation in the BRICS and the G-20 is clear evidence of this.

Chapter 1

THE FORMATION OF THE FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMACY OF BRAZIL IN THE IMPERIAL PERIOD: INNOVATIONS OF THE FIRST REPUBLIC

Imperial Diplomacy. Politics in the Region of La Plata

The process of shaping national interests and foreign policy strategy has a long history in Brazil. Precisely the geography, history and culture became those “deep forces” that had a determinative effect on the international position of this country from the eighteenth century. Firstly, among these “forces” one should single out the geographical position of Brazil in South America and in the world around it.

Brazil, as a country of almost continental scale, in the north, east and south borders on all South American states, except of Ecuador and Chile, and in the west its territory is washed by the waters of the Atlantic Ocean for 8.5 thousand km. Being practically at an equal distance from both Europe and the United States, Brazil from the moment of gaining independence in 1822 until the beginning of the First World War remained far from the

main hotbeds of international tension and, accordingly, from all the vicissitudes of “big” world politics.

The history of Brazil is closely connected with the history of Portuguese colonization and the legacy of the Portuguese royal court, which in 1808 was forced to move to Rio de Janeiro from the capital of Portugal, Lisbon, occupied by Napoleon’s troops. In 1815, Brazil received a new political status, becoming no longer a colony, but a part of the Kingdom of Portugal, and joined the united “Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarve”.

After the bourgeois revolution of 1820 in Portugal, the Portuguese king João VI, returned to Portugal having received the honorary title of Emperor of Brazil. The Brazilian landowners (fazendeiro) created independently of Portugal their own government headed by the natural scientist Jose Bonifacio de Andrada y Silva (1763 – 1838), and forced the Prince Regent Pedro to issue a manifesto on Brazilian independence. On September 7, 1822, they obtained from the prince a decision to confirm their government and break off relations with the metropolis.

A constitutional monarchy was established in Brazil, and the prince-regent went down in history under the name of the Brazilian emperor Pedro I.

The new state was formed in the difficult internal and external conditions. It was necessary to replace the officials of the old Portuguese colonial administration, to form legislative and executive branches, to create a professional army and diplomatic service. The most important unresolved issue remained the question of the borders of the giant country.

Almost the first half of the 18th century entirely took place the struggle between Spain and Portugal, who contested the boundaries of their territorial possessions in the New World.

Only in 1750, the Portuguese diplomat, a native of Brazil, Alechandri di Guzman (1695 – 1756), using the principle of “uti possidetis”² * taken from Roman law, finally succeeded in securing the territory of Brazil for Portugal (Treaty of Madrid, 1750). Today this Portuguese politician is considered the “Father of Brazilian diplomacy”.

However, there were a lot of unresolved problems associated with the specific delimitation of borders with neighbors – new Latin American countries that conquered their independence from Spanish rule. And, first of all, with the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata (present-day Argentina).

Strengthening the independence of Brazil, Pedro I in 1822 granted full autonomy to the State Secretariat for Empire and Foreign Affairs (Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios do Império e Estrangeiros), which took over foreign policy.

The Brazilian Constitution of 1824 finally determined the powers of the executive branch of government in the field of international relations and gave it the right to revise the border treaties that existed in Brazil at that time.

2 Principle was transferred from Roman civil law. In international law, it presupposes the preservation of the existing order of things, when the disputed territory remains with its actual owner, unless otherwise provided by the treaty. This principle was widely used in South America after the Revolutionary Wars to reduce the likelihood of territorial conflicts between the newly independent states.

Picture 1 – Last portrait of the emperor D. Pedro I, whilst in Brazil, with imperial garment.



Source: Simplicio Rodrigues de Sá (1785–1839)

The basis for the formation of Brazil’s national identity in the 19th century was the monarchy, which distinguished it from other Latin American republics, and at the same time, politically and culturally, brought it closer to Europe. In South America Brazil was “different” for its neighbors – the Spanish-speaking republics. The monarchical regime in Brazil, as noted the famous Brazilian diplomat and politician Rubens Ricupero, made it “a strange exception against the background of its neighbors, the Hispanic Latin American republics“, much more responsive to the progressive aspirations of the 19th century.(Ricupero, 2017, p.29).

Mutual alienation increased with the gradual withering away of the slave trade, which still took place in Brazil, making this form of government even more anachronistic and unworthy

to emulate. However, it should be recognized that the Portuguese language and culture, as well as the fact of the peaceful, unlike all other Latin American countries, liberation from the power of the metropolis, played a significant role in the social, economic and cultural cohesion of the country's multi-ethnic population (there were descendants of the Portuguese, Indians, Africans, European immigrants, and later Arabs and Japanese).

All these elements of the multifaceted Brazilian reality reflected in the country's foreign policy projection. The "softer" nature of slavery in Brazil (J. Freire)³ and, in general, the non-violent nature of political changes in this country, in comparison, for example, with the North American one, led to the emergence of such a phenomenon as the "Luso-Brazilian culture of compromise", which would later become one of the most distinctive features of Brazilian diplomacy.

The most important stage in the formation of the Empire's foreign policy was the period from 1822 to 1828, when Brazil established diplomatic relations with a number of foreign states and determined its foreign policy interests and methods of ensuring them. Prominent Brazilian historian Amado Luis Cervo identified four successive stages in the formation of the foundations of Brazilian foreign policy:

- Political, economic and legal break with Portugal;
- Assertion of independence;

3 Gilberto Freire (1900 - 1987) is a renowned Brazilian anthropologist and writer. In his works, he emphasized the "soft" nature of slavery in Brazil, defining it as "racial democracy", as opposed to racial segregation in the United States.

- Initiatives to recognize the independence of Brazil by other states;
- Determination of its own foreign policy interests. (Cervo A., Bueno C., 2008, p.27).

In 1822, the first Brazilian consulate was opened in Buenos Aires to negotiate with respect to Uruguay, over whose territory Brazil and Argentina were in dispute, and the contacts were established with other Spanish American republics. The conflict with Argentina took on the character of a real war from 1825, which lasted until 1828, when representatives of the Emperor of Brazil and the government of the United Provinces of La Plata concluded negotiations by signing a peace convention and recognizing the right of the province of Montevideo to self-determination and the creation of an independent state of Uruguay.

In August 1822, the first diplomatic envoys were sent to Paris, London and the United States. The cooperation with the United States and Great Britain gradually began to come to the fore from 1823. The relations with Brazil were important to them for a variety of reasons. Great Britain considered Brazil to be a promising market for its goods. The United States were preparing to extend its hegemony throughout South America, pursuing explicit political, economic and strategic goals. This was clearly reflected in the "Monroe Doctrine" proclaimed in 1823. For the republican United States, the monarchical form of government that existed in Brazil was not so significant. It was much more important for them to challenge British influence in the region, which they began to consider as their own. The United States had never completely rid themselves of messianism and external interventionism. They were good at hiding their egoistic and hegemonic aspirations under the guise of democracy and

republicanism. In 1828, Brazil signed the first trade agreement with the United States.

Brazilian diplomacy is gradually turning into an important instrument for recognizing the country's independence. The agreement concluded with Portugal on August 29, 1825, led to the recognition of the independence of Brazil by its former metropolis, while Brazil had to pay 2 million 600 thousand pounds for this, of which 600 thousand were intended personally for the Portuguese king.

This agreement removed obstacles to the recognition of Brazil by European countries and the United States, which in turn led to the expansion of the number of its diplomatic missions abroad: in Germany, Austria, Colombia and France.

By decree of September 15, 1828, there were allocated six departments in the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, each of them had its own area of responsibility:

- The first Department was responsible for Great Britain and the Imperial Court;
- The second – for France, the USA and other American states;
- The third – for consular affairs, Austria, The Holy See, Naples, Germanic and Italian states;
- The fourth – for the Netherlands, cities of the Hanseatic Union, Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Prussia and patent letters;
- The fifth – for Portugal with its colonies, Spain and the African states;
- The sixth – for office work. (Castro, 2009).

During those years, Brazil actively sought to enter the world commodity markets, to take advantage of the rapid development of its main export industries. Gold mining grew in the country, the production of sugar, coffee, cocoa, indigo and cotton increased on huge plantations, where slavery still persisted.

Freedom of trade and enterprise was enshrined in the constitution of 1824, and new consulates and diplomatic and trade missions were opened in Europe, South and North America in order to advance trade interests.

The Emperor himself annually approved the list of newly opened diplomatic missions and consulates. Brazil pursued a number of specific goals in relations with European countries: it was interested in the massive attraction of workers to agriculture and the emerging industry by encouraging immigration, in opening European markets for Brazilian goods, protecting national shipping, domestic and foreign trade, and developing its own commodity production.

In 1828, diplomatic relations were established between Russia and Brazil. Brazil became the first Latin American country to achieve diplomatic recognition from St. Petersburg, and the monarchist predilections of Emperor Nicholas I were fully manifested here. Franz Frantsevich Borel (1775 – 1832), one of the prominent experts in politics, economics and finance in the Portuguese-speaking world of the first third of the 19th century, was appointed as the first Russian envoy to Brazil.

Foreign policy was the instrument that helped Brazil to build national structures into the existing scheme of international relations in the early years of independence. The growth of trade improved the financial position of the country, strengthened its economy, and stimulated banking by the middle of the 19th century. Great Britain became the main trading partner

of Brazil. So, in 1842-1848 it accounted for 48% of Brazilian imports and 28% of exports. (Cervo A., Bueno C., 2008, p.55).

As the Brazilian state consolidated, its ruling elites became aware of the national interests of their country and the conditions for developing a new foreign policy were formed, and in 1844 the entire system of existing treaties with foreign states began to be revised in the direction of their greater attachment to national interests. In the middle of the XIX century Brazil signed new treaties with the USA (1850), with Paraguay (1850), with Peru (1851), with Argentina (1851), with Uruguay (1851), with Venezuela (1853), with New Granada (1853), with Ecuador (1853).

Brazil's foreign trade structure has changed. In 1821-1860 imports exceeded exports by 9-12% in value (excluding the value of imported black slaves from Africa), then in 1861-1890 exports already exceeded imports by 11-17%. Coffee began to enjoy stable demand in the markets of the USA and European countries. This product brought large profits on the foreign market, which opened up new opportunities for the development of industry, trade and transport.

In the last decade of the XIX century Brazil accounted for up to 2/3 of the world's coffee exports, and by the First World War coffee accounted for more than 60% of Brazil's foreign trade revenues.

Since 1868, Brazil began annually publishing the collections of official documents entitled "Information from the diplomatic missions and consulates of the Empire" with comprehensive data on the economy and foreign trade of the country.

The desire to increase export opportunities in every possible way and control the country's trade policy led to the fact that the promotion of immigration (especially after the final abolition

of slavery on May 13, 1888), the demarcation of borders and the protection of the national territory began to acquire an increasingly important character. The empire made great efforts to eliminate the threat to its territorial integrity and establish secure borders by concluding agreements with neighboring countries. But the tangled relationship in La Plata region stood in the way of a peaceful settlement of border issues.

In 1864, a war broke out between Paraguay, on the one hand, and Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay on the other, called the “War of the Triple Alliance” (1864-1870) – the bloodiest war of all that took place in the Western Hemisphere in the XIX century.

It makes sense to pay attention to the following circumstance. Despite the fact that Brazil, as part of the Triple Alliance troops, made a decisive contribution to the victory over Paraguay, the country was not at all proud of it. “There are victories that should not be celebrated,” said the Golden Chancellor of Brazil, Baron de Rio Branco. His words that “war is not the worthiest way out of the situation” became famous in the country, which decided to celebrate this victory at the state level only a century later, in 1970, when the emphasis was on the fact of “a century of peace, not a hundred years of war”.

The Tripartite Coalition was victorious, but the war led to an increase of economic and social problems, an opposition sentiment, and an intensification of the abolitionist movement. In 1888, an act on the abolition of slavery was proclaimed in the country, which led to a change in the alignment of class forces in the country and the strengthening of the position of the republicans. In 1889, the Brazilian emperor was removed from power and a republic was established in the country. Encyclopedically educated (knew nine languages!) Emperor Pedro II (1825 – 1891) went to live in Portugal.

Picture 2 – Emperor of Brazil Pedro II



Source: Delfim Joaquim Maria Martins da Câmara / Enciclopédia Itaú Cultural

The transition from a monarchy to a republic in Brazil was peaceful and fully fit into the paradigm of the “Luso-Brazilian culture of compromise,” which was mentioned above, although there were no objective prerequisites for this step, in the opinion of many experts. By that time, slavery had already been abolished in Brazil, there was a parliament and freedom of the press, and political parties began to operate.

The federal government in 1891 was copied by the Republicans from the US Constitution, and opened up never-seen-before possibilities for the former provinces (and now the states!) Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro. A neutral mediator in the person of the emperor no longer stood in the way of their political ambitions. As wrote S. Bouarqui,

“The country, which was on the verge of disintegration in 1840 (the year of the coronation of Pedro II), by 1889 demonstrated an enviable

territorial unity and national cohesion. In foreign policy, Don Pedro II adhered to a balanced neutrality, which earned him the respect of European and North American politicians," (Bouarqui, 2005).

And the famous American Brazilian scholar Thomas Skidmore added: "Don Pedro II was a symbol of national unity. But his most radical critics argued that the monarchy is not only an anachronism, but also an obstacle to progress, since the country, allegedly, no longer needed the services of a mediating force". (Skidmore T., 1998) Gilberto Freire was convinced that "if the emperor remained in power, he could better facilitate its entry into the primary processes of globalization." (Freyre, 1977).

After the establishment of the republic, contradictions between separate states and between representatives of oligarchic groups intensified, primarily between the coffee magnates of the central states – Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais and the cattle breeders of the south – Gausus. The country's unity was jeopardized.

The first consequence of the monarchy fall was so-called Federalist Revolution – a bloody civil war in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. The fall of the monarchy forced the Brazilians to forget for a while about the "culture of compromise". And foreign policy, carried out on behalf of the federation, became an important tool for maintaining the unity of the country and regulating the interests of various parties and oligarchic groups, which ensured the continuity and consistency of the foreign policy line.

Foreign policy ties of the "Tropical Giant" became more and more extensive. In 1891, Brazil had 9 general consulates of the first class (in Hamburg, New York, Buenos Aires, Antwerp, Paris, Liverpool, Geneva, Lisbon, Montevideo), 10 general consulates

of the 2nd class (in Trieste, Santa Cruz, Valparaiso, Copenhagen, Barcelona, Rotterdam, Asuncion, Iquitos, Geneva, Halifax), 24 consulates and 21 diplomatic missions around the world. Missions in Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Spain, Vatican, Mexico, Paraguay and Japan were added to the existing ones.

The main tasks of Brazil's foreign policy during the period of the empire, consisted in achieving the recognition of the country's independence and the development of diplomatic relations, consolidating the national space, ensuring the independence of foreign trade, were basically fulfilled. During this period, the principles of Brazilian foreign policy, based on the desire for the peaceful settlement of conflicts, non-conflict and respect for the norms of international law began to form.

The country entered the era of Brazil's "Golden Chancellor" – Baron de Rio Branco, who managed to solve peacefully all its territorial problems and lay the foundations of its independent foreign policy and diplomatic tradition for many years ahead.

"Ubique Patria Memor!" Baron of Rio Branco and the Formation of Brazil's Foreign Policy.

The task of consolidating the national space, effective developing the territory and resolving territorial disputes dominated in Brazil's foreign policy both during the imperial period and in the period of the First Republic (1891 – 1930). Over 80 years since Brazil's independence its foreign policy, as a whole, was determined, but the objectives had to be modernized by taking into account the changes in the country, in the region and in the world.

Brazil also had to form a modern diplomatic service as in the leading states of the world and to find the goal of its own existence and to develop a strategy corresponding to this goal.

This difficult task was taken on by José Maria da Silva Paranhos, Baron de Rio Branco (1845-1912), who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs under four presidents of the country: Rodriguez Alves (1902-1906), Afonso Penne (1906-1909), Nilo Pesagnier (1909-1910) and Hermese di Fonseca (1910-1914).

José Maria da Silva Paranhos, who earned the title of Baron de Rio Branco in the last years of imperial power, was born in 1845 in Rio de Janeiro in the family of a prominent figure of the Empire, Minister of Foreign Affairs, then Prime Minister, Viscount de Rio Branco. After graduating from the Law School of the University of Sao Paulo, he spent 20 years as Vice Consul in Liverpool before his star of distinguished diplomat and politician began to rise on the horizon.

The main merit of Rio Branco at the first stage of his activity (1893 – 1909) was the fact that he was able to peaceful resolutions of all Brazil's territorial disputes (and there were many of them!), through mediation, negotiations and arbitration, in order to give a final configuration to the borders of Brazil. Skillfully using all the available at that time means for the peaceful resolution of disputes, he ultimately managed to pacific joining to Brazil a territory almost equal to that of France. Baron became a symbol of Brazilian diplomacy, which it proudly carried through all periods of Brazilian history, despite the rather drastic changes in foreign policy throughout the twentieth century. (Pereira de Araujo, 1989).

Picture 3 – José Maria da Silva Paranhos, Baron de Rio Branco



Source: Unknown author - Revista Nossa História (Our History magazine), issue 25, 2005.

The republic inherited from the empire countless controversial issues about border territories, shipping, border trade, and so on. At the same time, internal troubles in the republican government made it possible for neighboring states to come up with territorial claims against Brazil.

In 1893, Baron de Rio Branco, having left the post of plenipotentiary representative for immigration in Paris, was forced to deal with the problem of the Misiones – territory-bordering Argentina. With the mediation of US President G. Cleveland, he managed to solve this problem successfully in favor of Brazil. The series of diplomatic successes continued in 1901 with the resolution of the territorial conflict with French Guiana through the mediation of the President of the Swiss Confederation.

Again, the referee's decision was in favor of Brazil. Monarchist "at heart", Baron receives the first honors from the republic: the title of Outstanding Brazilian, the rank of plenipotentiary minister and the post of envoy in a great power – the German Empire.

But the Outstanding Brazilian did not stay long at the court of William II. Already in 1902, he received from President Rodriguez Alves the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. His first important task in this position was a comprehensive reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He restored the old building of Baron de Itamaraty in Rio de Janeiro, built in 1853, adapted it to the needs of the ministry and increased significantly the salaries of its employees. Baron invited the people from the world of science, art and literature to work in the diplomatic department, and later they (Joaquim Nabuco, Domisio da Gama, Euclides da Cunha, and others) left a noticeable mark in the history of the foreign policy of their country.

The same year, he had to resolve a complex territorial problem in relations with Bolivia. The difficulty was that Bolivian President Pando unilaterally transferred the concession for the development of rubber in the Acre territory disputed with Brazil, to the Consortium American Syndicate. Baron's complicated task was to prevent the United States from intervening in the conflict on the side of Bolivia, which was already beginning to feel "just at home" in South America.

He began negotiations with Bolivia, having previously closed the navigation on the river Amazon, in order to prevent the American shareholders of the syndicate from entering the disputed territory. He also sent a letter to US Secretary of State Hay, where, referring to "Docrina Monroe" (!), justified the inadmissibility of an attempt to colonize the territory of the American state, attended by citizens of England, Germany and France.

Brazil demonstratively began the mobilization of Brazilian troops in the state of Mato Grosso bordering Bolivia. This was the only time when Baron decided to resort to the threat of force, solving territorial dispute. However, he did not intend to fight, but relied on negotiations. According to the Treaty of Petropolis (1903), Bolivia ceded the Acre territory to Brazil, having received a strategically important piece of territory from Brazil, which gave it access along rivers to the Atlantic Ocean. Bolivian Syndicate was forced to settle for a compensation of £ 110,000.

The diplomatic skill of Baron de Rio Branco was not to dramatize the agenda and patiently resolve conflicts and crises using a wide variety of diplomatic means. He aspired to see Brazil as a country “loyal to the signed agreements, zealously defending territorial integrity, calm and balanced, ready to compromise, without aggressive intentions or attempts to interfere in the affairs of neighboring states,”– as he noted in 1903 in the magazine of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry “Política estrangeira” (Foreign Policy).

By concluding a border treaty with Peru in 1909, Rio Branco put an end to Brazil’s long history of territorial disputes with its neighbors. Thanks to him, today’s Brazil does not have any territorial problems in its region, which is an exception against the background of all other states. In addition, until now, Rio Branco’s experience in the peaceful settlement of the country’s territorial problems has no equal in the world.

The enthusiastic Brazilians called their Baron “The God of Brazilian Borders” and “Brazilian Bismarck”, but they were unfaithful considering the way Bismarck expanded Germany’s borders. The fact remains: relying solely on the norms of international law, without firing a single shot, Baron de Rio Branco eventually managed to annex an area of almost 900,000 square

km to Brazil without violating the sovereignty of any of the neighboring countries.

Picture 4 – The old building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil (Itamaraty Palace) in Rio de Janeiro



Source: Photographer/Fulviusbsas, 2007.

However, it would be naive to consider the “Golden Chancellor” of Brazil an inveterate idealist. “Diplomacy, - he liked to say, -needs a strong navy to support it”. Baron understood that the United States’ambitions and other imperialist powers of that time would not be limited to the “Acre Affair”. In 1902 the fleets of Great Britain, Germany and Italy unleashed aggression against Venezuela. In 1909, Brazil was forced to intercede for Chile, which received an ultimatum from the United States for trying to restrict the rights of the American company “Alsop”.

Foreign Minister spearheaded extensive reform in the Brazilian army and navy, and in 1909 Brazil ordered from England two powerful dreadnoughts and several ships of other classes, thereby bringing its fleet to the level of major sea powers. (Мартынов, 2004). (Martynov, 2004).

“It doesn’t matter which port I take you to, it is important that it rescues you from the storm,” – this phrase of Baron Rio Branco, which has become popular in Brazil, explains a lot in his foreign policy strategy. Having resolved all territorial disputes with neighbors, he proceeds to implement his long-standing idea of creating a trade and defensive alliance between them. “Union ABC” (Argentina, Brazil, Chile) – the brainchild of the Golden Chancellor – is the forerunner of the current Mercosur.

The ABC treaty, unfortunately, did not come into legal force, to a large extent due to the death of Baron, which followed on February 10, 1912. Rio Branco did not live to see his nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize, initiated by the Brazilian parliamentarians. (Мартынов, 2004). (Martynov, 2004).

Under Baron Rio Branco, Brazil for the first time managed to powerfully assert itself in the great world politics. This happened at the 2nd Hague Peace Conference in 1907, where Brazil was represented by the friend and colleague of Baron, diplomat and prominent politician Ruy Barbosa de Oliveira (1849 – 1923).

The conference, which was attended by 44 states, and 18 of them were Latin American, opened up opportunities for consolidating Brazil’s leadership in the region. The aim of the conference was to find mechanisms for the preservation of peace and the peaceful resolution of international conflicts with an emphasis on international law. At this truly worldwide conference, which, like the first one, was convened on the initiative of Nicholas II, Ruy Barbosa raised a number of important issues.

Among them – the debate on the Drago doctrine⁴, problems of international maritime law and norms of international humanitarian law which should be applied during hostilities.

The most dramatic, however, was the question of the composition of the International Arbitration Court. The Brazilian delegate rejected the principle of its formation according to the method of dividing all countries into more or less “great” ones, according to their military potential, proposed by the United States and Germany. “You cannot inspire the peoples that the greatness of a country is measured by the strength of arms and the state of its armed forces,” – said R. Barbosa to the applause of the audience and introduced his own project based on the principle of sovereign equality, which was immediately joined by all Latin American states, small states of Europe, China, Siam and Persia. (Obras completas de Rui Barbosa, 2007).

This project proposed the creation of a structure with broader credentials, a kind of supranational legal body for resolving conflicts between states, which could be seen as a forerunner of the subsequent League of the Nations and the UN. (Celso A., 2007).

Of all the so-called “great powers” of that time, the Brazilian project was supported only by the representative of Russia – A.I. Nelidov. As for other Latin American republics, then, according to the report of the Russian envoy to Rio de Janeiro M.E. Prozor, their delegations “first received instructions to coordinate their actions with the point of view of the United States, and then new

4 “The Drago Doctrine” - formulated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina L.-M. Drago in 1902. It provided for the refusal to collect debts by force and compensate for the damage caused.


instructions – to act in concert with Brazil, which took upon itself the protection of common interests”.

The 2nd Hague Conference was the first major international forum where Latin American countries, led by Brazil, joined forces to oppose Washington. It was the first conference to show signs of the collective diplomacy of developing countries that became a characteristic feature of later times. As later noted, Baron Rio Branco,

It was not immodesty that was the reason that at this international forum we came out in defense of the peoples of our continent and even those European states that cannot compete in strength with the great world powers. The reason was our constant adherence to the principles of justice, on which relations between states should be based. (Obras do Barao do Rio Branco, t. IX, 1947)

The 2nd Hague Conference for the first time exposed before the Latin American states the duplicity and hypocrisy of Washington, whose representative at the 3rd Pan American Conference in Rio de Janeiro, E. Ruth, promised to support Latin Americans in Hague, but went over to the camp of the great powers of Europe, as soon as he was promoted to a similar status.

Picture 5 – Ruy Barbosa de Oliveira



Source: Fitz Gerald, 1919.

The 2nd Hague Conference has clearly shown that the so-called “Pan-Americanism” of Rio Branco was in fact the means chosen by Rio Branco, to gain time and build up energy. Baron was determined to complete the reform of the army and navy and create an alliance ABC for collective defense against aggression, wherever it came.

Rio Branco characterized the international system of that period as interaction between states that seek to realize their pragmatic interests through competition and cooperation. At the same time, all the “great powers”, including the United States, in his understanding appeared as “huge and destructive units”. Possessing imperialist tendencies, according to Baron, they become a deeply conflicting force in world politics. All these

definitions were made by the Great Diplomat of Brazil shortly before the First World War. (Alves P., Celso A., 2012).

The minister understood that Brazil must be prepared for any threat to its rights and interests, not only from neighboring states, but also from outside the South American region. Having a complete understanding of the policies of the imperialist powers in Africa and Asia, he feared that Brazil, with its vast natural resources and sparsely populated areas, might attract their attention as an “easy prey”.

As foreign minister, he witnessed the US policy of dismembering Colombia and creating a new state – Panama (1903), with the sole purpose of acquiring the rights to build an interoceanic canal.

(...) When the great powers of Europe have no land left (...) for colonization in Africa and Australia, - Baron wrote, - then they will have to turn their eyes to the countries of Latin America, devastated by civil wars. And then turning to the so-called Monroe Doctrine will hardly help us, since (...) the United States itself will continue its imperialist policy, securing the right to expropriate the weaker nations by the strongone. (Obras do Barao do Rio Branco, tomo IX, p.27).

By the early twentieth century, there had been an inevitable reorientation of Brazil's foreign trade toward the United States. By 1912, 36% of Brazilian coffee was sent there, while only 15% were sent to Great Britain and its colonies. Brazil should be considered with the growing influence of the United States in South America, and therefore opened its first embassy in Washington in 1907. Earlier, in February 1904, Brazil recognized the Republic

of Panama, which was separated from Colombia with active support from Washington.

Paying tribute to “Pan-Americanism” in words, Baron did not think easily to “cave in” to the US foreign policy guidelines. It should be noted that Brazil, Argentina and Chile (countries ABC + Mexico) recognized Panama as the last, four months after its recognition by the first country – Nicaragua, when the formation of this new state had already become *a fait accompli* (an accomplished fact). On December 5, 1905, US President Theodore Roosevelt announced the US adherence to the Monroe Doctrine, drawing from it his own “conclusion” that the US now has the “right” to interfere in the affairs of Latin American republics under the pretext of their “poor governance”.

At the IV Pan American Conference in Buenos Aires (1910), Brazil actually thwarted the American initiative to recognize officially the Monroe Doctrine as a “factor of peace in the Americas”. Rio Branco insisted on the mandatory collective recognition of this doctrine *by all, without exception, participants in the Pan American system, which was deliberately ruled out*. The US was forced to withdraw its proposal without even putting it to a vote.

In all ten years of his tenure as foreign minister, Rio Branco has never paid a visit to Washington, despite repeated invitations. Under Rio Branco, Brazil’s foreign policy gradually began to take on the features of an emerging new great power. At the 3rd Latin American Scientific Congress, held in Rio de Janeiro in August 1905, he announced the goal of his foreign policy strategy: Brazil, and possibly some other leading Latin American countries, would receive a status similar to that of great powers. At the same time, Baron outlined the need to create a special body for the collective security of the region, since others, perhaps, have the wrong idea about its insufficient development.

In 1908, the Export Development Commission was established in Brazil, at the initiative of Baron, which main purpose was to maximize export earnings and massively attract immigrants from Europe in order to neutralize the growing unilateral dependence on the United States.

During the period from 1905 to 1911, Brazil opened 13 new diplomatic missions and 25 new consulates in the countries of America, Asia and Europe and increased the status of existing ones. Brazilian consulates appear in Sydney, Curacao, Colombo, Beijing, Shanghai, Singapore, Monaco and Dakar. New diplomatic missions were opened in Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Panama, Costa Rica, Cuba, Panama, Constantinople and Cairo. Over the 10 years of the Golden Chancellor's tenure as minister, Brazil has signed agreements on compulsory arbitration with 31 states, which has raised the international prestige of a country that sets an example in resolving international conflicts.

Brazil's creditworthiness, thanks to the punctual repayment of loans and servicing external debt, increased significantly, and after 1904, European creditors no longer viewed it as an underdeveloped country. The development of ports, the rapid growth of railways contributed to its accelerated economic integration. The export - oriented economy of Brazil developed at a high rate. The expansion of foreign trade and the growth of foreign investments led to an increase in sales of the main export crop - coffee, which required tariff protection, to the development of railways and ports. In 1914 Brazil accounted for 19.2% of all foreign investment in Latin America (Argentina - 40%, Mexico - 13.3%).

Since 1903, it has become a practice in Brazil to publish annual reports of the Foreign Ministry, which, under Baron Rio

Branco, has become an influential and dynamic structure leading in the development and implementation of foreign policy.

All these years, Brazil has actively participated in the work of Inter-American and world conferences (III Pan American Conference in Rio de Janeiro, II Hague Peace Conference, IV International Conference on International Law in Brussels). It acceded to the Red Cross Convention (Washington, 1908), the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva, 1906), and the Universal Postal Services Convention (Rome, 1906). The Hague Convention of June 29, 1898 for the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflicts was ratified by the Brazilian government on May 28, 1907, and the conventions on humanitarian law adopted at the 2nd Hague Peace Conference (1907) were approved on December 31, 1910.

In 1889, Brazil took part in the World Exhibition in Paris under the characteristic motto: New Latin Nation of the New World. During the period that was called “diplomacia a la Belle Époque” (“Belle Epoque diplomacy”) Brazil really reached such heights that were able to ensure its foreign policy continuity, despite the negative changes that followed soon. As wrote R. Ricupero,

Thanks to Rio Branco and other diplomats of his school, the idea of a country that is satisfied with its territorial status, is committed to the rule of law and seeks to recognize itself as a constructive mediating force in building a more democratic and an egalitarian, peaceful and balanced international system. (Ricupero, 2017).

The main direction of Brazil's foreign policy strategy under Baron Rio Branco, which was determined immediately after he had completed the settlement of territorial disputes of his country, was the achievement of national greatness, but not through wars and provoking international conflicts, but through the comprehensive development of the country, relying on cooperation with neighbors in the region. Today we would call it the "strategy of peaceful ascent".

"Ubique Patria memor!" – "Everywhere remember the Motherland!" – this Latin motto became a guiding line for Baron Rio Branco, who, for the sake of his fatherland's benefit, was more than once ready to make difficult compromises. However, this is precisely why he entered the history of his country as the Golden Chancellor. "The entire foreign policy of the Brazilian republic, from its origins to the present day, can be divided into three periods: before, during and after the tenure of the foreign minister of Baron de Rio Branco," – wrote the Brazilian historian Eliu Vianna. "His influence, together with some elements of the imperial cultural heritage, became the basis of the peaceful tradition of Itamaraty, a ministry that is designed to guard the territorial and moral integrity of Brazilian society". (Vianna, 1961, p.134-135)

The Foreign policy of the "First Republic" (1912-1930).

"The republic is aging, and its foreign policy is becoming mediocre" – this is how Rubens Ricupero characterized the period of country's development after the death of Baron Rio Branco. This period was marked by the rapprochement of Brazil with the United States, the slowdown of integration processes in the South American political and economic space, the

participation of Brazil in the First World War and later in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the uprising of the “tenentists” and the emergence of the charismatic leader of the “new wave” on the Brazilian political scene- Getulio Dornelles Vargas (1882 – 1954).

The mine, laid in the foundation of the Brazilian state after the change of the monarchical form to the republican, immediately began the countdown of the existence of the “First” or as it was also called – the “Oligarchic” republic. It was very far from true democracy in Brazil. The post of president of the republic was divided by alternating power oligarchs of two largest and richest “coffee” states: Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais. The lesser oligarchs were content with almost absolute power in the remaining 18 states, and the people were concerned about their daily bread, casually voting for the next usual candidate nominated by the oligarchy. (Ricupero, 2017).

Impressive from the front, Brazil – a sovereign and in the recent pasta very influential state, de facto eked out an unenviable existence. If there wasn’t Rio Branco in Brazil, a foreign minister who could behave as if his country really was a “great power”, then, one could draw a parallel between Brazil and the then China, which became a victim of blatant imperialist aggression.

After the “Outstanding Brazilian” left the political scene, foreign policy ceased to occupy a leading place in the minds of the country’s political and economic elites. Now they were more interested in internal affairs, specifically – the division of power between the states and the federal center and access to material benefits. During the life of Rio Branco, whose popularity among the people literally “went off scale”, and the authority and charisma were several times higher than the authority of

the presidents who replaced him, it was dangerous to ignore his opinion. After his sudden death, right at the workplace in the Itamaraty Palace, Brazil perhaps has persisted only coffee of the national treasure.

Coffee accounted for an average of 60% of all export earnings. The coffee industry laid the foundations for the industry, provided the currency needed for import purchases and servicing external debt. It attracted immigrants from European and Asian countries⁵ to its large cities and guaranteed a free life for local elites who sought to copy the inhabitants of Buenos Aires, which was then referred as South American Paris.

However, it would be wrong to think of the federal government as a “coffee plantation club”. Like any central government, it claimed, at least in words, to the role of “spokesman for national interests”. The rulers of Brazil, who seemed to be dependent on the production and sale of coffee, did not always come out in his defense. Brazilian historian Boris Fausto cites the example of three presidents – natives of the state of Sao Paulo: Campos Salles (1898-1902), Rodrigues Alves (1902-1906) and Washington Luis (1926-1930), who not only did not patronize the coffee business, but sometimes even clashed with it.

What was the explanation for such a strange, at first glance, behavior? And the fact that “national interests” (in the form, of course, as these presidents imagined them) were in the field of

5 From 1887 to 1930 approximately 3.8 million people entered Brazil. The peak was in 1887-1914. The largest group were Italians (35.5%), followed by the Portuguese (29%) and Spaniards (14.6%). There was a very high percentage of Japanese, who settled in the state of São Paulo. Other small but qualitatively important groups were Syrians, Lebanese and Jews. The First World War significantly reduced the influx of immigrants. After it, there will be a new wave of immigration, which will last until 1930.

stabilizing the financial system and concluding agreements with foreign creditors, in particular, with the Rothschilds, the main financial counterparties of Brazil abroad.

The country, which readily surrendered itself to external control, could not fully defend its economic interests. Baron Rio Branco understood this. His successor in the highest diplomatic post, Lauro Mueller, whose friendship with the United States reached, at times, “extreme values”, did his first official visit to Washington. Within a month, he traveled all over the country from New York to San Francisco and returned to Brazil aboard an American battleship.

After the US invasion of Mexico in 1914 and the severing of diplomatic relations between two countries, Brazil readily volunteered to represent US interests in Mexico. The country enthusiastically accepted the proposal of US President W. Wilson to sign the Pan-American Treaty on Solidarity and the Protection of the Territory of the Continent’s Countries (December 1914), and in May 1915 took part in the 1-st Pan-American Financial Conference, where US financial dominance was consolidated in Latin America.

“In the field of foreign policy, - noted the Russian envoy to Rio de Janeiro Maksimov, - a significant change has taken place for Brazil, and it is far from being for the better. Three years ago, it could still be considered as occupying a leading position among the South American republics, but since then its star has faded”. (Мартынов, 2004). (Martynov, 2004).

At the head of Itamaraty (1912-1917), Lauro Mueller adopted a New Code of Laws, Decrees and Decisions concerning the Brazilian Diplomatic and Consular Corps and issued an order on the activities of the Secretariat of State. The tasks for embassies, missions, consulates and their classes were defined

in this code of laws. These tasks were supposed to serve the purposes of expanding foreign trade. (Castro, 1983)

Brazil's entry into World War I on the side of the United States represented the culmination of cooperation between Washington and Rio de Janeiro. This step, taken formally in response to the sinking of the Brazilian commercial and passenger ship *Parana* by a German submarine, for a time made one forget about Rio Branco's plans to consolidate the South American political space and create the Union of ABC.⁶ Before that, however, the idea of the "Golden Chancellor" had time to sprout.

As a result of mediation, successfully carried out by ABC countries in Niagara Falls in May – June 1914, an agreement was reached, according to which the United States abandoned the impending new intervention in Mexico. The collective authority of three most influential South American countries was enough to prevent another aggression from the north. Examples of such mediation have since been repeatedly traced in the foreign policy of Latin American countries and Brazil in the 1930's.

Unfortunately, ABC did not last long. In April 1917, Brazil, with a population of over 30 million, broke off trade and diplomatic relations with Germany. The country abolished all neutrality decrees and entered World War I. 46 German ships stationed in Brazilian ports were confiscated by the government and attached to the Brazilian fleet. Argentina and Chile remained neutral at the same time, which put an end to their short-term alliance.

6 The ABC agreement was signed after the death of Baron de Rio Branco in Buenos Aires in May 1915. It limited itself to the creation of a general arbitration commission to resolve disputes between its participants - Argentina, Brazil and Chile. At the same time, there was no talk of creating a defensive alliance. The treaty was only ratified by Brazil.

The United States in cooperation with Brazil tried to mobilize other Latin American countries to oppose Germany, but met with strong opposition from Argentina and Mexico. Brazil's example was followed only by small Caribbean and Central American states, where US influence reached absolute values: Haiti, Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, Nicaragua and Panama

The famous Brazilian political and public figure Ruy Barbosa de Oliveira, who gained fame as the "Eagle of The Hague", justified Brazil's entry into the war as an absolutely independent act associated with the robbery sinking of a Brazilian ship. However, even though the sinking of a ship of a neutral country in neutral waters was, of course, an "act of robbery", Brazil's unilateral dependence on the United States, its main investor and trading partner, left no doubt by that time.

In 1917-1918 Brazil participated in operations to counter German submarines in the South Atlantic. Towards the end of hostilities in Europe, the ships of the Brazilian Navy appeared in the Mediterranean Sea, having received a good opportunity to demonstrate the flag far from their waters. After the conclusion of the armistice and the end of the World War I, Brazil took part in the Paris Peace Conference and in the signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty⁷. The United States opposed the appointment of Ruy Barbosa as head of the Brazilian delegation to the Paris conference, fearing his anti-imperialist sentiments. In turn, the

⁷From Latin American countries, the Versailles Peace Treaty was signed by Brazil, Bolivia, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. Ecuador signed it, but did not ratify it.

“Eagle of the Hague” refused to lead the Brazilian representation in the League of Nations.

The World War I disrupted Brazil’s established trade ties with Europe, which led to a decline in foreign investment, a decrease in demand for coffee and traditional exports. Along with this, in connection with the growing needs of the belligerent powers for food, the country’s meat-processing industry began rapidly to grow. Accordingly, the influence of the southern states began to increase in economic and political life: Rio Grande do Sul, Parana and Santa Catarina – producers of beef and wheat. The coffee oligarchy, however, still firmly held state power in its hands and was interested in maintaining consistently high coffee prices and opening up new markets.

However, at the beginning of the 1920s, there was talk about the need for a transition to a “coffee and bread” republic. Brazilian trade missions appear in Cape Town, Bombay, Vladivostok, Thessaloniki, Dakar and Kolkata, as well as in the Middle East. The country pays more attention to promoting its products abroad and regularly publishes newsletters on the financial and economic situation.

The new Foreign Minister Nilo Pesanya, who replaced L. Mueller in 1918, ordered to the Brazilian consulates abroad:

1. To disseminate information in several languages about the wealth of the country, the possibilities of investing in the steel and meat-processing industry, in the extraction of mineral raw materials and in agriculture;
2. To publish regular newsletters in French and Portuguese about Brazilian products and regularly showcase the country’s products at exhibitions, consulates and embassies. (Castro, 1983).

The Brazilian Foreign Ministry has begun preparing annual trade surveys containing data on the production and sale of cocoa, cotton and rubber. Together with the Institute of Coffee (Sao Paulo) and the State Bank of Sao Paulo, diplomats began to study the issue of promoting coffee on the world market. Later, in 1931, an international conference on coffee was organized in Sao Paulo, where was adopted a program to protect the culture of coffee and improve the conditions for its sale. The Department of Statistics has switched to the regular preparation of reports on the population and number of immigrants arriving in Brazil, on the state of its foreign trade, shipping, banking and financial activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Itamaraty began to work closely with the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Trade and prepare detailed instructions for immigrants in Brazilian consulates. The task of expanding the reception of immigrants required the solution of a host of additional problems: vaccination, preparation of lists, taking care of the transportation of sick passengers, etc. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs regularly prepared instructions for consulates on working with immigrants.

By that time, in addition to the embassy in the United States, Brazil had opened embassies in France, Italy, England, Portugal and under the Holy See.

The centenary of Brazil's independence was widely celebrated in 1922. A number of continental meetings and conferences were held in the country in order to mark this date:

- American Conference on the Study of Leprosy (26.06.1922),
- XX International Congress of Americanists (20.09.1922),


- The Second International Congress for the Study of Fever (27.09.1922),
- The Second Congress on the Construction of Railways in South America (19.10.1921),
- •The Second American Congress on Economic and Trade Development (12-20.10.1922),
- Conference of Cotton Producers (15-18.10.1922),
- The Third American Congress on the problems of the child (27.08 -5.09.1922)
- Latin American Athletics Games, held at the invitation of the Brazilian Sports Confederation (30.09.1922)
- International Industrial Exhibition to commemorate the 100th anniversary of Brazilian independence.
- On September 7, 1922, the American History Congress was held and the book “Brazil: The First Century” (“Brasil en su Primer Centenario”) was published.

Brazil’s goal in the League of Nations, as the largest in territory and the only Latin American country that took a direct part in the war on the side of the Allies, was to obtain a permanent seat on its Council. The main “promoter” of this idea was a follower of Baron Rio Branco, ambassador to Argentina, the USA and Great Britain, then – Minister of Foreign Affairs (1918 – 1919) Domicio da Gama (1861 – 1925). He bequeathed to his comrades-in-arms in Itamaraty “never to act in foreign policy from a position of weakness”. He tried to implement his truth, sometimes even in spite of the prevailing situation, in all the diplomatic posts that he happened to hold. Domicio da Gama noted that the main obstacle to Brazil’s obtaining the desired status in

the Council of the League was the “indifference and arrogance” of the British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon.

Following Britain, other European states also did not support the candidacy of Brazil, which considered it a disregard for its interests and the interests of Latin American states. Latin Americans, joining the League, initially sought to see in it a means that could strengthen their positions in dialogue with the United States, help them resolve their territorial disputes and diversify their foreign policy and trade ties outside the Western Hemisphere. (Brazilian Diplomatic Thought, Vol.2, 2017).

Picture 6 – Domicio da Gama



Source: George Grantham Bain Collection (Library of Congress), publisher.
D. Da Gama [between ca. 1910 and ca. 1915].

However, the Bureau for Relations with Latin America, established by the League of Nations, had a purely formal nature and did not meet the needs of the countries of the region. Despite the wishes that periodically appeared in the documents of the League to expand the representation of Latin American countries in Secretariat, the main posts in it and in the Council of the League were still distributed among representatives of the great powers. This fact sharply reduced the interest of Latin Americans in the work of this organization.

In 1923, at the IV Assembly of the League of Nations, the Brazilian delegation was led by the experienced diplomat Afranio de Melo Franco (1870-1943)⁸ as special representative. Soon he was appointed ambassador and permanent head of the Brazilian delegation to the League. During his tenure in this post, the Brazilian diplomat had the opportunity to preside twice over the Council of the League of Nations. The most significant result of Brazil's presence in it was the Geneva Protocol approval on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes at V Assembly in 1924.

Brazil's goal of securing a permanent seat on the League Council has never been achieved. For two years, A. de Melo Franco unsuccessfully tried to convince the Europeans of the

8 Afranio de Melo Franco was born in the state of Minas Gerais. After graduating from law school in São Paulo, he worked in the legislative assembly of the republic. He made his first steps in the diplomatic field back in 1917. In 1923, he headed the Brazilian delegation to the V Inter-American Conference in Santiago, and in the same year was appointed as Brazil's representative to the League of Nations. After his appointment as foreign minister in 1930, A. de Melo Franco carried out a serious personnel reform in Itamaraty, introducing the principle of compulsory rotation of diplomats in foreign posts and in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and free movement between diplomatic and consular posts.

justice of the Brazilian demand, accusing them of being interested in the problems of the Old World and showing complete indifference to America's problems,

The "moment of truth" was the question of Germany's entry into the League of Nations and its reintegration into the political life of Europe with the place of a permanent member of the Council. Afranio de Melo Franco understood the importance of such step in stabilizing the situation in Europe, but the President of the country, Arthur Bernardes, believed that Brazil would lose international prestige if allows Germany to become a permanent member of the Council. The President instructed the Brazilian delegation to exercise veto on this issue.

Melo Franco made significant efforts to solve the German problem during the discussions in the League, while trying to convince the President that veto would be a fatal mistake. "As supporters of arbitration, we will drop out of the system of pacts, concluded in Locarno, and will take on an enormous responsibility to abolish treaties concerning politics and peace in Europe," – the diplomat wrote. The President, however, insisted on his own decision, which led to increased European hostility towards Brazil.


Opposing Germany's candidacy, Brazil prepared a note criticizing the League of Nations and its activities, and in July 1926 announced its withdrawal from the League. In September 1926, at the VII session of the Assembly of the League, Germany's accession was approved⁹.

In addition to the indifference of the European powers concerning Latin American countries participation in the activities

9 De facto Brazil will leave the League of Nations in 1928. Germany will withdraw from it in 1933 after the National Socialists came to power.

of the League was their intraregional rivalry. The league was not interested in unraveling the endless territorial claims of Latin American countries against each other (which the United States took upon itself in the Pan –American system). So, the attempts of Brazil, which was repeatedly elected as a non-permanent member of the League Council to represent the entire American continent, have invariably failed by Argentina and other states of the region.

Picture 7 – Afranio de Melo Franco



Source: Author/Photographer – unknown. Galeria de ministros das Relações Exteriores do Brasil.

The political gap between Europe and America has led Brazil to understand the need to redouble efforts to ensure Pan-American solidarity and prevent European interference in the affairs of the American continent. The Itamaraty Report, prepared in 1927, noted the fact of increasing isolation of Brazil in

South America, and the task was to bring it closer to the countries of the region.

The same year, the final demarcation of the borders with Paraguay, Argentina and Bolivia was carried out. At the VI Inter-American Conference (Havana, 1928), where the principle of non-interference was discussed, there were adopted a number of conventions with the support of Brazil, including the Bustamante Code of International Private Law.

Meanwhile, there were serious shifts in Inter-American relations, and Washington's influence in the countries to the south of the Rio Grande had become undeniable. In 1929, USA accounted for 34% of exports and 39% of imports of the region, while the share of Great Britain was only 19% and 15%, respectively.

However, the growing economic dependence was paradoxically combined with the desire of Latin American countries to obtain from the United States legal recognition of the principle of non-interference into their internal affairs.

In 1923, at the V Inter-American Conference in Santiago de Chile, Brazil was the first to sign the Treaty on the Prevention of Conflicts between American States (or the "Treaty of Gondra", after the name of the Paraguayan Foreign Minister, who initiated it). It provided for the creation of a system of Inter-American arbitration separate from the League of Nations and created certain legal barriers to US intervention.

On the other hand, it responded to Washington's desire to remove the League from participation in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. The same year, the "Declaration of Principles of Foreign Policy towards Neighboring Countries" declared the main goal of Brazil - to live in peace with all peoples, which was a reflection of the Brazilian people ideals, their traditions and

the spirit of its constitution, which defines the country's foreign policy as an aspiration to the world.

At the VI Pan-American Conference (Havana, 1928), where the principle of non-intervention was discussed, the project of US Secretary of State Charles Hughes on the so-called "interposition", which de facto legitimized the principle of intervention, was rejected with the support of Brazil.

At the same place, Afranio de Melo Franco made a proposal to condemn aggression, to outlaw crimes against humanity and to accept by all American countries (including the United States) the obligation of arbitration to resolve contradictions by legal means. In 1929, at the Conference on Arbitration and the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Washington, Brazil signed the General Convention on Settlement, the General Treaty on Inter-American Arbitration, and the Protocol on Progressive Arbitration.

Closely observing everything that happened in Europe and in the world as a whole, Brazil, together with the United States and other Latin American countries, joined the Briand-Kellogg Pact signed in Paris on August 27, 1928 (Treaty on the renunciation of war as a means of national policy). The pact entered into force on July 24, 1929, and by the end of 1938, 63 states (almost all countries that existed at that time), had joined it. In a circular issued by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry on this occasion (March 18, 1929), it was said about the "naturalness" of its relations with the United States, which since the days of the Monroe Doctrine have been characterized by complete solidarity and coincidence of our positions. Claiming that this solidarity forms the basis of the country's diplomatic tradition, Itamaraty spoke out against the "anti-American tendencies" emerged at the Havana Conference in 1928.

The republican system did not become the key to the successful development of Brazil. At that historical moment one could notice that the dichotomy that existed between the “form” of Brazil (continental scale, demography, natural resources, etc.) and its “content” (technological backwardness, underdevelopment, poverty), did not disappear since the time of Rio Branco, but sometimes only intensified. Brazil’s interests may have been global, but the means to achieve them were extremely limited. And the arguments about equality of everybody before the law were enough to participate in the debates of the League of Nations, but arguments were not enough to take the place of a permanent member on its Council”.

During that difficult period, Brazilian diplomats of the Rio Branco school, such as Domisio da Gama, Afranio de Melo Franco, Gastao da Cunha and others, often had to make great efforts to prevent the presidents, appointed by the oligarchs or some of their chosen ones, forget about the national interests of Brazil.

Chapter 2

THE LIMITS OF “GREATNESS” AND THE EDGE OF DESPAIR. FOREIGN POLICY OF GETULIO VARGAS (1930-1954)

Getulio Vargas. The End of the “Oligarchic Republic”.

The global economic crisis had severe consequences for Brazil, whose economy continued to be heavily dependent on coffee exports. The level of industrial production in 1930 fell by 28% in comparison with 1929. Brazil's foreign exchange reserves were reduced by half, and by the end of 1931 fell to zero. The national debt at that time amounted to \$237 million. The country was de facto bankrupt. A further drop in exports and a decrease in imports led to a deterioration in the socio-economic situation and an aggravation of the political crisis in the country. (Lira, 2013).

Against this background, there was a natural weakening of the ruling coffee oligarchy of the states of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais and the strengthening of the collective position of other states. The governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul Getulio

Dornelles Vargas (1882 - 1954), whose controversial figure still arouses heightened interest and heated political disputes, was able to take full advantage of this situation.

Picture 8 - Brazilian President Getulio Vargas (1930-1945, 1951-1954)



Source: Author/Photographer - unknown (official photo from the Presidency) - Galeria de ministros das Relações Exteriores do Brasil, 1930.

The stagnation in the political life of the “First Republic”, associated with the alternation of coffee oligarchs in power, was sharply disrupted by the revolutionary action of the young military – “tenentists”¹⁰ in Rio de Janeiro on July 5, 1922. The uprising was suppressed, but it proved that changes in the largest Latin American country became inevitable.

Getulio Vargas possessed remarkable political talent and great personal ambitions. A master of political intrigue and

10 From the port. “Tenenti” - lieutenant

a supporter of a reasonable compromise, an innovator who rejected the revolutionary path of development, he saw himself at the head of a strong, independent, industrially developed state with undeniable influence in the region and in the world.

To do this, he needed to put an end to the excessive autonomy of the states, which threatened the collapse of the country, and to begin its accelerated modernization based on the heavy industry. At the same time, Vargas did not consider democracy a guarantee of development. He believed that before democracy could be established, a united and strong state should be created in Brazil by authoritarian methods of government. At the same time, in his opinion, it was necessary to prepare the people for the adoption of democratic institutions. In foreign policy, Baron Rio Branco served as the ideal for Getulio Vargas. Following the “Outstanding Brazilian”, he also believed that in order to be successful, diplomatic skills must rely on the economic and military power of the state.

In 1930, a revolution took place in Brazil, and representatives of the Liberal Alliance headed by J. Vargas came to power. The “First”, “Oligarchic” republic has come to an end. After becoming the interim (pending the constitutional reform and subsequent elections) president of the country, Getulio Vargas immediately faced opposition of liberal circles, that demanded immediate democratization, and part of the military who insisted on extending the dictatorship, and communists ready to commit a socialist revolution. After Hitler came to power in Germany, “own” Nazis appeared in Brazil, united in the Brazilian Integralist Action (AIB), party led by journalist Plinio Salgado. The AIB Manifesto (October 1932) proclaimed the motto: “God, Fatherland and Family” and proposed the development of “a truly Brazilian state”, without the influence of the ideas of

communism or liberalism. The Integralists enjoyed broad support from the German and Italian embassies. (Lira, 2013).

On July 14, 1934, the Assembly promulgated the new constitution of Brazil, which proclaimed a federal republic. The country returned to a democratic form of government. The Constituent Assembly, through indirect elections, elected Getulio Vargas to the presidency, giving him a term of office until May 3, 1938. Thereafter, the election of the highest official in the country was to be carried out by direct vote.

However, in November 1935, Brazil faced an attempted communist insurgency led by agents of the COMINTERN. Although the rebellion was quickly suppressed, it had serious consequences. The threat of new conspiracies on the part of the communists, as well as the supporters of the AIB, whose influence in the country increased after the suppression of the communist demonstrations, forced J. Vargas to abolish all democratic norms and proclaim in November 1937 the “New State” on a corporate basis, like the one that was created in 1934 in Portugal by the dictator Antonio Salazar.

The New State’s constitution transferred all-natural resources to the nation’s ownership and enshrined the provision that only the banks and insurance companies with Brazilian shareholders could function in the country. The federal government received the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the states, not only in the event of a foreign invasion, but also to restore disturbed public order. Strikes and lockouts were declared antisocial actions, dangerous to labor and capital.

On May 10, 1938, in the country was made an attempt to seize power by “greenshirts” - integralists, supporters of the Brazilian “Führer” Plinio Salgado. The uprising was quickly suppressed, but the very fact of the attempted coup allowed J.

Vargas to put an end to the creeping penetration of AIB supporters into the power structures and eliminate the “fifth column” of the Nazis in three southern states - Parana, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul. The German ambassador, convicted of having links with the conspirators, was declared “Persona non grata” and expelled from the country.

In a short period, J. Vargas managed to get rid of the threat to his power both from the “left” and “from the right,” and walked between Scyloa and Charybdis of left and right extremism. Now, having received dictatorial powers in his hands for an unlimited period, he could finally begin to implement his national reformist policy. It should be noted that in 1935-1938, as a result of the decisive suppression of both “left” and “right” threats, Getulio Vargas managed to keep Brazil Brazilian, not allowing it to become either a pale copy of the USSR or a satellite of Nazi Germany.

The core of J. Vargas’s reforms was the development of national production. The country nationalized many foreign campaigns in strategically important sectors of the economy. His policies stimulated the development of import-substituting industrialization and the creation of a large state-capitalist sector of the economy. By that time, a number of new trade agreements were signed: with England, the Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Iceland, Canada, Mexico, Romania, Hungary, Norway.

Relations with Germany were restored very quickly, and soon Brazil received a new ambassador from Berlin. Since 1934 Germany has become one of Brazil’s largest trading partners. In 1936, a trade agreement was signed, which led to a significant increase in bilateral trade. The Nazi Reich became the main

buyer of Brazilian cotton and rubber and the second largest market for its main commodity, coffee.

By offering industrial goods, equipment for railways and power plants, Berlin was broadly in line with the goal of industrializing Brazil and diversifying its exports.

Table 1 - German and US trade with Brazil

Import (in %)		
	1933 r	1938 r.
Germany	11,93	024,99
USA	21,18	24,21
Export (in %)		
Germany	8,12	19,06
USA	46,71	34,32

Source: Hilton S., 1977.

So, in terms of exports, German purchases of Brazilian products more than doubled, while shipments to the United States fell. German influence in Brazil grew despite the Reich's support for the "Integral" conspiracy, and this could not but worry the United States. In March 1938, the Brazilian military for the first time signed a contract with the Krupp firm for the supply of artillery weapons and an agreement with Italy for the construction of submarines.

In the first years after the creation of the "New State" the nationalist policy of J. Vargas was characterized by the logic of pragmatism and equidistance from the United States and Germany. The goal was to obtain the maximum economic benefit from the diplomatic game against these two centers of power. In January 1940, Getulio Vargas approved an ambitious five-year economic development plan. Ferrous metallurgy was to become

the basis of industrialization. The leading US steel corporation, United States Steel, initially refused to participate in Vargas's ambitious plans.

Then the Brazilian Ambassador to Washington, in a conversation with the Undersecretary of State S. Welles, "accidentally" mentioned that if the United States did not help in the construction of the Volta Redonda metallurgical plant, then Brazil could turn to Krupp for help.

On April 11, 1940, S. Welles called on "United States Steel" to reconsider its earlier decision, and soon the US Federal Treasury agreed to allocate \$ 10 million to Brazil for the construction of a metallurgical plant, promising to open additional credit lines. The final agreement between the United States and Brazil on the construction of the Volta Redonda under the control of the state-owned "Company Metallurgical National" was signed in 1940. On January 30, 1941, Decree No. 3002 created the National Metallurgical Company (CSN), which became the backbone of the public sector of the Brazilian economy. The construction of the Volta Redonda plant proceeded at an accelerated pace, and in 1946 it was operating at 80% of its capacity. By the same year, it had grown to be the largest steel company in South America. Over \$ 70 million was spent on its construction. (Lira, 2013).

"In peacetime, - wrote the Brazilian journalist Lira Neto, biographer of Getulio Vargas, - Brazil did not have the potential to negotiate with the great powers on an equal footing. Now it has been able to convert its exceptional geographic position into hard currency by offering a political alliance in exchange for ferrous metallurgy." It is unlikely, however, that such an exchange could have taken place only as a product of Washington's "goodwill", without Vargas' exceptional diplomatic ability. "His flexible policy, - noted the Brazilian diplomat S. Correa, - allowed him to

negotiate with Washington without losing contacts with Berlin and Rome. He has established himself as an inimitable master of the political game, which at times resembled a “political hula-hoop”. (Correa de Seixas, 2009).

A significant role in a number of diplomatic victories of J. Vargas was played by his ambassador to Washington, and later - Foreign Minister Osvaldo Euclides de Sousa Aranha (1894 - 1960)¹¹ Adhering to liberal views, O. Aranha, nevertheless, learned the truth that politics is the “art of the possible”. As ambassador to the United States, and later as head of Itamaraty (1934-1944), he, like J. Vargas, understood that the far-sighted and realistic-minded US President F.D. Roosevelt, foreseeing the inevitability of war with Germany and Japan, seeks to see Latin American countries and, first of all, Brazil, as reliable allies in the forthcoming world conflict.

At the VII Pan - American Conference in Montevideo (Uruguay) in December 1933, was concluded the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, where in Art. 8 The United States finally agreed that “no American state has the right to interfere in the foreign and domestic affairs of another one”. The “good neighbor” policy proclaimed by F.D. Roosevelt, became an important vehicle for strengthening the foundations of “Pan American solidarity”, which were previously subject to justified doubts in connection with the acts of American interventionism.

11 Osvaldo Euclides de Sousa Aranha (1894 - 1960) - a famous Brazilian diplomat and statesman. Graduated from the Faculty of Law at the University of Rio de Janeiro. In 1934 - 1937 - Ambassador of Brazil to the United States, in 1938 - 1944 - Minister of Foreign Affairs. During his tenure as head of the Foreign Ministry, he advocated an alliance with the United States against the Axis countries. In this period, several thousand Jews officially moved into the country. In 1947 - 1948 - President of the UN General Assembly. In 1953 - 1954 - Minister of Finance and Minister of Agriculture of Brazil.

In February 1934 by order of F.D. Roosevelt in the United States founded the Export-Import Bank ("Eximbank") - a state corporation that facilitates the export of American capital abroad. By the end of 1936, the United States had signed agreements based on the principle of most favored nation trade with a number of Latin American states, including Brazil.

In February 1935 a new Brazilian-American trade agreement was concluded and replaced the previous one, from 1923. According to it, 52 Brazilian goods received the free access to the American market (coffee, cocoa, precious stones, oils, copper, cobalt, etc.). Brazil has become increasingly central to F.D. Roosevelt "Good Neighbor Policy" and become a key partner in US relations with the countries of South America. (Hilton S., 1994).

In January-March 1939, the head of Itamaraty, at the invitation of President F.D. Roosevelt, paid a state visit to the United States, which was named "Mission Aranha". Its main goal was the final elimination of German influence in Brazil and closer rapprochement with the United States. The minister noted that the "Good Neighbor Policy" should become more practical, and expand markets and increase the number of allies in America, because if the US hesitates, other countries are ready to do it. The negotiations were in the nature of political and economic bargaining, where the main issues were confined to economic development, the creation of an industrial base and the rearmament of the Brazilian army and navy. O. Aranha received a promise from the United States to open a credit line from Eximbank for Brazil. An important practical result of his mission was the receipt of a \$ 19.2 million loan from Eximbank and a \$ 50 million loan from the US Treasury Department to form the reserve fund for the creation of the Central Bank. In addition, Eximbank has

promised a new loan of \$ 50 million to finance the Volta Redonda metallurgical complex. The US government has expressed its readiness to stimulate the creation of joint Brazilian - American companies, to promote the exploration and production of minerals and the development of the Brazilian mining industry. (Moura G., 1980).

Picture 9 - Osvaldo Aranha



Source: Author/Photographer - unknown (official photo from the Presidency) - Galeria de ministros das Relações Exteriores do Brasil.

“Mission Aranha” initiated the process of bilateral consultations, which during the Second World War acquired the character of a strategic partnership. It was important for Brazil to assert itself in the correctness of its orientation towards an alliance with the United States, which, in the opinion of J. Vargas and his foreign minister, should have brought it real benefits. As for Washington, on the eve of entering the war, it saw Brazil as the most promising and worthy partner on the continent.

Strengthening the Foundations of Pan-Americanism.

The second most important track after promoting accelerated development were relations with neighbors in the region. In the 1930 years Itamaraty course of establishing friendly relations with South American countries has markedly intensified. On October 7, 1933, Argentinean President A. Justo came for a visit to Rio de Janeiro. Forging relations with Brazil's long-time geopolitical rival was as important to Vargas as it was to Rio Branco at that time. In the halls of the presidential palace, the presidents of two countries agreed to sign an Antiwar Non-Aggression and Reconciliation Pact (known as "Saavedra Lamas Pact" - after the name of Argentina's Foreign Minister). The Treaty spoke about support for arbitration, condemnation of the seizure of territories, the threat of war, about the non-use of armed force, about resolving conflicts in a peaceful way in the course of direct negotiations based on the principle of sovereign equality. In addition to Brazil and Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay have joined the treaty. In the context of the "right to intervene" in the affairs of the Latin American republics, which Washington stubbornly sought, this treaty was, in fact, anti-imperialist. Overcoming past differences, two largest countries in South America tried to unite the rest of the region in the face of US expansion. K. Saavedra Lamas was the first Latin American to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for this pact.

However, before they could be united, they had to be reconciled first. In those years the Chaco War broke out between Paraguay and Bolivia (1932 - 1938) - the bloodiest conflict in the history of this continent in the twentieth century. It was prompted by the desire of the American oil giant Standard Oil to secure a concession in Chaco, a territory that Bolivia and Paraguay have disputed between themselves since the 19th

century. In the same 1932, a fleeting conflict started in the Trapezium of Leticia between Colombia and Peru. Its roots go back to the events of 1903, when Washington, under the pretext of “the right to self-determination” seized the province of Panama from Colombia in order to gain access to the Panama Canal zone.

Afranio de Melo Franco took over the mediation mission in attempts to resolve both of these conflicts. Largely thanks to his efforts, it was possible to prevent the conflict in Leticia from escalating into a full-scale war. Peru’s actions were met with disapproval by its neighboring countries, since Lima did not recognize the Salomon-Lozano Treaty, signed by Peru and Colombia in 1923. According to it, Leticia, a territory disputed with Peru in the upper Amazon, was assigned to Colombia. Brazil insisted on the principle of “*pacta sunt servanda*” (“treaties must be respected”), and proposed transferring the disputed territory under the control of the League of Nations for a one year.

In June 1932, Leticia was captured by the Peruvians, what threatened the escalation of the conflict into a full-scale war. Brazil refused to allow Peruvian warships to arrive at Leticia, at the mouth of the Amazon, and made it clear that its position was in favor of maintaining the status quo in South America. Any change in borders within the South American continent could trigger a chain reaction and revise the main achievement of Rio Branco: securing the borders of his country.

On May 24, 1934, in the capital of Brazil, the Rio de Janeiro Protocol was signed, according to its terms the Peruvians still had to recognize the validity of the Salomon - Lozano agreement. The principle of “*pacta sunt servanda*” has been retained. (Brazilian Diplomatic Thought, vol.2).

The war in the Chaco could not be prevented. A. de Melo Franco repeatedly offered the parties mediation services for the settlement of the dispute on the basis of the principle “uti possidetis”. He carefully considered all the treaties relating to the ownership of this territory, starting from the colonial period. The search for a compromise, however, did not bring results, due to the lack of disinterested support outside. Paraguay was victorious in the war that lasted almost six years.

However, unlike the events that took place simultaneously in the center of Europe, the winner was forced to moderate seriously its appetites in favor of the principles of good neighborliness. It has nothing to do with the policy of European dictatorships that buried themselves on the territory of their neighbors! To a large extent, it was achieved due to the fact that Brazil, while observing strict neutrality, actively contributed to the signing of a peace treaty and the establishment of post-war good-neighborly relations between Bolivia and Paraguay. “Tireless efforts A. de Melo Franco, aimed at concluding peace and organizing subsequent economic cooperation between two countries have become a serious help in concluding a worthy peace”, - as it noted in the collective work of Brazilian scientists “Diplomatic Thought of Brazil” (vol. 2).

These two wars, which broke out almost simultaneously in the center of the South American mainland, and the efforts to resolve them peacefully showed the increased political maturity and peacekeeping potential of the states of the region, and at the same time, the growth of Brazil’s regional authority.

In 1936 the Spanish Civil War broke out. With the formation of Nazi “axis” the polarization of Europe was completed. In 1938, Hitler carried out the annexation of Austria, and at the

Munich Conference, England and France agreed to the partition of Czechoslovakia.

At that difficult historical moment, Brazil supported the position of F.D. Roosevelt on strengthening peace and unity in the Western Hemisphere. In the draft conference program, Brazil included items on:

1. Ratification by all American governments of the Arbitration Treaty and the Settlement Convention, signed in Washington on January 5, 1929.
2. Translation of the articles of the anti-war treaty, signed in Rio de Janeiro on October 10, 1933, into the Declaration of Principles of the American Republics.
3. The development of a new collective pact, designed to strengthen measures to prevent war between American states, which should reflect the possibility of resorting to the institution of mediation, should be given a definition of the aggressor and provide assistance to the country that was attacked.
4. The conclusion of an Inter-American collective security pact to protect the continent from any aggression, including external.

Brazil has proposed its draft treaty to consolidate peace and prevent war between American states, as well as a draft Inter-American collective security treaty. This position on collective security was confirmed during the visit of F.D. Roosevelt in Rio de Janeiro.

After A. de Melo Franco ceased to be foreign minister, he headed the Brazilian delegation to VIII Inter-American

Conference in Lima (Peru) in 1938. The political atmosphere in the Western Hemisphere on the eve of this conference was imbued with the idea formulated formerly a Brazilian diplomat: to avoid direct participation in hostilities that were about to erupt in Europe.

VIII Inter-American Conference adopted Lima Declaration, which noted the “similarity of the American republics” and stated “respect for international law and the principle of state sovereignty”. Paragraph 2 declared the determination to “defend this principle against any foreign interference” and to take collective action “as circumstances may require”. Lima Declaration provided for the creation of a new collective body - the Consultative Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American states, which if necessary and on the initiative of one of them will meet in the capitals of the American states. At Lima Conference, it was decided to create a neutral zone around the Western Hemisphere.

The Inter-American Commission on Neutrality was based in Rio de Janeiro, in recognition of Brazil’s strategic importance. The 1938 Lima Declaration was the first stone in the foundation of the Inter-American security system, the construction of which will be completed after the Second World War.

Since that time, the formation of the military-political bloc of the American states proceeded with a vengeance. The draft resolution of the Inter-American Conference was prepared in its First Committee, which was chaired by A. de Melo Franco. He was active in the Inter-American Commission on Neutrality (later the Inter-American Legal Commission). Melo Franco contributed to the development of this commission and the expansion of its powers, began researching on the problems of the

post-war world order, but his death on January 1, 1943 interrupted this work.

President J. Vargas declared three days of mourning in the country, paying tribute to A. de Melo Franco as the Minister of State responsible for the country's foreign policy during one of the most turbulent periods of Brazilian history. His tenure at the top post in Itamaraty came during the Great Depression, the Chaco War, the conflict in Leticia and the political crisis in Europe, the outcome of which was the Second World War. The problems he faced at the head of the Foreign Ministry demonstrated his talent as a statesman, which, according to the authors of the three-volume "Brazilian Diplomatic Thought", allowed A. de Melo Franco to be considered as "one of the greatest figures in Brazilian and Pan American diplomacy". The program that A. de Melo Franco put as the basis for the policy of neutrality of Brazil in 1939 - 1942 assumed:

1. Peaceful settlement of disputes by diplomatic means or by arbitration,
2. Strengthening Pan American solidarity as a means of maintaining peace,
3. Diplomatic containment of Argentina through official friendly relations and the intensification of trade ties;
4. The expansion of Brazilian influence in other countries of the La Plata basin, especially in Bolivia and Paraguay, in opposition to the influence of Argentina,
5. Development of special relationship with the United States based on economic complementarity, bilateral trade and potential mutual assistance in the event of a war,

6. Development of the national military-industrial potential. (Pensamiento Diplomático Brasileiro. Formuladores e Agentes da Política Externa (1750-1964).

Argentina's "containment" policy should have come as no surprise to anyone. By that time, the traditional geopolitical rival of Brazil began to lean more and more towards the Axis countries and to evade the implementation of the collective decisions of the Pan-American structures.

Against this background, an attempt to repeat Rio Branco's idea of ABC alliance looked unlikely. The choice in favor of a strategic partnership with the United States, made by Getúlio Vargas and his Foreign Minister A. de Melo Franco, and then - Osvaldo Aranha, in the face of a sharp complication of the international situation, thus became a pressing necessity. This choice was greatly facilitated by the realistic policy of F.D. Roosevelt, who managed to abandon the traditional US policy towards its southern neighbors.

Brazil in the Anti-Hitler Coalition.

In 1940-1941 Brazil's alliance with the United States has strengthened even more, having overcome the stage of "equidistance" and "pragmatic balance", which were previously heard in the speeches of J. Vargas. A great contribution to the strengthening of this alliance was made by the Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, and then the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a personal friend of President J. Vargas, Osvaldo Aranha.

After being appointed an ambassador to the USA in 1934, O. Aranha traveled to Washington via Europe. He met with the Italian dictator B. Mussolini, discussed the issue of concluding

a trade agreement. In the letter to J. Vargas, he described his impressions:

Europe, my dear, is in a state of potential war. Troops and squadrons are not yet at war, but they are already threatening each other. Trade is a battle without a truce: money wages a blind battle. An amazing game of secret combinations, mutual claims, warnings and accelerated preparation for a collision takes place between governments. The entire military industry is in a state of unprecedented activity. Instincts sharpened, like those of animals that sensed danger ... Europe found itself between two abysses: one war that has passed, and one that is about to break out - this is how you can define its current state. (Camargo A., Araujo J.H.P., Simonsen M.H., 1996).

With his characteristic pragmatism, O. Aranha comes to the conclusion that only the United States among all the great powers can be a potential ally of Brazil in such difficult conditions "Many accuse us of consistently pursuing a policy of solidarity with Washington, implying that we adhere to this policy without hesitation," - he said at a meeting in Itamaraty in January 1935. "But we are not guided by a deliberate desire to blindly follow him, trying to show that we are alike. It's just that our interests coincide at the moment".

With the outbreak of the war in Europe, Brazil advocates for the strengthening of continental solidarity, deals with issues related to the proclamation of a policy of neutrality, which was announced on September 2, 1939. The next day, the US government proposed to hold in Panama the First Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers of American states. There were

adopted three important documents: the General Declaration of Neutrality, the Panama Declaration, which established a security zone around the continent at a distance of 300 to 1000 miles, and the Declaration of Principles of Continental Solidarity. In January 1941, when Germany seemed to have achieved unshakable domination in Europe, O. Aranha declared that Brazil would remain “true to its continental political, economic and military obligations” and maintain the “sense of loyalty” that its government and its people have always felt for the United States “both in peace and in war”. (*A Atuação de Oswaldo Aranha no Processo de Engajamento do Brasil na Segunda Guerra Mundial*, 2017).

Until the end of 1941, all the belligerents, including Germany and Japan, respected the neutrality of the American states. The neutrality of the Latin American countries was also quite satisfactory for the United States, who preferred not to interfere in the European war. At the same time, it reflected the desire of the states of the region to maintain economic ties with the Axis powers. By 1940, German capital investments in the region amounted to \$ 969 million, and Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, Brazil, Mexico and Peru were the main sphere of German capital investment. Germany imported strategic raw materials from Latin America.

In Latin American countries, influential public organizations, large politicians, and representatives of the business community sympathized with the Nazis. They also enjoyed the sympathy of some social forces. Often, these sympathies were manifested in the “spat” of the Anglo-Saxons, who managed to establish themselves in the countries of the region by far from the best side.

The Second Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers (La Havana, July 1940) adopted the Havana Act with the recommendation on the protection of the Western Hemisphere. According

to this act, any attack from outside on any American country will be considered as aggression against all. The adopted resolution “On Mutual Assistance and Cooperation of American States in Defense Matters” provided for the conclusion of specific treaties in the event of “non-continental” aggression.

It was the initial legal basis for the future military-political alliance of the American countries under the auspices of the United States. The question of the fate of the Dutch and French colonies was raised at the meeting, and although most Latin American countries were in favor of granting the colonies the right to self-determination, the point of view of the United States won out: temporary collective trusteeship was established over these territories.

In early 1941, O. Aranha confirmed the basic principles of Brazilian foreign policy:

- Pacifism in the framework of the concept of non-intervention,
- Continental solidarity,
- Strict neutrality in relation to the European war,
- Cooperation in the defense of the Western Hemisphere. (Castro, 1983).

The Japanese attack on the American base at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the entry of the United States into the war completely changed the situation. Brazil, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, Haiti, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Panama and Costa Rica declared war on Japan. Mexico and Colombia severed diplomatic relations with it. Uruguay condemned the Japanese aggression and gave the United States the opportunity to use

its ports. It was extremely important for Washington to force all the countries of the continent to sever relations with all the Axis countries.

At the Third Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers (January 15, 1942, Rio de Janeiro), Brazil announced the severance of diplomatic relations with all the Axis countries. It was supported by 22 states attending the conference, except Argentina and Chile. The resolution of the meeting recommended all countries in the region to break off diplomatic relations with Germany, Italy and Japan. It was also made a decision to establish the Inter-American Defense Council (IAD).

This meeting was of great importance to the United States. President F. D. Roosevelt, in a letter to the chairman of the meeting, Brazilian Foreign Minister O. Aranha, wrote:

It is obvious (...) that the leadership of the conference will be in the hands of a statesman who has a deep and comprehensive understanding of the importance of continental solidarity. In recent years, I have watched with great interest and with genuine admiration your activities in guiding Brazil's foreign policy (...) I would like to express my deepest gratitude to you for everything that you have done and will still do to strengthen continental solidarity. (Oswaldo Aranha, un estadista brasileiro, 2017).

Bilateral US-Brazilian relations had reached a new qualitative level by that time and acquired an exceptional character, incomparable with Washington's relations with any other country in the region.

On October 1, 1941, an agreement was signed on Lend-Lease, according to its provisions Brazil till 1947 had to receive

American weapons in the amount of \$ 100 million. It was provided for the opening of a US military mission in Rio de Janeiro and the exchange of information in the field of defense. "You can count on us", - said Getulio Vargas to US Ambassador Jefferson Cafferi after he probed Brazil's possible position in the event of the US entering the war. Deliveries went smoothly, so that at the end of the war, Brazil received US military equipment (\$ 360 million worth). It was 73% of the total amount provided by Washington to Latin American countries. (Hilton, 1994).

March 1942, the Washington Treaty was signed, and the United States provided a loan of \$ 100 million to finance the steel project and a loan of \$ 200 million to modernize the armed forces. It was the largest U.S. agreement with a Latin American country during World War II. Later, on August 25, 1943, the Joint Brazilian-US Defense Commission (JBUSDC) was created to use bases in northwestern Brazil as strategic sites for operations in North Africa and control the South Atlantic, to exchange information and to coordinate bilateral military cooperation. The military-political alliance of Brazil and the United States during the war becomes irreversible.

The entry of the United States into the World War II has finally put everything in its place. Due to its geographic location, demographic and resource potential, Brazil simply could not remain neutral. In addition, somehow too "timely" information was leaked to the press that the United States was ready to occupy a strategically important part of the Brazilian coast in the northeast, without informing Rio de Janeiro about it. In January 1942, convinced of Washington's readiness to contribute to the modernization of the Brazilian army, J. Vargas decided to fulfill the recommendation of the Third Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Western Hemisphere (Rio de Janeiro)

and to sever diplomatic relations with the Axis countries. A short telegram came from Rome, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Fascist Italy, Count Ciano: "Our Duce has an elephant's memory. The day will come when Brazil will regret this decision." Germany, on the other hand, preferred deeds to loud words.

On February 16, in the midst of the Brazilian carnival, the Nazi submarine U - 432 sank the Brazilian bulk carrier "Bouarqui" off the coast of the United States. It marked the beginning of a killing streak. The same month were launched "Olinda" and "Cabedelo", and in March "Arabuta" and "Cairo" were torpedoed off the coast of the United States. None of 75 people in the latter's team survived. In April, one of the largest merchant ships in Brazil, the cargo-passenger steamer "Parnaiba", was torpedoed.

On March 11, Getulio Vargas signed a decree to compensate for the damage caused by attacks on merchant ships at the expense of the property of citizens of Germany, Italy and Japan who lived in Brazil. The activities to uncover the spy network and expose the "fifth column" of the Nazi Axis were intensified, and the Brazilians were able to uncover the network of Nazi agents who entangled South America with their network of radio transmitters.

Meanwhile, Brazilian merchant ships continued to drown in the Atlantic. In mid-June, Hitler, disregarding the neutrality of Brazil, ordered his admirals to sink all Brazilian ships, including passenger ships, in its territorial waters. For this purpose, ten of the latest Nazi submarines left the ports of occupied France. In August 1942 they sunk 5 Brazilian ships, and only 15 out of 252 passengers of the steamer "Bypendi", which followed from Salvador to Maceio, were saved. On August 22, 1942, Brazil declared war on Germany and Italy.

It was obvious that without the help of the United States, the Brazilians could not protect more than 8 thousand km of the Atlantic coast, where all their major cities and industrial centers, including the capital, were concentrated. The Brazilians have forgotten Rio Branco's behest that "diplomacy needs a strong navy to support it". The Brazilian fleet was a collection of outdated ships, and naval aviation, as a type of armed forces, was created only in 1941. The Brazilian ground forces were created counting on a potential conflict with South American neighbors and could not withstand the first-class armies of Germany, Italy and Japan.

October 1942, there were formed three operational-tactical groups of the Brazilian Navy, which came under the control of the American Navy. However, the administrative leadership over them remained with the Brazilians, and when forming joint convoys, a senior officer of any of the fleets was appointed commander. This far-sighted step of the American Admiral J. Ingram, approved by the President of the United States F.-D. Roosevelt, led to the fact that, according to Commander Gerson di Macedo Soares, complete harmony was established in relations between the sailors of both countries.

Till 1943, relations between the leaders of these largest countries of the Western Hemisphere acquired the character of personal friendship (of course, to the extent that this concept can take place in politics). "Roosevelt was the only politician in the United States with whom Vargas preferred to get in direct contact," - noted Vargas biographer Lear Neto.

He saw him as a man capable of helping Brazil in the implementation of its most daring strategic plans. During the negotiations on the metallurgical plant, only Roosevelt could force

certain members of his administration to cooperate with Brazil. Getulio shifted the entire routine in bilateral relations onto the shoulders of O. Aranha and, as Lira Neto wrote, he contacted with the owner of the White House only when it came to issues of big 'strategy' (Neto, 2013).

On January 26, 1943, Getulio Vargas went to northeastern Brazil, to Natal, to meet the President of the United States. Roosevelt flew there straight from Casablanca after negotiations with British Prime Minister W. Churchill. After the final agreement on the main item on the agenda - the creation of US naval and air bases in the northeast of Brazil, Roosevelt tried to negotiate with Vargas on sending Brazilian troops to occupy the Portuguese Azores and Madeira. Fortunately for the Portuguese dictator Salazar, battles in Africa were already drawing to a close, and the strategic importance of the Portuguese islands was declining, so the sending of Brazilian troops to the Azores did not take place.

J. Vargas and O. Aranha understood perfectly well that only the direct participation of Brazilian troops in the war in Europe could guarantee their country a worthy place in the post-war world, and most importantly - make Roosevelt's important promise made in Natal irreversible: to grant Brazil a permanent member of Security Council in the future United Nations.

Picture 10 - J. Vargas and F.-D. Roosevelt at a meeting in Natal



Source: Author/Photographer – unknown. 1936.

Following the Natal meeting, Brazilian-American cooperation in World War II reached its culmination. On May 30, 1944 Getulio Vargas, accompanied by the Minister of War General G. Dutra boarded the US military transport “General Mann”, anchored in the port of Rio, to instruct the Brazilian Expeditionary Force soldiers (FEB) on their way to the Italian front. After the first Brazilian contingent, the second soon set off on the battlefields in Europe.

Almost two years elapsed between the declaration of war and the dispatch of FEB to Italy. “The government showed passivity, being interested in receiving American assistance to mobilize the Brazilian economy, as well as in signing various kinds of economic agreements with the United States.” (Окунева, 2010). (Okuneva, 2010). But Vargas’ opportunism was probably not the only reason for this delay. The army’s unpreparedness to

conduct modern combat operations and its insufficient equipment were obvious.

Before entering the battle, the Brazilians had to undergo a training course of modern warfare under the guidance of American instructors. However, the very fact that the largest Latin American country sent its military contingent to Europe had a truly unprecedented historical significance. It was necessary to evaluate it, first of all, from a political point of view. It became clear that Brazil wanted to see itself among the victorious powers with a role corresponding to this status in the region and in the world.

It seemed that there were no obstacles along the way. For example, US Deputy Secretary of State Sumner Welles wrote in the Washington Post:

If one dares to assume something in this unpredictable world, it is that, apart from the United States itself, only two countries will achieve unprecedented exaltation after the war due to the abilities of their peoples, gigantic territories, the presence of immeasurable natural resources and rapid economic development - these are the Soviet Union and Brazil. (Neto, 2013).

The statistics seemed to confirm this. Between 1920 and 1940, Brazil's population increased from 30.6 to 41.1 mln, with people under the age of 20 accounting for approximately 54% of the total population. In 1920, agriculture gave 79% of the total value of products produced in the country, and industry - only 29%, then in 1940 this ratio was already 57% and 43%, respectively. The basic industries - metallurgy, machine-tool building, the production of electrical equipment and vehicles almost

doubled their share in the added value of industrial production by 1945. The chemical and pharmaceutical industries have shown impressive growth. The number of illiterates fell from 69.9% in 1920 to 56.2% in 1940, although it was still high.

In 1944, a Brazilian contingent of 25,334 arrived on the Italian front, which became part of the 5th American army under the command of General Mark Clark. "Vargas actively supported the sending of troops to Italy from the very beginning,"- noted Neil Lochery. According to the testimony of this English historian, he originally planned to send 100 thousand Brazilians to Europe. The Americans, however, could hardly afford the accelerated training of such a mass of unprepared people recruited from all over the giant country with varying degrees of basic military knowledge. (Lochery, 2014).

The battles in the Monte Castelo area in February 1945 were intense, and Brazilians, together with the US Army Mountain Division, managed to capture a heavily fortified mountainous region. After the capture of Monte Castelo, the so-called German "Gothic line" in northern Italy was broken through and Bologna was liberated. In April 1945, the FEB commander, General Mascarenas de Moraes accepted the surrender of the German division in Italy. Brazilians fought as far as Turin, and on May 2, 1945, near the city of Susa on the Franco-Italian border, FEB joined the French army. The war was over for them.

A special conversation is about Brazilian pilots. After the decision to send FEB units to Italy, the Brazilian Air Ministry formed a special First Air Force Fighter Group. On January 3, 1944, the group's personnel (approximately 350 pilots and technicians) were sent to study at the American military base in Panama. Soon, the first squad began to replenish with new pilots from Brazil. The pilots from the South American country

mastered the R-74 Thunderbolt fighter-bomber to fight in the skies of Italy. (Lavanere-Wandelely, 1987).

On October 6, the Fighter Group landed at Livorno. At the very first front-line airfield, it received brand new P-47 with Brazilian blue-yellow-green stars on the fuselages and wings and was officially included in the American 350th Fighter Regiment. The Brazilian flag was solemnly hoisted over the base and the country's national anthem was played. In total, during the Italian campaign, the Brazilian squadron flew 445 sorties, destroyed 1.312 units of enemy military equipment, 263 trains, 25 rail and road bridges and 31 ammunition depots.

At the FEB Squadron's homecoming ceremony in August 1945, Brazilian Ambassador to Italy Mauricio Nabuco said, that looking at twenty-year-old guys who were not afraid of death and coped with all the challenges of modern warfare, I realized that a country that had such youth, couldn't face the future with confidence. During the war, the Brazilian ground forces, aircraft and navy earned the respect of the Americans. Some tension that was present at the beginning in their relations soon gave way to genuine friendship. (Lockery, 2014).

On June 6, 1945, by order of the Minister of Defense G. Dutra, all FEB units located in Italy returned to their homeland. As a result, the only Latin American country that sent its troops to the European theater of operations received no economic benefits and almost no political recognition for this. In this regard, one should agree with B. Fausto that the problems of the "New State" arose not so much from internal political conditions as from the fact of Brazil's involvement in the system of international relations.

Picture 11 - Monument to members of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force - infantrymen, pilots and sailors, installed in Rio de Janeiro. Author - O. Niemeyer



Source: URL: Author/photographer, Fernando Dallacqua, 2005.

The death of Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, was a serious blow to J. Vargas. The trust and understanding reached with the President of the United States turned to nothing. It soon became clear that independent, self-confident and patriotic Brazil, respected and recognized for its role in World War II, was not needed by the new President of the United States, H. Truman, who was interested only if Brazil could unquestioningly fulfill the will of Washington in the flaring “cold war”.

The “undemocratic” nature of the “New State”, which Roosevelt and the top officials of his administration turned to a blind eye, began to irritate G. Truman, his Secretary of State E. Stettinius and the new ambassador to Brazil, Adolphe Berle. They actively used this factor in order to interrupt the process of Brazilian modernization under the leadership of Getulio Vargas.

In its war with the charismatic President of Brazil, the United States relied on the military, with whom they achieved “complete

understanding” during the war. Their first success was the resignation of O. Aranha on August 22, 1944, the foreign minister who consistently advocated a strategic alliance with the United States, but was not going to sacrifice Brazil’s national interests to this alliance. His position was to support US action in the world in exchange for their support for Brazil and South America. The guideline that he recommended to President Vargas – to follow the United States in the war, until the victory of American weapons, and in the world, until the victory of American ideals, was determined by the fact that in the post-war years, in the context of the liberalization of international trade, the United States, in his opinion, would have to promote industrialization and the flow of capital to Brazil.

At the same time, the main concern of O. Aranha was the development of the country and its defense capability. In his 10-page letter, written in early 1944, he identified the following priorities:

1. Improvement of the political situation in relation to neighboring countries,
2. Stronger and closer solidarity with the United States,
3. Rapprochement with Portugal and its possessions,
4. Creation of a modern naval forces,
5. Creation of a modern air force,
6. Creation of an industrial park for heavy industry,
7. Creation of the defense industry,
8. Creation of an agrarian industry, extractive industry, which will give additional leverage for industrialization and economic reconstruction,

9. Development of railways and highways for economic and strategic purposes,
10. Mineral exploration. (Oswaldo Aranha, un estadista brasileiro. 2017)

During Oswaldo Aranha's tenure as head of the Foreign Ministry, he made the greatest contribution to improving significantly the work of his office and departments related to foreign trade, consular affairs and immigration policy. Contributing to the development of Pan-Americanism, minister paid the most serious attention to national security issues, sought to strengthen relations with neighboring Latin American countries. He demanded from the Itamaraty staff a careful analysis of the international situation in order to determine the course of Brazilian diplomacy, considering trade and other economic activities as the basis of the country's foreign policy. Under Oswaldo Aranha, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry played an active role in the formation of the Bretton Woods system and the UN, as well as in the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS, 1948) on the basis of the Pan American system. Thanks to his efforts, on August 2, 1945, Brazil established diplomatic relations with the USSR, which had not existed since 1917.

One of the most important contributions of Oswaldo Aranha to the history of Brazilian foreign policy and diplomacy can be considered the opening of the Rio Branco Institute in Rio de Janeiro on April 18, 1945, a higher educational institution, designed to train personnel for the country's diplomatic service. This event was timed to the 100th anniversary of the birth of

“Outstanding Brazilian” Baron de Rio Branco. The Rio Branco Institute became the part of the Itamaraty structure.¹²

President J. Vargas agreed to the resignation of his highly experienced foreign minister under the influence of the Minister of War Gaspar Dutra. He was also “obliged” to him for another mistake: the untimely withdrawal of the Brazilian contingent from Europe. Thus, writes N. Lokery, “J. Vargas refused to participate in the capitalization of the economic results of the war and those political prerogatives that the United States gave to its allies.” It is possible that the reason for this thoughtless decision was the premature resignation of O. Aranha. As a result, Brazil not only did not receive a permanent member of the UN Security Council¹³ promised by F.-D. Roosevelt, but Vargas himself was removed by the military from participating in the presidential elections on December 2, 1945, which Gaspar Dutra won. The modernization policy was temporarily interrupted. (Lockery, 2014).

12 The Rio Branco Institute is up to the present time one of the most prestigious institutions of higher education in Brazil, the main forge of its diplomatic cadres. The one-and-a-half-year IRB program involves an in-depth study of history, economics, sociology, law, international relations, English, French, Spanish, Russian and Arabic. After successfully graduating from the IRB, its graduates are hired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the rank of third secretary.

13 The direct reason for this was the opposition to the candidacy of Brazil by Great Britain and the USSR - permanent members of the Security Council. However, the absence of any perseverance in this matter on the part of the Truman administration is quite understandable: the United States did not want to see an opponent in the person of Brazil in the hemisphere, which they considered “their own.”

The Foreign Policy of the Government of Dutra (1946 - 1951).

The government of G. Dutra, completely dependent on the will of the United States, has become their loyal satellite in the “Cold war” that has flared up in the world. Brazil’s policy during this period could be called a policy of “automatic alignment” with the United States. In the context of the post-war market recession for traditional Brazilian exports - coffee, cotton, soybeans, iron ore, etc., Brazil’s economic and financial dependence on the United States has increased many times over. American direct investment into Brazil rose from \$ 212 million in 1946 to \$ 803 million in 1951, exceeding half of all foreign investment in the country. After the war, close cooperation between two countries continued in the military sphere. The inertia of thinking did not allow the Brazilian military to discern qualitative differences between the policy towards Brazil, which was carried out during the war years by the government of F.-D. Roosevelt and the course of his successor, H. Truman, which fully corresponded to the realities of another, “cold” war.

The new Brazilian Constitution was adopted in 1946, which outlined basic democratic rights. However, all rights remained on paper. Under Dutra, the persecution of all left forces and democratic forces intensified, the Communist Party of Brazil was banned, and the growing trade union movement was in a difficult situation.

On October 20, 1947, under pressure from Washington, Brazil broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR. The pretext was that one of the Soviet newspapers published material that testified to the former pro-Nazi sympathies of G. Dutra, who was

Brazil's Minister of War on the eve of World War II. This material was true.

The same year, Rio de Janeiro became the venue for the Inter-American Conference, where was signed the Inter-American Treaty on Mutual Assistance (otherwise - the Rio de Janeiro Pact). The absence of at least some alternative to US hegemony in Latin America and Washington's promises (which remained on paper!) to develop plans for economic cooperation with the region forced Latin Americans to sign a document that became an open challenge to international law and the UN Charter.

According to this treaty, the United States and 19 Latin American states pledged to provide each other with assistance (including military) in the event of an attack on any of them within the "security zone" established by the treaty. This "security zone" in an arbitrary order, seized vast areas of the high seas, the territories of the Arctic and Antarctica, as well as the possessions of European states located in the Western Hemisphere. The treaty contained a strange understanding of aggression, which may "not constitute an armed attack". According to its provisions, all disputes between American states, contrary to the UN Charter, were to be submitted as a matter of priority to the bodies of the inter-American system.

The main articles of the Inter-American Treaty on Mutual Assistance formed the basis of the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), signed in 1948 in Bogota (Colombia), which completed the creation of the post-war security system in the Western Hemisphere. Instead of the organs of the Pan American system, rigid supporting structures of the new inter-American system were created in the form of regularly convened conferences, consultative meetings of foreign ministers and meetings of a permanent body - the OAS Council. OAS

Secretariat was established, headed by a Secretary General. The structure of the organization provided for the existence of an extensive network of specialized organizations and institutions designed to solve various issues. OAS headquarters continued to be located in Washington DC.

Thus, the United States formed the first military-political bloc in post-war history, two years ahead of NATO creation. According to US Secretary of State A. Dulles, the Rio de Janeiro Pact became a model for the creation of similar regional pacts in other regions of the world, primarily in Europe (NATO). This Pact strengthened and expanded American military and political influence in Latin America in the post-war period. G. Dutra began negotiations with the United States to sign a bilateral military treaty. Speaking in Washington in May 1949 during his official visit to the United States, the President of Brazil said that his country will unconditionally support the United States in any military conflict. With a dizzying speed, Brazilians were losing everything that had been achieved during the years of J. Vargas's rule in the field of restoring democracy, ensuring the social rights of workers, strengthening the sovereignty and foreign policy positions of their state. Now it was not necessary to think about any special status of Brazil in Latin America and in the world. In the UN and the OAS, the "Tropical Giant" had to dissolve in the conglomerate of the remaining "independent" Latin American countries from Argentina to Jamaica.¹⁴

14 The "one country, one vote" rule adopted by the OAS formally equated the United States with Brazil or, for example, with Honduras. But Washington has such an informal power and influence in this organization that no Brazil, let alone Honduras, can overcome it alone. Latin American countries can somehow identify their interests there only by acting together, which does not always happen in practice, given that Washington is constantly making efforts to separate them.

In the context of an extraordinary strengthening of the economic, political and ideological US influence in the post-war world, and especially in Latin America, in the absence of any real alternative to this influence, the ruling elites of the regional countries, including Brazil, have relied on a relatively “soft” nature of American hegemonism. By signing the Inter-American documents, they counted on the principle “one country - one vote” laid down in the OAS Charter, and on Art. 8 of the Rio de Janeiro Pact, according to which “no state is obliged to provide its armed forces for the needs of the Inter-American system without its consent”. However, the main thing was, nevertheless, that Latin American countries still harbored hopes for US economic assistance within the framework of a certain Marshall Plan¹⁵ for Latin America, which never was destined to be realized. From 1947 to 1950 all Latin American countries received American “aid” of only \$ 400 million - this is less, than Belgium and Luxembourg received.

“Legal Romanticism” and belief in Washington’s promises in the Mid-1950s led to disappointment and mass protests. Between the United States and Latin America, as noted Brazilian author R. Ricupero, there was a “dialogue of the deaf”: the United States fought against international communism and upheld the rules of private enterprise and the free market, while Latin Americans believed that the best guarantee against the communists coming to power was only economic development based on industrialization with the active participation of the state. Soon, these contradictions will fully affect Brazilian-American relations.

15 The Marshall Plan is a plan for the economic revival of post-war Europe, adopted at the initiative of US Secretary of State J. Marshall in 1948.

In the meantime, maintaining the high reputation of Brazilian diplomacy in the region and the world fell to the lot of Osvaldo Aranha, whose popularity was immeasurably higher than that of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Raul Fernández. In February 1947, President Doutra appointed O. Aranha the head of the Brazilian delegation to the UN and its representative to the Security Council. Osvaldo Aranha became the first speaker at the 1947 UN special meeting, and since then the tradition of giving the Brazilian delegate the first word at the opening of the annual UN General Assembly session has continued.

The Brazilian representative to the UN played an extremely important role as the head of the commission that considered the Arab-Israeli conflict. He presided over the special meeting in 1947, when Resolution 181 was approved on November 29: 33 votes in favor (including Brazil), 13 against (including all Islamic and Arab states that had the right to vote at the time), with 10 abstentions. The key provision of Resolution 181 was the division of the territory under the British mandate into a Jewish and an Arab state. The Israelis approved it. It is no coincidence that streets in the cities of Bir Sheba, Ramat Gan and Tel Aviv were named in honor of O. Aranha. His name, in particular, bears the square in Jerusalem. The Arabs rejected the resolution, which was their strategic mistake. As you know, the first Arab-Israeli war broke out immediately, when Arab countries attacked Israel, but were defeated.

In his speech at the opening of the II session of the UN General Assembly, Osvaldo Aranha said:

More than two years have passed since the end of the world war, but true peace has not yet been achieved. All great conflicts inevitably lead to a period of reconciliation. Just as illness

shows us the benefits of health, so war has certain benefits because it makes us love peace more ... This war affected all peoples, no one managed to avoid its consequences, and therefore it is necessary to build peace on the basis of universal consent. And we all understand that this agreement cannot be a matter of one day or an automatic consequence of the cessation of hostilities ... It is necessary to consolidate the peace-loving aspirations of the peoples, for which this organization was created. (Oswaldo Aranha, un estadista brasileiro. 2017).

O. Aranha constantly repeated that it was not enough to outlaw weapons of mass destruction, but it is necessary to condemn those who use scientific progress to foment war and destruction, instead of applying advanced ideas to improve the well-being of people. At the same time, the Brazilian delegate never missed an opportunity to emphasize his country's contribution to the development of international law and the maintenance of the idea of universal peace. "The republic proclaimed in 1889, perfected the political tradition, when the principle of arbitration was included in the 1934 Constitution — the only basis for resolving international conflicts,"- he stressed in one of his speeches. (Oswaldo Aranha, un estadista brasileiro. 2017).

An Attempt to Return to Traditions under Hegemony: A Tragedy with a Flash of Hope (1951-1954).

Getulio Vargas won the presidential elections on October 3, 1950. Returning to power, he, more resolutely than before, continued the course towards accelerated modernization of the country. This course included industrialization, the nationalization of natural resources, the introduction of measures to

restrict the activities of foreign monopolies, the creation of a public sector of the economy, and the integration of the working class through government-backed trade unions into the system of state-run social institutions. At the same time, Vargas counted on his political experience, which would allow him to pursue an independent domestic and foreign policy without entering into conflict with the United States - the only country capable of providing Brazil with loans for the development of modern industry.

In September 1951, President introduced the National Economic Development Plan (Lafer Plan, named after Economy Minister Horacio Lafer) to Congress. It provided for the creation of new energy facilities, the introduction of progressive methods in agriculture, the modernization of the railway network and the expansion of the industrial park. Vargas was going to get the necessary loans through the Brazilian-American Bilateral Commission, which was created as a tool for closer economic cooperation of the largest states of the continent. After the Lafer Plan was adopted, President introduced to the National Congress a bill on the creation of the Petrobras corporation, engaged in the production, processing and distribution of oil and petroleum products. According to the bill, the state in Petrobras was supposed to own 51% of the shares, the rest - to private capital, and 10% could be owned by foreign shareholders.

In 1951, Brazil created the National Council for Scientific Research to coordinate the work of scientists from different directions. Towards the end of that year, Getulio Vargas introduced two more bills to Congress, which had a great public response and caused abundant comments abroad. The first provided for an increase, starting in 1952, of the minimum wage by almost 300 (!) percent: from 380 to 1200 cruzeiro, the second set a maximum rate of 8% for capital transferred abroad.

“We want to create a favorable climate for foreign investors and provide them with guaranteed profit margins. But we will not allow the plundering of the national wealth,”- the president said, recalling that during the years of Dutra’s rule, the country has lost over 1 billion cruzeiro due to numerous gaps in the laws. US Deputy Secretary of State E. Miller, who violently reacted to this bill, called on Washington to send immediately a protest note to Rio and put pressure on the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank in order to revise the plans for lending to Brazil. As a follow-up to this bill, in 1953 Vargas introduced a new system of foreign exchange and foreign trade regulation, when industrialists received large subsidies in importing equipment, and a significant part of foreign exchange earnings was withdrawn from exporters of coffee and other agricultural products. O. Aranha, the Minister of Finance that year, made great efforts in the accelerated modernization of the country.

The foreign policy of the new administration of J. Vargas, the conductor of which was a friend of the president from the university bench, Joao Nevis da Fontoura (1887 - 1963), kept pace with the times, which were marked by the collapse of the colonial system in the post-war period and the rise of the national liberation movement. In 1951, Brazil signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, restored diplomatic relations with Germany and Japan, and actively worked at the UN, where it supported the independence of the former colonial territories in Asia (Burma, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc.) and established diplomatic relations with them.

The Brazilian Foreign Ministry has gradually developed into one of the most respected institutions in the country’s power structure. Unquestioning leadership in foreign policy issues, a rigid hierarchical structure and a positive historical reputation

made it a very influential, elite structure. In Itamaraty appeared a new direction - an economic diplomacy, and the system of diplomatic representation in the UN expanded, the number of countries who established political and trade relations with Brazil, greatly increased.

An event that left a negative imprint on the further development of US-Brazilian relations and the personal fate of President J. Vargas was his refusal to send Brazilian troops to the war in Korea (1950-1953). In April 1951, US President H. Truman, taking advantage of the presence of Brazilian Foreign Minister J. Nevis da Fontoura at the IV Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS, conveyed a personal message for J. Vargas. Truman urged Vargas to comply with the resolution of this meeting to send Brazilian soldiers to the Korean War. The implementation of the resolution adopted at the meeting rested on Art. 8 of the Inter-American Treaty on Mutual Assistance, according to which no member state of this treaty was obliged to provide its troops to the collective armed forces without its consent. With this reservation in mind, Brazil's position was decisive.

The economic weight and political authority of Brazil allowed it already in the early 1950s to captivate other Latin American states with its example, which would be extremely important for the United States. By that time, more than 1.5 million people had already died on both sides in the Korean War. The USA suffered heavy losses. After the entry into the war of the Chinese "volunteers" in October 1950 and the appearance of Soviet pilots in Korea, the war began to acquire a protracted character, more and more approaching the state of "heavy stalemate". The victory of the UN troops (the backbone of which were Americans) could now be ensured only if an atomic bomb was dropped on China or fresh portions of "cannon fodder" were

urgently delivered to Korea. The forces of 15 states - allies of the United States were no longer enough, and Washington looked at Brazilians with special hope. In a letter to Vargas, Truman wrote, "American soldiers need a respite, possible only if they are replaced with fresh reinforcements".

At the Consultative Meeting, the Brazilian delegate acknowledged the importance of fighting "world communism". However, following the instructions of his president, J. Nevis da Fontoura voiced the idea that, for a start, the United States would "help Brazil financially" by providing loans for development needs. "Letting our country be drawn into a war on the other side of the planet was not part of the plans of Vargas and the Brazilian military," - writes Vargas' biographer Lyra Neto. However, Truman, in his letter, made it clear that he intends to condition the provision of loans and economic assistance to the preliminary dispatch of Brazilian soldiers to Korea. (Neto, 2013).

Apparently, Getulio Vargas decided to act the same way as in the late 1930's in the case of the construction of the Volta Redonda metallurgical plant: to condition Brazil's solidarity with the United States by providing it with the necessary loans, and at the same time delay the decision as much as possible in order to allow the situation to "mature". To begin with, J. Nevis da Fontoura had to ask for a loan of \$300 million to Brazil in exchange for monthly supplies to the United States of 500 thousand tons of manganese - a metal necessary for the production of weapons-grade alloys and uncertain volumes of monazite sand¹⁶ - a raw material that is used in nuclear reactors for

16 Weakly radioactive mineral containing uranium and thorium. Occurs in the form of crystals. First discovered in Brazil in 1880.

uranium production. However, the United States didn't seem to have much time left.

“We will not surrender to them like lambs to the slaughter,” - this phrase of Getulio Vargas has become historical. On June 30, 1951, US Deputy Secretary of State E. Miller sent a telegram to UN Force Commander in Korea General M. Ridgway that it is no longer worth counting on the help of the Brazilians.

Until the end of the Korean War, the United States did not succeed in attracting its “privileged ally” to the fighting in Asia. Of all the Latin American countries, only Colombia sent a battalion of soldiers and an old frigate to Korea to “show the flag”. Ecuador got off with a batch of blankets and sacks of rice. For three years of fighting in Korea, the Americans did not acquire military glory for themselves. Their losses exceeded 50 thousand people (out of almost 480 000 contingent), and the goals of the war - the unification of Korea under the auspices of the south and the elimination of the North Korean regime - were never achieved. Leaving the Brazilian Foreign Ministry after another unproductive conversation with the minister about sending Brazilian soldiers, US Ambassador Herschel Johnson threw words that announced to the world that time was starting to work against Getulio Vargas: “Mr. Vargas is playing with fire: he risks not sitting out before the end of his term”. (Neto, 2013).

As an experienced politician, Getulio Vargas understood that he urgently needed to do something to restore the former level of US-Brazilian relations. In 1952, J. Nevis da Fontoura signed a Bilateral Military Treaty with the United States, which text was prepared during the presidency of G. Dutra. This treaty did not provide for the establishment of American bases on Brazilian soil or the automatic involvement of Brazilians in United States military operations. In exchange for the old American weapons left

over from the World War II, Brazil pledged to supply Washington in unlimited quantities of manganese and monazite sand for the needs of the US nuclear industry. The United States insisted on the inclusion in the text of the treaty of an article that prohibited Brazil from supplying these strategic materials to any other country without the US Department of State permission. In addition, all contradictions that could arise during the implementation of its articles were to be resolved based on American laws.

“For the first time since the liberation of our country from Portugal, laws that were not passed by our parliament and government will be in force on its territory,” - the Brazilian National Congress announced. Getulio Vargas, “reluctantly” went to sign this agreement, because he was supposed to “guarantee the participation of Americans in national development projects in the amount of \$ 500 million”.

This sacrifice, however, did not pay off. The July 1952 visit of US Secretary of State Dean Acheson to Brazil showed that Vargas’ policy did not find understanding among the broad masses of Brazilians, who came up with the slogans: “Acheson - get out!” and “Acheson - go home!” And the attitude towards the President of Brazil in the United States, in spite of everything, has become persistently negative. (Neto, 2013).

Inside the country, the top military united with the liberal opposition and began to demand the resignation of Vargas. Many of those military who fought alongside the Americans in World War II have exaggerated memories of them. These military did not trust the president and believed the malicious propaganda that the “hidden communist” in him would still show himself. In addition, in contrast to the “hothouse” conditions of the New State, the famous political maneuvering of J. Vargas under the conditions of democracy began failing and the methods that

brought him success back in the 1930s lost their novelty in the 1950s. None of the parties of the domestic political process at that crucial period in Brazilian history wanted to notice the difference between the president's long-term strategy aimed at accelerating the country's modernization and his tactics possible only under such conditions. A political vacuum around the figure of Getulio Vargas began forming.

Taken to the limit by the war in Korea, G. Truman put off the affairs of the Western Hemisphere for later. Republican D. Eisenhower, who replaced him, decided at once to put an end to the illusions of his southern neighbors regarding the hypothetical Marshall Plan for Latin America, which they counted on by signing the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty, and bilateral military agreements with Washington.

The deterioration of the post-war world economic situation and the drop in demand for Brazilian goods have had a heavy impact on the country's economy. In 1952, inflation was almost 13%, and in the foreign trade balance, which was in surplus a year before, two years had a deficit of \$ 280 million. The emissaries of Vargas on returning from Washington, where they had met with Eisenhower, reported to him that the policy of the new US president towards Latin America did not imply any special status for Brazil. In practice, this meant the end of the recently created Bilateral US-Brazilian Economic Commission to finance the construction of industrial facilities in Brazil. The "Good Neighbor policy" of F.D. Roosevelt became the property of history. Within the framework of the regime for all Latin American countries, the provision of loans was conditional on the creation of a favorable investment climate. "For Brazil, this was becoming a serious problem, because the law, which limited the transfer of profits abroad, undermined the confidence of foreign investors

in it," - wrote the daughter of J. Vargas, Alzira in her memoirs. These innovations dealt a blow to the president's economic bills, which were being discussed in the National Congress, in particular, on the creation of Petrobras. The establishment of a state monopoly on oil really threatened the interests of the American Standard Oil. The US President's special envoy Milton Eisenhower, who soon visited Brazil, confirmed the information about Washington's unilateral termination of the activities of the Bilateral Commission. It became clear that plans for the development of the transport network and port facilities, metallurgy and energy, chemical industry and agriculture in Brazil would be left without credit. "He was experiencing a moment of serious depression," - recalled this period in the life of Getulio Alzira Vargas. (Мартынов, 2022). (Martynov, 2022).

"The American Illusion" turned out to be a tragedy. As a result of harassment organized in the press and unproven accusations of organizing an "attempt" on an opposition journalistlife (today we would call it the methods of the classic "color revolution"), on August 24, 1954, Getulio Vargas committed suicide. Tens of thousands of people gathered for his funeral in Rio de Janeiro.

Picture 12 - The funeral of G. Vargas in Rio de Janeiro on August 26, 1954



Source: Author/Photographer – unknown. 1954.

G. Vargas attempt by to return to the methods of traditional diplomacy under the conditions of almost complete US domination in Latin America in the post-war period (1945-1959), turned into a natural defeat. In his suicide letter, he clearly outlined the forces that made him take the fatal step:

(...) powerful international groups linked up with internal forces that rebelled against the government of universal employment. A law restricting the transfer of foreign corporations' excess profits overseas has been delayed in Congress. An infamous hate campaign has been unleashed against the upward revision of the minimum wage. I wanted to strengthen national independence by relying on national wealth, but before I had time to create Petrobras, a wave of indignation immediately began to build up. The obstacles built on the path of Electrobras turned out to be

insurmountable. They don't want to see the Brazilian worker free. They do not want to see the Brazilian people independent ... Profits of foreign companies reached 500% per annum. Due to legalized fraud in customs regulations, our imports brought in annual damage of up to \$ 100 million. When the coffee overproduction crisis hit, we resorted to valorising our main export product in order to raise the price of it. The answer was tough pressure on our economy, as a result of which we were forced to retreat ... If birds of prey are thirsty for someone's blood and are going to continue to squeeze all the juices out of the Brazilian people, then they sacrifice my life. I choose this means in order to stay with my people forever (...) (Мартынов, 2022). (Martynov, 2022).

After reading these lines, it is difficult to agree that the suicide of J. Vargas was an act of despair. As a sophisticated politician, he understood that he would be able to preserve his positive image among the people and guarantee the country's return to the course, which he was never allowed to complete, only in this non-trivial way. Abstracting from the rational, which at the height of the Cold War did not give up hope that Brazil would ever be able to break out into the category of strong and independent states, he relied on the irrational - the emotions that fueled the patriotism of Brazilians and their belief in the future of their country.

While agreeing that there was a certain calculation in the president's suicide, Rubens Ricupero speaks at the same time about the "mystery" of Vargas, whose diplomacy was "contradictory" and, at times, even "dual" in nature. According to the Brazilian diplomat, the almost direct accusation of the CIA contained in the suicide letter clearly "does not fit" with the policy

of “automatic alignment” with the United States, which Getulio Vargas allegedly continued after Dutra. As proof, one can cite the example of the “anti-communist resolution” of the X Inter-American Conference (Caracas, March 1954), which allowed the United States to commit aggression against Guatemala. Together with other states of the region, the representative of Brazil also voted for this resolution. “Where is the real Getulio?” - asks a reasonable question R. Ricupero. Nevertheless, immediately replies himself:

In any case, in those years there were no objective conditions for Brazil to pursue that nationalist and neutralist course in international affairs, which J. Vargas wrote about in his last letter. He no longer had the opportunity to balance the way he balanced between the United States and Nazi Germany in the pre-war period. (Ricupero, 2017).

Obviously, this is the root of the so-called “mystery” of Getulio Vargas, who knew how to “step on the throat of his own song” in order to ensure the security of his country. Like his idol, Baron de Rio Branco, J. Vargas could sacrifice short-term interests for the sake of long-term ones, considering his main task to win time and money to ensure the development of the country. As a good diplomat and an experienced politician, he understood that if “weak” Brazil could afford to pursue an independent foreign policy “here and now,” it would not last long. In addition, subsequent events showed it.

Chapter 3

AN “INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY”

The Pan American operation of J. Kubitschek.

Constructive nationalism, the basis of Getulio Vargas’s domestic policy, sprouted in foreign policy shortly after his tragic death. That circumstance was reflected in the change of course of the new leadership of the country. The “Interregnum”, which lasted from August 1954 to October 3, 1955, when the vice-president Café Filho was acting as president of the country, was characterized by frequent changes in government officials, including foreign ministers. At that time, the reactionaries –“entregisters”, who managed to drive Vargas to suicide, were not able to consolidate their victory for a long time: the massive popular demonstrations of the supporters of the deceased president, which broke out throughout the country, did not allow them to change sharply the internal and foreign policy of Brazil. The journalist Carlos Lacerda, who made a special “contribution” to the tragic fate of the “Father of the Brazilian Nation”, as G. Vargas was called among the people, was forced to emigrate abroad, fearing for his life.

The United States, while pandering to the anti-Vargas campaign, hoped, however, that the government, led by the former vice-president Café Filho, would blindly follow instructions from Washington. It is no coincidence that Brazil was immediately issued an American loan of \$ 200 million, which the US Federal Treasury systematically refused to J. Vargas. In response, the Café Filho government lifted all restrictions imposed by the previous government on the transfers of foreign capital abroad. “Entregism” in foreign policy was illustrated by the refusal to restore diplomatic relations with the USSR, the recognition of the so-called “Hallstein Doctrine” in relation to the GDR and the refusal to recognize the People’s Republic of China.

The same years, it was born the doctrine of the Higher Military School of Brazil. Located in Rio de Janeiro, this elite educational institution, which graduated representatives of the military and civilian elites, was at the peak of Brazilian foreign policy thought. Correctly linking the country’s economic development with its security, the Higher Military School doctrine called for “automatic alignment” with the United States, mistakenly seeing this country as the guarantor of Brazil’s economic development. At the same time, it proclaimed the so-called doctrine of “ideological boundaries”, which actually followed the American policy of “containment and rejection of communism”. It seemed that Brazil would obediently follow in the wake of the foreign policy of the United States.

During the 1950s, Brazilian society managed to go through an accelerated path of social and political development and maturation. The urban population grew at an accelerated rate, illiteracy declined, the middle class grew, the working class and the national bourgeoisie developed. Urbanization and industrialization required expanding markets outside the Western

Hemisphere and pursuing a foreign policy that would meet the national interests of the country as an emerging major power.

The international situation was changing. The beginning of the anti-colonial struggle, including the Portuguese colonies in Africa, the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement, the launch of the first Soviet artificial earth satellite, and the emergence of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community as a force capable of resisting the United States, have changed it. The decolonization process led to the emergence of dozens of new independent states with their own national interests. Now Brazil and other Latin American countries could no longer feel alone vis-à-vis their northern neighbor. But the main blow to the undivided domination of the United States in Latin America was the Cuban Revolution.

Picture 13 - Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira



Source: Author/Photographer – unknown.

Changes in Brazilian foreign policy began after the victory in the presidential elections on October 3, 1954, by Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira (1902-1976), the former governor of the state of Minas Gerais, a descendant of Czech immigrants. He took up the plans for the modernization of the giant country, developed during Getulio Vargas. However, in his calculations, he staked not on heavy industry, but on raising the living standard of people, creating a mass consumer stratum and a capacious internal market capable of absorbing the goods produced in the country. At the same time, J. Kubitschek, or as he was popularly called **Zhota Ka** (after the first letters of his name and surname), intended to open new foreign markets for Brazilian products. Zhota Ka promised to bring Brazil into the rank of advanced states in 50 years.

The most notable result of the reign of J. Kubitschek was the transfer of the capital from coastal Rio de Janeiro to the center of the country, to the so-called Planalto Central, where a new futuristic city called Brasilia was built in 5 years. The capital was officially moved from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia on April 21, 1960.

The construction of Brasilia was fraught with enormous difficulties and financial costs. It employed up to 30 thousand people who arrived from different parts of the country. Opponents blamed J. Kubitschek for the high cost of the project, for the fact that the construction of the “city of the future” unleashed the spiral of inflation, etc. But history has proved the president’s rightness. The transfer of the capital from Rio to Brasilia had deep economic, political and symbolic implications. It also had serious foreign policy consequences.

Picture 14 - Itamaraty Palace in Brasilia



Source: Author/Photographer – unknown.

The emergence of the new capital was a key moment in the history of Brazil: from a relatively provincial and uninteresting to the outside world, it turned into an industrial giant. Moving away from the Atlantic ports - evidence of export dependence, - inland, Brazil simultaneously opened in breadth - in the direction of its underdeveloped central states and the vast Amazon basin, the markets of neighboring Latin American countries, and even farther, towards the Pacific Ocean. The architectural novelty of the new capital, designed by such eminent architects as O. Niemeyer and Lucio Costa, grabbed the attention of the world community for a long time, for the first-time making people talk about Brazil as a “emerging great power” at the global level.

The Brazilian Foreign Ministry was one of the last to leave the former capital. Its employees, not without regret, left the well-lived former palace Itamaraty in Rio de Janeiro. However, it was not the conservatism of the diplomats that caused the

delay in the inevitable relocation. “New Itamaraty” or “Palace of Arches” - one of the most remarkable creations of O. Niemeyer, by the time of the inauguration of the new capital wasn’t ready yet. From now on, the Foreign Ministry officials had to expand seriously the range of their professional duties: President J. Kubitschek began to regionalize the country’s foreign policy, establishing ties with the countries of Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa.

The post of foreign minister under the new president was taken by career diplomat José Carlos di Macedo Soares (1883-1968). Until 1958, Brazil, as if by inertia still continued moving along the trajectory outlined by the United States. J. Kubitschek’s first foreign visit was to Washington in order to obtain new loans. The visit to the United States was followed by a visit to Western Europe: new investments and loans were badly needed for the construction of Brasilia and the implementation of accelerated social programs. For this, Itamaraty tirelessly declared his unconditional adherence to the values of Western Christian civilization, avoided recognition of the national liberation movement in the Portuguese colonies and did not miss the opportunity to condemn the countries of the Soviet bloc (the events in Hungary in 1956). Gradually, however, this situation began to change.

Contrary to the hopes of Latin American countries, the 1950s did not usher in a new era of inter-American cooperation. Hopes for some form of Marshall Plan for Latin America collapsed simultaneously with the failures of the Inter-American economic conferences in Rio de Janeiro in 1954 and in Buenos Aires in 1957. Brazil’s economic situation was dire: inflation in 1957 stood at 20%, and the cost of living in the first semester of 1958 had risen by 10% compared to 1957. The Plan of Goals

presented by J. Kubitschek at the start of his presidency had its central aim as “50 in 5” (meaning the goal of achieving fifty years’ progress in five), but it was threatened by intensified strikes and widespread discontent. In March 1958, an IMF mission to Brazil recommended that the government freeze wages, reduce government spending, and lower inflation to 6% as conditions for securing another loan.

Starting in 1958, President J. Kubitschek’s foreign policy began to adopt an increasingly active, independent, and open character. In May, the President of Brazil, in a letter to U.S. President D. Eisenhower, raised the issue of resuming cooperation in the Western Hemisphere in a multilateral format to restore continental unity. J. Kubitschek proposed a series of measures known as the Pan American Operation (OPA). The very fact that the President of a Latin American country initiated this independent proposal, urging the United States to return to the ideals of Pan-Americanism that had been widely discussed, signified several important developments.

First, it affirmed the growing political and economic influence of Brazil in the Latin American political landscape, where others had been accustomed to receiving “instructions from above” without presenting their own suggestions. Second, it highlighted the U.S.’s neglect of the interests and needs of its southern neighbors, absorbed as it was in the global struggle against the “communist threat.” “It’s time,” wrote J. Kubitschek, “to finally admit that the Pan-American idea has been seriously tarnished in the eyes of world public opinion. There is a prevailing impression that we no longer understand each other on our continent. Something must be done to restore continental unity.”

The essence of J. Kubitschek’s proposal revolved around the United States recognizing the imperatives of economic, scientific,

and technological development in Latin American countries, while simultaneously increasing its role and importance in international affairs, Vizentini quotes a statement of Zhota Ka:

Despite the well-known economic difficulties associated with development problems, our country, spiritually and materially, has reached a level that makes it necessary to recognize its right to be listened to. We can't continue (...) counting on the continuation of the automatic and traditional policy of solidarity or solidarity associated with the factor of geography (...) Our nation felt that it has matured and is able to independently assume all responsibility in conducting such a foreign policy that meets its national interests (Vizentini, 1995)

The Brazilian president's idea immediately met with support from neighboring Argentina. During the official visit to the United States, the President of that country, A. Frondisi, called J. Kubitschek's plan "an expression of the natural striving of Latin American countries for progress". In this regard, the OPA could be viewed not only as a kind of lifeline for an ambitious president, but also as a last chance, that Brazil, the spokesman for the interests of the entire Latin American region, gave the United States to revive the ideals of "true Pan-Americanism". Moreover, in this regard, we can agree with P. Vizentini that the Pan-American operation by J. Kubitschek "opened a new page in the history of Brazilian diplomacy". (Vizentini, 1995).

The initial reaction of US President D. Eisenhower to the OPA was rather cold. The Brazilian political scientist V. da Silva rightly pointed out that the United States would never agree to any country in the Western Hemisphere pursuing its own regional and world policy without regard to Washington. In

August 1958, US Secretary of State J. Foster Dulles paid an official visit to Rio de Janeiro. The visit, according to press reports, ended in failure. Dulles brought to Kubitschek a proposal to rally even more closely in the fight against the “intrigues of international communism”, completely ignoring OPA. The only concrete result of this meeting was the US consent to create the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in the Western Hemisphere.

Taking into account the positive reaction of all Latin American countries to the proposal of J. Kubitschek, a committee of representatives of 21 countries was created within the OAS to discuss and implement it. At the same time, it was spread the idea of creating a regional common market (later -Latin American Free Trade Association - ALALC). However, the main goal of J. Kubitschek to achieve something special, corresponding to the new reality of Brazil, its status in the region and in relations with the United States (what immediately after the end of the World War II G. Vargas sought to achieve) - failed.

In May, Francisco Negro de Lima was appointed to the post of Foreign Minister. He was going to promote the idea of OPA, while simultaneously activating ties with the countries and new regions for Brazil: Asia, Africa and the states of Eastern Europe. In November 1958J. Kubitschek voiced the idea of restoring diplomatic relations with the USSR, and it was set up aspecial commission in Itamaraty to deal with this issue. Earlier, Brazil established trade relations with Romania, Yugoslavia and GDR. In response to the views of opponents, Kubitschek himself has expressed the sense that if the United States do not promote Brazilian goods to their markets and do not invest in Brazil, then the country would be ready to look for appropriate solutions into other regions, including Eastern Europe.

But not only supporters of “automatic alignment” with the United States opposed to the Pan American Operation, but also such masters of Brazilian diplomacy as former Chancellor Osvaldo Aranha. “I don’t think, - he said, - that any country has managed to achieve national greatness through external assistance and loans.” Aranha was an active supporter of the restoration of relations with the USSR and the development of trade with the countries of the *Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)*.

In the middle of 1959 J. Kubitschek came up with the idea of holding a transcontinental business forum “Brazil - Asian countries”, which immediately caused a flurry of criticism from the “entregisters”. It was the first Brazilian attempt to build economic and political bridges outside its hemisphere. In June, Brazil, after months of unsuccessful negotiations, severed relations with the IMF. The President blamed the “enemies of independent Brazil” of trying to achieve national surrender by transferring its industry into the hands of foreigners. Therefore, there were clearly visible the motives of Getulio Vargas’ suicide letter.

The refusal of the United States to provide Brazil with the necessary loans and heed the proposals about OPA program made a reshuffle in the country’s government inevitable. J. Kubitschek appointed Horacio Lafer (1900 - 1965), a banker and a spokesman for national entrepreneurship, to the post of Foreign Minister. His activities as foreign minister coincided with an event that radically changed the entire course of regional and global international relations - the Cuban Revolution.

From now on, the dispute about what is the source of instability in the region - poverty, as most Latin Americans believed, or the malicious intrigues of the Soviet-Chinese bloc, as it was believed in Washington, went beyond the correspondence

between J. Kubitschek and D. Eisenhower, and acquired purely practical character.

The Brazilian Foreign Ministry tried to adhere to the middle line in this dispute, but the very course of the historical process forced it to follow the line of strengthening national independence. This was also facilitated by the radicalization of moods within the country, which began, largely thanks to the Cuban Revolution. «Brazilian nationalism, which developed rapidly during these years, - noted P. Vizentini- was of a specific nature. On the one hand, it moved the official foreign policy of the state, on the other, it was pushed by the actions of the opposition”. (Vizentini, 1995).

Picture 15 - Memorial J. Kubitschek in Brasilia



Source: Author/Photographer – unknown.

At the 6th and 7th OAS Foreign Ministers' Consultative Meetings, where the "Cuban issue" was discussed, Brazil, contrary to Washington's desire to accuse Cuba of violating Pan American solidarity, insisted on non-interference in the affairs of Island of Liberty. Regardless of whether J. Kubitschek had personal sympathy for F. Castro or not, it was more important for him to defend two fundamental principles on which the relations between "two Americas" were to be built from now on. They were outlined in his program of Pan American Operation: *non-interference in internal affairs and the establishment of a clear link between security and development issues.*

Views on an "Independent Foreign Policy".

In the late 1950s - early 1960s the concept of the developing state is begins dominating in Brazil, where the state was assigned a leading role in accelerating industrialization, planning and administrative reform. The doctrine of a pragmatic and independent foreign policy gradually began to gain strength on this basis. Departing from an exclusive orientation towards the United States, the country turns towards constructive nationalism with a "universalist" characteristic. There were serious internal and external preconditions for this turnabout.

In 1961, Brazil's population reached 72 million, 20 million more than at the end of the Vargas era. The urban population grew at the rapid rate, with an ever-increasing outflow of the rural population to large cities. For the first time, industrial products in the country's GDP surpassed agricultural ones. The positions of the national bourgeoisie and the working class were consolidated, political parties and trade unions were strengthened. Politicians could no longer lock themselves in their own

narrow party interests; they needed to seek support from the masses. (Vargas, 2006).

The economic crisis has resulted in falling prices for traditional Brazilian exports: coffee, sugar, cotton, soybeans and iron ore. Falling export earnings have reduced imports and increased external debt. On this background, the refusal of the United States to cooperate with Brazil on a preferential basis and their disregard for the Pan American operation plan by J. Kubitschek caused a negative reaction not only in Brazil, but also throughout Latin America. This reaction fully manifested itself in 1958, as the cold reception given to the US Vice President R. Nixon during his tour of the countries of the region.

The Cuban revolution, which took place under the banner of nationalism, but in the harsh conditions of the Cold War, was forced to become socialist, accumulated contradictions. It showed that a close-knit people can challenge a powerful empire even where its omnipotence seemed to be undivided until now - in Latin America. The revolution in Cuba became a powerful catalyst for the strategy of Brazil's transition to the doctrine of Independent Foreign Policy, whose first manifestations, however, began under J. Vargas, and continued to develop under J. Kubitschek.

Having won the presidential elections in 1960, the governor of the state of Sao Paulo Janio Quadros (1917 - 1992), seemed to have become an opponent of the course that was started under G. Vargas. He appointed ultra-conservatives to the post of war ministers, and tough "monetarists" to the economic bloc. The appointment of the head of Itamaraty Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco (1905 - 1990) - a diplomat, lawyer, historian, writer and one of the founders of the Democratic National Unity party, which since its creation was in opposition to G. Vargas

and supported the course of close cooperation with the United States, seemed strange against this background. “The paradox of Afonso Arinos was that, - wrote his biographer, famous Brazilian diplomat and politician Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, - as a conservative politician, he became the author of the doctrine of the Independent Foreign Policy (IFP) and its most active promoter.” (Guimarães, 2000).

Picture 16 - Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco



Source: Author/Photographer – unknown. Arquivo Nacional.
Fundo Agência Nacional, 1945.

Through all his activities as a minister, which lasted only 205 days (!), Afonso Arinos proved that the national interests of Brazil, if correctly understood and creatively comprehended, stand above party affiliation and any ideological clichés. The son of the famous diplomat, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil in

the 1930s, Afranio de Melo Franco, Afonso Arinos, managed to leave a noticeable mark on the history of Brazilian foreign policy.

The transition to IFP was accompanied by a reform of the Foreign Ministry apparatus. Afonso Arinos prepared a draft of 107 chapters for its implementation. The reform was designed for a period of 10 years and was perceived as an ongoing process of reorganizing the ministry, aimed at increasing its receptivity to the international situation and to forecasting international relations.

On March 10, 1961, the Service for the Promotion of Foreign Trade Interests (SEPRO) was established within Itamaraty. Its functions included the increased activities of the Brazilian trade missions abroad. Because of the decentralization of the administrative apparatus, in the ministry appeared departments, formed according to a geographical principle, and the services involved in administrative and diplomatic functions were divided. The reform increased the independence of the Foreign Ministry from the executive branch, giving more powers to the minister and the general secretary, a professional diplomat who headed the ministry's secretariat.

The internal basis of the IFP was the reliance on the masses with the help of the "Brazilian ideology", which began to spread at the official level. The establishment and development of new contacts outside the Western Hemisphere was supposed to contribute to the development of foreign trade, saturation of the domestic market and the acceleration of economic development. Even the most inveterate monetarists in the government of Janio Quadros could not fail to understand this. Soon the personal sympathies of the president became apparent – he was impressed by such independent politicians as De Gaulle, Tito and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

“We renounce subordinate and imposed diplomacy that meets the interests not of our own people, but of foreigners, and in order to protect our rights, we come to the fore, as we are convinced of our ability to act on our own to establish mutual understanding between peoples.” The main directions of IFP were clarified in the message of President J. Quadros to the National Congress on 20 March, 1961, which was sent to the embassies and diplomatic missions of Brazil and to international organizations. It noted that the foreign policy of a democratic country like Brazil should be adequately represented in the world around it. A country that can be proud of its representative democracy, racial tolerance and culture free of prejudice, is ready to participate in the fight against poverty and economic underdevelopment. Renewed and free from opportunistic external commitments, Brazil, which has already achieved unequivocal influence in international relations, is constantly expanding its opportunities for deliberate action in the international arena and taking on subsequent responsibility. Our country must pursue a foreign policy that reflects our individuality, our special conditions and our national interests. It will have to correspond to the common aspirations of mankind for economic development, peace and security, for respect for human rights, social justice and racial equality, for self-determination and cooperation among peoples. (Vargas, 2008).

J. Quadros strove to see Brazil as a medium-developed state in world politics, an independent mediator in disputes between the great powers. He declared:

“Brazil is a continental-scale power, occupying almost half of all South America, relatively close to Africa and including representatives of all races: European, Asian and African. In the

next decade, our population will exceed 100 million, and the accelerated economic development of some regions heralds its transformation into a major economic power". (Mensagem Presidencial ao. Congresso Nacional. Capitulo IV. Politica Externa do Brasil//Documentos da Politica Externa Independente. 2007. V.2, P.49-50).

"Brazil, - noted P. Visentini, - tried to achieve diplomatic autonomy and increase its negotiating capabilities, based on internal and external realities for the best integration into the world system, meeting the needs of economic development and improving the well-being of citizens". (Vizentini, 1995).

J. Quadros immediately begins to take practical steps to achieve these goals. In 1961, he restored diplomatic relations with the USSR, which were severed in 1947, then he established them with the PRC and a number of socialist countries of Eastern Europe. He sent a delegation headed by Ambassador Joao Dantas to the Eastern Europe in order to increase the trade with these countries. In 1958, according to statistics, the volume of Brazilian trade with the socialist countries of Europe amounted to 3.3% of the country's foreign trade turnover, with the USSR - 6.3%, and had a tendency to increase. In May of the same year, Brazil sent to Moscow a large trade delegation headed by Minister Paulo Leao da Moura. There were opened permanent trade missions in Moscow and Rio d-Janeiro.

Itamaraty seriously strengthened ties with the developing countries of Asia and Africa. Brazilian delegation was present as an observer at the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade, and supported the main criteria of non-alignment, which were proposed by India in Cairo on June 5-13, 1961.

African countries, as J. Quadros has repeatedly stated, are today a new direction of Brazilian foreign policy. "We are connected with this continent by ethnic and cultural roots and share with it its desire to achieve an independent position in the modern world. Our country should become a connecting thread, a bridge between Africa and the civilization of the West". (Documentos da Política Externa Independente. 2007. V.2).

In March 1961, it was established a Working Group on African Countries in Itamaraty, for a more in-depth study of relations with the countries of the Black Continent. An independent Institute of Afro-Asian Studies appeared in the country. In April, Brazilian embassies were opened in Senegal, Nigeria, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Ethiopia, and consulates were established in Congo (Leopoldville) and Kenya. At the same time, there were recorded the first contacts of the official Brazilian delegation with representatives of the MPLA (The Movement for the Independence of Angola). Under Quadros, Brazil for the first time departed from the double position regarding the anti-colonial struggle that had flared up all over the world, when its "welcome" by the official Rio de Janeiro did not extend to the struggle for the independence of the African colonies of Portugal.

J. Quadros and A. Arinos literally "revolutionized" Brazil's foreign policy, both in terms of improving its ideological baggage and in terms of the practical actions taken,"- noted P. Vizentini. (Vizentini, 1995).

It is worth to note the position of Itamaraty on the most acute issue of Inter-American politics and international relations of those years - the Cuban Revolution. Cuba, positioning itself as a counterweight to the United States in the region, seriously increased the negotiating potential of Brazil and other Latin American countries. The most radical revolution that took

place in the Western Hemisphere in the 20th century, significantly accelerated the integration processes on the continent. In 1960, it was created the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC) - the first attempt of economic integration in Latin American region, undertaken immediately following the creation of the EU.

The plans to revive the “Union of ABC”, which first appeared during the reign of Baron de Rio Branco, also revived. On April 21, 1961, the presidents of Brazil and Argentina - J. Cuadros and A. Frondizi, having met in Uruguayana on the border of these two countries, signed a joint declaration. In the Uruguayana Declaration, both states agreed to coordinate their positions on international issues through the exchange of information and regular consultations, stating the need to strengthen economic interdependence. The declaration was opened for other Latin American countries to join.

In addition to the policy of blackmail and intimidation, the main attempt by the United States to respond to the Cuban challenge was the Alliance for Progress program, which was solemnly announced by President John F. Kennedy, which was three years late in comparison with the Pan American Operation by J. Kubitschek. The Inter-American Conference, which launched the Alliance for Progress program, was opened in the Uruguayan city of Punta del Este on August 5, 1961. “There is no doubt, - wrote the Brazilian historian Clodoaldo Bueno, - that such a radical change in Washington’s position regarding the states of the region occurred only thanks to the Cuban revolution, as a result, the “Kennedy Plan” in Latin America was often referred to as the “Fidel Castro Plan”.

It should be noted one circumstance that, in our opinion, will soon have a serious impact on the Independent Foreign

Policy, on the history of Brazil, and on the Latin American region as a whole.

The Cuban delegate took part in the conference in Punta del Este, and the charismatic E. Che Guevara, returning from the conference on August 19, 1961, visited Brazil, where J. Quadros personally awarded him the highest Brazilian order - the Order of the Southern Cross. This, it seemed, was not such a significant event, superimposed on the soon following circumstances associated with the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, will permanently change the political landscape of Latin America.

According to P. Vizentini, Quadros's "defiant" behavior hastened the process of his resignation. R. Ricupero also believes that the diplomacy of J. Quadros was characterized by "sometimes abrupt and unjustified steps". It differed from the diplomacy of J. Kubitschek with his great alienation from the United States, in comparison with the desire to strengthen coordination with Argentina (Declaration of Uruguayana) and other Latin American countries, with African states and leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement: Nasser, Nehru, Sukarno and Tito. For Quadros relations along the North-South line have acquired an equal importance, if not more, than relations along the West-East line. (Vizentini, 1995).

The United States, which by that time had reached the level of direct-armed conflict with Cuba, could not forgive Brazil for its neutral position in relation to the country, which openly violated the principles of Pan American solidarity. The awarding of the Brazilian Order to E. Che Guevara was obviously "the last straw" for Washington. This episode was the reason for the internal opposition to launch an organized offensive against the government of J. Quadros. His abdication from power on August 25, 1961 was the result of an accelerated radicalization of the

country's foreign policy, sometimes insufficiently thought out in the context of an aggravated bipolar confrontation, for which neither internal nor external forces were ready.

J. Goulart and the End of an "Independent Foreign Policy".

After the resignation of J. Quadros, a regime of parliamentary democracy was established in Brazil. Former vice-president João Goulart assumed the highest government post, and the government was headed by Tancredo Neves, the former Minister of Justice in the last government of J. Vargas. The Brazilian representative to the UN, a well-known lawyer and career diplomat Santiago Dantas (1911-1964) was appointed to the post of foreign minister. The most important place in his activities was immediately taken by the Cuban question.

At the VIII Consultative Meeting held in Punta del Este (Uruguay) in January 1962, the USA, contrary to the provision of the OAS Charter on the impossibility of excluding a member state, tried to exclude Cuba from this organization, to force the rest of its members to break off diplomatic relations with Island of Liberty and declare political and economic sanctions against it. As a result, the United States, by a majority vote, managed to exclude the "government" of Cuba (and not the "state") from the OAS, but it failed to gain support from the largest countries in the region - Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, as well as Chile and Ecuador. These countries, having agreed, in principle, with the thesis about "the hostility of Marxism-Leninism to the principles of the Inter-American system" (Cuba announced its intention to follow the path of socialism on May 1, 1961), believed that the OAS could not be a body that could adopt sanctions without full powers from the UN Security Council, ignore the rights

of sovereign governments and engage in interference in internal affairs. There was an acute sense of the presence of a clear and impartial legal argumentation in the position of the Latin Americans, and one of its authors was Santiago Dantas, an international lawyer who worked in the early 1950s as a representative of Brazil at the Permanent International Court of Arbitration in Hague. Speaking to members of the Chamber of Deputies of the National Congress of Brazil, the minister said:

Based on the rule of law and relying on its own convictions, Brazil has taken a common position with representatives of the other four states, which in terms of population, level of economic development and culture make up more than two-thirds of all Latin America. These countries clearly stood on the side of international law. (Vargas, 2008).

S. Dantas wrote about his attitude to the IFP, that the independent foreign policy, which I adopted when I came to the post of foreign minister and tried to develop further, was not formulated in advance, as a ready-made plan: events and facts clearly outstripped ideas. The steps taken by the Foreign Ministry were based on events taking place outside the country. Their generalization and systematization were carried out taking into account:

- a. the national interests of the country;
- b. the needs of economic development;
- c. the need for a historical reconciliation of two principles: the regime of representative democracy and the movement for the emancipation of workers. There was a keen sense of an attempt to comprehend the current reality from a legal standpoint in these words.

In March 1962, at the UN conference on disarmament in Geneva, Brazil positioned itself as a country belonging to Western civilization, but not part of any military-political blocs (while ignoring participation in the Rio-de-Janeiro Pact. Auth). Brazil strongly condemned the nuclear tests conducted by the United States, which clearly contradicted Washington's policy.

In the spring of 1962, the nationalist discourse was reinforced by the National Congress endorsement of presidential decrees that nationalized foreign energy and telephone companies and limited 10% of the profits of foreign companies (mostly American) transferred abroad that were registered in Brazil. By adopting these laws, the country de facto again entered the same path of confrontation with the United States. The US Ambassador to Rio - de - Janeiro, Lincoln Gordon, commented on them in the sense that Brazil "has re-entered the radical left path of development".

Starting from July 1962, when Brazil, because of a referendum, from parliamentary became a presidential republic again and real power was concentrated in the hands of President, J. Goulart began to take active measures to continue the IFP. However, he had to do this in the face of growing internal and external opposition. After the Cuban Revolution and the building of Berlin Wall, political parties in Brazil were qualitatively radicalized.

As noted by P. Vizentini,

the CIA has seriously increased its activities in the country. It provided support to entrepreneurs, politicians and the opposition-minded military. Under the unspoken auspices of the CIA, there were created such social structures as, for example, the Institute for Social Research

and the Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action, closely associated with the Higher Military School. They all received financial assistance from the US government and multinational corporations, and collected information, prepared relevant studies in order to turn the public against the government and the president. (Vizentini, 2004).

The post of Foreign Minister in August 1963 was taken by Joao Augusto de Araujo Castro (1919 - 1975), a professional diplomat, head of the political and cultural department of Itamaraty. Of all the Brazilian foreign ministers of the period of Independent Foreign Policy of J. Goulart, it was he who remained in office for the shortest time (Santiago Dantas - 10 months, Hermes Lima - 9, Araujo Castro - 8). The theoretical legacy left by him, however, significantly exceeds the legacy of his predecessors in this post. It is noteworthy that in August 1961 he visited Moscow as part of the Brazilian delegation headed by J. Goulart.

Picture 17 - J.A. de Araujo Castro



Source: Galeria de ministros das Relações Exteriores do Brasil, 1965.

Speaking in September 1963 at the XVIII session of the UN General Assembly, the new Brazilian Foreign Minister defended the need to overcome the artificial restrictions imposed by the Cold War. He identified three basic principles of Brazilian foreign policy, which were called “3 D” - from the first letters of the words disarmament, development and decolonization (in Portuguese - desarmamento, desenvolvimento e descolonização). The “3-D Speech” is a combination of innovative policy initiatives with the traditional direction of Brazilian foreign policy. The Brazilian diplomat and statesman Ronaldo Mota Sardemberg called Araujo Castro’s “3 D Speech” a remarkable legacy of diplomacy of those years, which allowed Brazil to open a new path to understanding foreign policy reality.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 had a negative effect on affairs in all countries of Latin America without exception. The deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba provided additional arguments of those who earlier unfoundedly asserted about communist penetration into the countries of this region. In addition, the Soviet Union’s hasty withdrawal of its missiles from the island, without any preliminary consultations with Fidel Castro, seriously damaged the image of the USSR in Latin American countries, forcing it to be perceived as an unreliable ally. Brazil, along with most other Latin American states, having condemned the delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba from outside the Western Hemisphere at a meeting of the OAS Permanent Council, nevertheless refused to consider this *casus belli* worthy of enacting the mechanisms of the Rio- de -Janeiro Pact. The ships of the Brazilian Navy, unlike the warships of other Latin American countries, did not participate in the “quarantine” announced by J. Kennedy around Island of Liberty. In addition, Goulart’s envoy, chief of the president’s military cabinet, General

Albino Silva, sent to Cuba for an urgent meeting with F. Castro, told him that Brazil was still ready to defend Cuba's sovereignty and promote its rapprochement with the countries of the region.

Picture 18 - Joao Goulart



Source: Author/Photographer - Presidents Gallery.
Official photo of João Goulart, president of Brazil between 1961 and 1964.

“On the whole, - noted P. Visentini, - the missile crisis was a blow to Brazilian diplomacy, strengthening the US argumentation that the Cuban problem was due to an external factor. Defending the principle of non-interference is now much more difficult”. The “incidental victim” of this crisis was the cancellation of J. Kennedy’s planned visit to Brazil. But the crisis was just a pretext for this decision, which reflected the fact of the deterioration of bilateral Brazilian-American relations. (Vizentini, 2004).

Let us add here that the determination of Cuba to take care of its own security, expressed by F. Castro to A.I. Mikoyan at the Soviet-Cuban talks on the results of the Cuban missile crisis in

November 1962, had, in fact, the opposite effect and set aside the process of democratic development of most Latin American states a decade ago. Cuba's sponsorship of a guerrilla movement in Latin America provoked a natural reaction from the military and a wave of coups d'état, which began to decline only by the end of the "lost decade" of the 1980s. In Brazil, the appearance of the partisan detachments of K. Marigella and K. Lamarca extended the stay in power of the military, who overthrew the government of J. Goulart with the support of the United States on April 1, 1964.

The cancellation of John F. Kennedy's visit to Brazil did not mean that Washington's interest in the largest Latin American country was lost. On the contrary, from the conversation of J. Goulart with the president's brother, US Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who visited him at the Planalto Palace on December 17, 1962, it became clear that the attention of the United States was shifting to Brazil in order to prevent the appearance of a second Cuba in the region. In this conversation, which was attended by Ambassador Lincoln Gordon from the American side, Robert Kennedy expressed his dissatisfaction with Independent Foreign Policy, simultaneously presenting Brazil with something like an ultimatum: "Obviously, - said J. Kennedy, - that it (this policy-Auth.) causes irritation in public opinion and in Congress, and its continuation will make impossible the cooperation between our two countries". As testified R. Ricupero, who was present at this meeting as an interpreter, that in response to Goulart's request to directly name those anti-American steps that displeased the United States, R. Kennedy conveyed a note to L. Gordon, which said: "It seems that we will not achieve anything here". (Ricupero, 2017).

In October 1963, President J. Kennedy discussed with members of his cabinet the prospect of a military intervention in Brazil to secure the rise to power of a pro-American opposition, as follows from the tapes published later. Just at this time the foundations of Operation “Brother Sam” began to be laid, which would bring the military to power in April 1964.

Araujo Castro, realizing that the United States stubbornly wants to see in J. Goulart “the second Kerensky”, unsuccessfully tried to smooth out some of the sharpest corners of the IFP. He advocated a pragmatic foreign policy that could accelerating economic development. The minister urged the Brazilians to stop wavering between complacency and despondency, between the goals of economic development and the unfortunate metaphors that promise an inevitable fall into the abyss. In this discourse, he gave preference to the ideas of those politicians - technocrats, who would “give the tone” in the policy of military regimes beginning with the government of A. da Costa - e - Silva (1967-1969). He tried to “correct” the negative perception of Brazil in the United States and told that Brazil has never considered neutralism to be the basis of its foreign policy. Brazil is not part of any military-political bloc, but it is part of the system of Inter-American relations.

Araujo Castro tried to emphasize the need to ensure collective economic security, which testified to the intention to reduce the intensity of the third world rhetoric. The imperatives of increasing export opportunities in the context of the narrowness of the internal market did not allow excessive ideological “blinking”. Stressing the need for economic and social assistance to the overwhelming majority of the world’s population, who live in “sad conditions”, A. Castro proposed the creation of a specialized UN agency to promote development and the creation

of a multilateral mechanism to attract capital to underdeveloped countries. In order to reform the structure of international trade, Brazil took an active part in the preparation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development – UNCTAD, which began working in March 1964 in Geneva.

The topic of decolonization has traditionally been inconvenient for Brazil. Despite advocating decolonization as a principle, the country continued to support Portugal in preserving its colonies. At stake was not only the civilizational and cultural kinship of the two countries, but also relations with Europe, which was increasingly becoming a new pole of attraction for the Brazilian economy. Therefore, any attempts to mediate in the internal Angolan confrontation, which were undertaken during the time of Santiago Dantas, under Araujo Castro were stopped. “Brazil benefits from a prosperous Europe, if only this prosperity does not bring it a loss,” - said J. Goulart, speaking at the National Congress in 1963. By “losses” the president meant the consequences of the protectionist policy of the European Community, whose preferential agreements with some African countries created obstacles in the way of traditional Brazilian export goods. (Documentos da Politica Externa Independente, 2007. Vol.2, P.106-106).

The policy of opening new markets assumed the development of trade with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. In 1963, a Soviet-Brazilian trade agreement was concluded, which provided for an increase in mutual trade turnover by 1965 to \$ 220 million. But the contacts were limited to their trade and economic content, which, given the shock of the recently ended Caribbean crisis and the beginning of detente in relations with the United States, was quite satisfactory for the Soviet Union as well.

In its hemisphere, Brazil, in addition to its policy of supporting the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAST), sought to develop bilateral relations with Latin American neighbors, but did not miss the opportunity to cooperate with the United States in the framework of the OAS and the Alliance for Progress program. However, not everything here was as «smooth» as the United States would have liked, especially after the «shock» of the Cuban revolution. In April 1963, Brazil opposed the introduction of a provision in the draft reform of the OAS Charter that would give the Organization's Special Security Commission the right to monitor "communist activity" in the countries of the region. At insistence of Itamaraty, the commission could only do this with the consent of the concerned country.

Despite all the efforts of A. Castro to smooth out the American-Brazilian contradictions, the United States continued to exert economic and political pressure on the government of J. Goulart. In the fall of 1963, the IMF reduced the loan to Brazil from \$ 100 to \$ 60 million. Washington continued to tighten barriers for Brazilian goods to the US market. Bypassing the federal government, the United States moved to contacts with Brazil at the level of individual states, municipalities and cities, where the power belonged to supporters of the opposition. The State Department did its utmost to provide visas for representatives of various NGOs, religious and paramilitary structures, members of the so-called Peace Corps, who, arriving in Brazil, were immediately involved in anti-government propaganda.

P. Vizentini characterizes the course of J. Goulart government towards the United States as "rushing between the desire to reconcile and the need for a response, which was, as a rule, limited and belated". It can be considered that the responsible for thereconciliation was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the

President himself showed an incessant desire to react. (Vizentini, 2004).

At the end of December 1963, J. Goulart signed a decree establishing a complete monopoly on the import of oil and petroleum products for the Petrobras state corporation. Moreover, on January 30, 1964, despite his intention to postpone the extension of the 1952 US-Brazilian security treaty by Congress as much as possible, it was nevertheless implemented thanks to a simple exchange of notes between Araujo Castro and the US Charge d'Affaires in Brazil. "Such a hasty renewal of the treaty provided the United States with a legal basis for an armed intervention in Brazil under the pretext of fighting communist aggression" - noted the Brazilian historian M. Bandeira. (Bandeira M., 2006).

On March 31, 1964, began an uprising of the garrisons in the state of Minas Gerais. The mechanism of Operation "Brother Sam" was finally launched. The hesitation of the government and the hope that everything would somehow resolve by itself, led to the fact that by April 1, most of the states and large cities of the country were already in the hands of the putschists. Before the legitimate President J. Goulart went into exile in Uruguay, power in the country illegally passed to the speaker of the National Congress R. Mazilli, behind whom were the generals. The United States was the first to recognize his government. Brazil's new military-appointed foreign minister, Vasco Leitao da Cunha, said that the first step of the Revolutionary Government would be to change the course and nature of foreign policy, which, in his opinion, was out of touch with the true traditions of Brazilian diplomacy. From now on, Brazil intended to establish "special relations" with the United States, sever diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba and "in every possible way to help strengthen the foundations of Inter-American

security". However, Vasco Leitao was mistaken in trying to pass off "automatic alignment" with the United States as "true adherence to the traditions of Brazilian diplomacy," misrepresenting and altering the content and meaning of Baron Rio Branco's policy. In less than three years, the same military anti-communists will return to pursuing a nationalist course, which will be based on the true traditions of Itamaraty and many of the postulates of the Independent Foreign Policy by J. Cuadros - J. Goulart.

The famous Brazilian historian A. Luis Cervo was absolutely right when he believed that the military action on March 31, 1964 was "a step in the wrong direction". From his point of view, the IFP was not a mistake, but rather not a very timely manifestation of true "Brazilianness". Therefore, many of its postulates were implemented later, in the 70s, in the policy of Responsible Pragmatism of the military government of E. Geisel. Other Brazilian researchers, in particular C.E. Vidigal and J. Fonseca, tend to view IFP in a broader historical context, seeing it as elements inherited from the policies of J. Vargas during his second government.

Giving a kind of epitaph to IFP, Rubens Ricupero writes, that Independent Foreign Policy ... was a historical necessity that reflected the process of maturation of the Brazilian nation and ripening of its collective self-awareness. The delay in recognizing it was primarily due to its innovative content and the extremely difficult internal and external circumstances of that era. Being right ahead of your time is not a crime, but simply a lack of elementary luck. The epitaph of IFP, according to this diplomat, could be the famous phrase of Machiavelli: "A lot of correct, but little luck." (Ricupero, 2017).

Chapter 4

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PERIOD OF MILITARY DICTATORY: FROM THE DOCTRINE OF “IDEOLOGICAL BORDERS” TO “UNIVERSAL DIPLOMACY” (1964-1985)

The Doctrine of “Ideological Limits” and the Theory of “Hemicycles”.

Changing paradigms in Brazilian foreign policy: from constructive nationalism with elements of the third world orientation of the governments of J. Quadros and J. Goulart to “automatic alignment” with the United States with its ardent anti-communism and the doctrine of “ideological boundaries” of the first military regime (1964 - 1967) was not unique to Brazil. Throwing from tense relations with the United States to attempts at any cost to build bridges in relations with Washington will once again be observed in the future (for example, the government of J. Bolsonaro) This abrupt change of paradigms cannot be explained only with the presence of “entregisters” in the army, in the entrepreneurial and political classes of this country, as coincides with another attempt by trial and error to ensure the accelerated economic development of Brazil and its formation as an emerging world power. (Fonseca JR., 1996).

To the question: How soon to achieve the transformation of the country into an economic and political giant? - representatives

of different classes and strata of Brazilian society usually answer in different ways. Some (left-wing parties and movements, trade unions, part of the national bourgeoisie associated with the development of the internal market, nationalist-minded military, most of the university professors and the diplomatic community) insist on independent national development based on state enterprises and deepened cooperation in the international arena with the countries of the developing world. Others (large entrepreneurs associated with transnational business, the conservative-minded part of the officer corps and intellectuals of the “liberal mindset”) believe that the accelerated development of Brazil can be achieved only through close cooperation with the United States and the developed West.

A special role belongs to the military, who in Brazil, as well as practically throughout Latin America, traditionally actively participate in the political life. Brazilian generals were able to remove J. Vargas from power in 1945. Their role was also great in the tragic events associated with his suicide. The military seriously hampered the universalist aspirations of President J. Kubitschek, and most of them were opponents of the Independent Foreign Policy of Quadros-Goulart. Finally, the generals, relying on the CIA, the American embassy and personally the US ambassador Lincoln Gordon, overthrew the government of J. Goulart and established a pro-American military dictatorship in Brazil.

Moving away from speculative class schemes and ceasing to see in the Latin American military as simple executors of Washington’s will, today we are obliged to look at these events from a slightly different point of view. Otherwise, it will be impossible to understand the serious evolution that the Brazilian generals, who were in power in this country from 1964 to 1985, made in their domestic and, especially, in foreign policy.

Most of the Brazilian generals - the authors of the 1964 coup d'état -were supporters of close cooperation with the United States: Nero Moura, E. Cordeiro de Farias, U. Castelo Branco, Golberi do Couto-e-Silva, etc. During World War II, they fought on the Italian front as part of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB), which was under the operational command of the American army. The alliance with the United States during the war, which turned out to be very productive in terms of obtaining the necessary military knowledge and experience for Brazilians, inspired them with the idea that in the post-war years the United States would help Brazil to become a great power on its close cooperation in the international arena. It is difficult to blame them for this honest delusion. Let's not forget that in a similar way, Getulio Vargas himself was mistaken in the post-war intentions of the United States for a long time, at least before the events associated with the Korean War.

Generals, as usual, learned lessons from past battles, while diplomats, keeping in mind Machiavelli's precepts, remembered that no "Sovereign" who was in the slightest degree versed in politics would ever help to become a rival to himself in his own "inner circle ". An understanding of this law of international politics will come to the generals soon, especially since among the senior officers there were those who adhered to nationalist sentiments: A. da Costa-e-Silva, G. Medici, E. Geisel and others.

The first military government of Brazil, headed by Marshal Umberto Castelo Branco (in 1944 he was the FEB Chief of Staff), took an "entregist" position, striving with all its might to abandon all the developments of the previous governments, both in domestic and foreign policy. R. Ricupero believed that the government of Caselo Branco was a kind of lesser evil, since in the conditions of the intensification of the internal political struggle

in Brazil in the early 1960s, it removed from the agenda the almost ready direct armed intervention of the United States. It should not be forgotten that plans for such an intervention had already been worked out in the administrations of J. Kennedy – L. Johnson. (Ricupero, 2017)

In domestic politics, the government of U. Castelo Branco purged the army, dissolved political parties and the National Congress, limited freedom of the press and banned trade unions. The repressions in Brazil at the initial stage, however, differed for the better from those that later, already in the 70s, were deployed by the military regimes of Argentina and Chile. It is possible that the famous “Luso-Brazilian culture of compromise” took place here. Soon, however, due to the intensification of the partisan struggle in the cities and in the countryside, the repression will intensify. (Vizentini, 2004).

In the economy, the law restricting the transfer of profits abroad was canceled and decent compensation was awarded for previously nationalized enterprises. Brazil provided the United States with guarantees against the nationalization of industries, belonged to American citizens. As a reward for this, the United States unblocked millions of dollars that were stuck in American banks during J. Cuadros and J. Goulart and promised to provide new loans.

The purge also affected the Foreign Ministry. A number of diplomats who shared the ideals of Independent Foreign Policy were dismissed from Itamaraty. It is noteworthy that after leaving the post of foreign minister, Araujo Castro was not dismissed, but appointed ambassador: first to Greece, and then, in 1971, to the United States.

Attempts to reconcile the incompatible characteristic of the activities of Brazil's first military government were organically derived from the fundamental impossibility of reconciling the interests of the "emerging great power", as the generals had already seen it, with the rigid ideological restrictions of the Cold War that regularly descended from Washington.

At the inauguration ceremony of the next foreign minister, U. Castelo Branco spoke of Brazil's foreign policy as "absolutely independent", while calling for "automatic alignment" with Washington. Calling it interdependence, he forgot about such basic principles of the country's foreign policy as constructive nationalism, promoting development and distancing from the imperatives of the Cold War. In the confrontation between two superpowers, Brazil openly sided with the United States. The course of rapprochement with Washington was aimed at obtaining Brazil the status of a privileged ally and recognizing it as a regional center of power in Latin America. This was especially acutely traced in the famous Doctrine of National Security (DNS), which was prepared in the Higher Military School shortly before the coup d'état of 1964.

The authors of DNS general Lyra Tavares (director of the Air Force) and General Golberi do Couto-e-Silva (chief ideologist and gray cardinal of the military regime), planned to achieve national greatness by 2000.

Picture 19 - General Golbery do Couto-e-Silva



Source: Author/Photographer – unknown. Arquivo Nacional.
Fundo Agência Nacional. 1981.
Fundo Agência Nacional.

In the book “Geopolitics of Brazil” (1966), General Golbery popularly set out the basic postulates of the DNS. In addition to the dubious claims that in order to achieve national greatness, the Brazilians will have to exclude from their character a number of such negative traits as “romanticism”, “pathos” and “flamboyance”, it contained the idea of an inseparable connection between security and development and carried the idea that the state should become the main agent of economic security policy. The DNS and General Golbery’s book then became a guide to action for most of the military regimes that came to power in Latin America in the 1970s. At the same time, nobody paid attention to the fact that state regulation was a socialist principle that contradicted the postulates of the free market, and therefore

contradicted those “American values” that the military intended to be equal to. (Oliveira, 2005).

DNS ruled out previous approaches to the development based on universalism and regional integration. The document was replete with terms such as “ideological boundaries”, “communist infiltration” and “threat to national security”. The concept of dependence was changed to interdependence, which from now had to characterize the relationship between Latin American countries and the United States. The concept of national security included the fight against subversion by the internal enemy and justified the use of repression.

Particular attention in DNS was drawn to the doctrine of ideological boundaries. In the opinion of the authors of this document, the usual interstate borders in conditions of intense rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States should be replaced by ideological ones. In essence, this concept was in line with the previously adopted US strategy of “containment and rejection of communism” (the author J. Foster Dulles), and ran counter to the principle of non-interference, which Brazil has traditionally defended in its foreign policy. At the theoretical level, the doctrine was supported by the geopolitical calculations of the general Golbery, who found expression in the theory of three concentric circles or “hemicycles”. According to this theory, the responsibility for ensuring the security of the broadest “cycle” of world politics - the global one - was borne by the United States; for the less wide, continental, the United States was responsible together with the Latin American countries, and for the narrowest - the regional, for the countries of the Southern Cone and the basin of the river La Plata, was responsible the regional power center - Brazil. The circle of interests of the potential great powers, judging by the theory of hemicycles, was limited to Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay.

The document issued by the Foreign Ministry said:

The Brazilian government considers it expedient to proceed from a new concept of state sovereignty, which is based on the characteristics of the socio-political system, and not outdated geographic and political factors. The idea of interdependence at the OAS level presupposes, among other things, close military cooperation. (Castro, 2009, Vol.1, p.504-505)

Speaking about the concepts of self-determination and non-interference, Z. Magallais said that they should be considered exclusively through the prism of national (or collective) security interests, and added, that we are moving towards the establishment of a new world order based on replacing the outdated concept of sovereignty with the concept of interdependence. Brazil's interest in its concentric circle is to ensure the security of Latin America and to support the efforts of the entire Western community. Brazil has no hesitation in recognizing the leadership of the US there and the burden it has to bear in keeping it safe. The United States can count on solidarity with Brazil wherever and whenever it needs it.

It was assumed that in return Brazil would receive from the United States something like a special label for the management of South America and act there as a sub-leader. According to P. Vizentini, a serious contradiction in the theoretical constructions of the military consisted in the fact that "declaring the goal of building a great power, they, in fact, immediately abandoned it, since they considered priority not the national interests of their country, but the interests of Pan American Solidarity". (Vizentini, 2004).

In the left circles of Latin America, instead of the concept of sub-leadership in relation to Brazil, they began to use another – subimperialism. The words of the Brazilian military did not differ from the deeds. Immediately after the coup, in May 1964, they severed diplomatic relations with Cuba and joined the anti-Cuban sanctions. A year later, the Brazilian contingent formed the backbone of the Inter-American Armed Forces (IMF) to cover the US intervention in the Dominican Republic. The IMF numbered over 1,700 people, of which 1,300 were from Brazil. They were commanded by the Brazilian General Hugo Alvin, and the commander of the American contingent, General Bruce Palmer, formally held the post of his deputy. Support for intervention in the affairs of a sovereign country has become unprecedented in the history of Brazilian diplomacy. Brazilians prefer not to remember this event, after which they started talking about their country as a sub-imperialist power.

At the UN, Brazil, along with the United States, opposed a resolution that condemned the racist regimes of southern Africa and Portuguese colonialism; in the OAS, Brazil became one of the leaders of the initiative to make the IMF permanent, which would do OAS similar to NATO. In 1966, in the cities of Rio-de-Janeiro and Recife, the US military began to train special units of the Brazilian army, designed to fight the guerrillas. At the end of Castelo Branco's reign, the question of sending Brazilian troops to Vietnam arose. Latin Americans remember well the phrase of J. Magallais: "What is good for the United States is good for Brazil". (Vargas, 2008).

As wrote P. Visentini,

"The theoretical scheme of the military, however, did not take into account the fact that the more Brazil "sagged" under the United States,

the less the latter needed to encourage them for cooperation. Washington preferred to direct its resources to other parts of the planet, with more problematic scenarios, (Vizentini, 2004).

On July 18, 1967, U. Castelo Branco died in a plane crash near Fortaleza. The arrival of the arc marshal, Arturo da Costa-e-Silva, to the post of head of state, which meant the defeat of the entregisters, was natural. The military were let down by their naive belief in the good disposition of the United States. The inflow of capital to Brazil turned out to be much lower than expected; hopes for scientific and technical cooperation and a massive influx of specialists from the United States did not come true. Inflation has risen in the country and real wages have fallen. The people were burdened by the lack of democratic rights and freedoms, the ban on any strikes and rallies. Latin American countries rejected those integration projects with an emphasis on security issues, which were put forward jointly by Brasilia and Washington, and an attempt to cooperate with Argentina ended in aggravated rivalry. The Union for Progress did not live up to expectations, and interdependence turned into increased dependence. "The sub-imperialist project did not materialize,"- noted another Brazilian researcher, Carlus Estevan Martins. It existed only in the imagination of the generals.

The Prosperity Diplomacy of Marshal A. da Costa e Silva.

The coming to the presidency of Marshal A. da Costa e Silva meant the defeat of the "entregist" part of the Brazilian generals and the gradual return of its diplomacy to pursuing an independent course in the international arena. In March 1967, the

National Security Council was created, designed to strengthen the repressive orientation of the military regime in domestic politics in connection with the intensification of the partisan movement in the country. Nevertheless, at the same time, under the new president, the country gradually began returning to the basic tenets of the Independent Foreign Policy of the times of J. Cuadros and J. Goulart. The vector of foreign policy initiatives changed its direction from the East-West axis to the North-South axis.

The contradictions with the United States in the trade sphere, in the sphere of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as in inter-American relations intensified. Brazil moved away from supporting the unpopular in Latin America idea of creating a permanent Inter-American armed force and shifted the emphasis in regional politics from the OAS, which was still dominated by the United States, to cooperation with Latin American countries in the framework of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). So, the United States immediately expressed dissatisfaction with the new course of the Costa - e - Silva government and began to look for solutions that could return Brazil to the previous course, laid by Castelo Branco.

The return of the “Tropical Giant” to the implementation of elements of an independent foreign policy was only a matter of time. Brazil’s policy towards the socialist countries: the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, North Vietnam and North Korea has not yet undergone any radical changes. At the same time, Brasilia defended Portugal’s plan for the creation of SATO - a South Atlantic defensive pact like NATO, which was actively supported by the United States. However, at the UN and other international forums, Itamaraty continued to support Lisbon’s efforts to keep its colonial empire in Africa.

The contradiction, that originally laid down in DNS between the “automatic alignment” with the United States and the task of forming a powerful public sector in the economy, appeared only three years after the military came to the power. An important fact was that most of the new cohort, led by Costa-e-Silva, did not fight under the command of the American military, and, therefore, were free from those unjustified hopes for US assistance in peacetime, which fueled the mood Castelo Branco team.

Under Marshal Costa-e-Silva, the scale of economic hardship has reached unprecedented proportions. Such important industries as petrochemistry, metallurgy, mining, power generation, transport and communications have passed into the hands of the state. There were also decisions that could not be justified from a purely economic point of view. In the context of DNS’s idea of a link between security and development, the attraction of foreign capital began to be viewed not as a lever for the development of advanced industries, but as something like an inevitable evil. The most promising industries for foreign capital began to close, in particular the automotive industry, as well as the emerging electronic and aerospace industries. As a result, by the beginning of the 1970s, according to the American historian R. Wesson, there were only two “truly socialist” governments in Latin America: communist Cuba and anti-communist Brazil.

The import substitution policy advocated by ECLA theorists found loyal followers in the face of the Brazilian military, who united under the slogan of transforming their country into a “great power of the 21st century” with big entrepreneurs, civil bureaucracy and technocrats. As a result, a powerful military-bureaucratic caste was formed in Brazil, far from the previously declared ideological postulates and pursuing the goal of increasing national production through the development of domestic

and new foreign markets. For a long time, the conductor of this policy was the Minister of Economy Delfim Neto. At first, it brought success: Brazil managed to increase the non-primary component of its exports. If in 1960 industrial goods accounted for only 2% of it, then by 1970 they reached 11%. Demand for consumer goods also increased in the domestic market. Soon, however, the “greenhouse” nature of the Brazilian industry and its isolation from foreign competition will begin to affect the quality of Brazilian goods and the country’s export opportunities. (Cervo A., Bueno C., 2010).

In the foreign policy sphere, it was declared “a prosperity diplomacy”, implemented by the new Foreign Minister Jose de Magallais Pinto (1967-1969). His main efforts were aimed at obtaining international loans to finance industrial and infrastructure facilities. Foreign loans, which allowed the Brazilian economy to develop at an unprecedented rate in the early 1970s, become a heavy burden in the 1980s, seriously postponing plans to achieve greatness, which, ultimately, will lead to the departure of the military from power.

The determination of the Costa - e - Silva government to accelerate economic development as much as possible has manifested itself in the position of Brazilian diplomacy at international forums on problems related to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the peaceful use of atomic energy, the exploitation of the resources of the seas and oceans, the use of outer space for peaceful purposes and scientific research. Foreign policy, which in many features repeated the postulates of the previously rejected IFP, paidan exclusive attention to national interests, economic factors, prosperity and development, strengthening external interaction for development, ensuring peace and national security.

Diplomacy was understood as an instrument of economic expansion, which was supposed to contribute to:

- revising the foundations of international trade and expanding markets for Brazilian exports;
- obtaining through international cooperation the necessary scientific knowledge and technologies to ensure economic independence;
- an increase in financial flows from various sources on the best terms of their repayment.

The next reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was carried out by J. Magallais Pinto, also corresponded to these goals. There were created commissions for promoting trade, cultural diplomacy, developing new methods of foreign policy and organizing the transfer of the Foreign Ministry to the new Itamaraty building in Brasilia. The country again, as in previous civilian governments, focused on creating new alliances and an active trade policy, which was supposed to promote the development of a scientific and technological base, to attract financial flows and expand exports in cooperation with developing countries and rejection of ideological dogmas.

According to the historian A. Luis Cervo, three main postulates of U. Castelo Branco's foreign policy were left behind:

1. Commitment to bipolarity. With the beginning of the process of softening relations between the USSR and the United States, the conflict between the West and the East gradually began to fade into the background for Brazil;

2. Collective security in the block sense against the background of deepening socio-economic inequality in the world;
3. The concept of “interdependence” with the United States, since foreign policy was to be guided not by ideological motives, but by national interests;

Filled with prejudices and hindering autonomy in foreign policy “reckless Westernism”, under the government of A. da Costa e Silva, Brazil signed a number of important international treaties:

1. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Establishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (05.10.67);
2. International Coffee Agreement (03.18.67);
3. International Agreement on Sugar (12.03.68);
4. Agreement on cooperation in the basin of the river La Plata (04/23/1969);
5. Treaty on safeguards between Brazil, the USA and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (29.11.68);
6. Treaty on the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes (17.04.69). (Cervo, 2008; Cervo A., Bueno C., 2010).

A special note about the Brasilia nuclear program, which caused sharp contradictions between Brazil and the United States in the mid-1970s. According to some analysts, Tropical Giant has been trying to create its own nuclear weapons since 1953 (a failed attempt to import three centrifuges from West

Germany to produce nuclear fuel). It was supposed to be a response to the failure of Brazilian diplomacy to get a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In 1967, General A. da Costa-e-Silva declared that nuclear energy in the hands of developing countries is the most powerful tool that can reduce the distance separating them from the developed ones. The same year, Brazil signed the Treaty on a Nuclear-Free Zone in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

However, a year before its signing, Brazil and Argentina reserved for themselves the right to conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. According to the text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (Article 18, paragraph 1), this right can be exercised with the help of “devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons”. Thus, Brazilian diplomacy, on the one hand, spoke in favor of the prohibition and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and on the other hand, retained for Brazil a real opportunity to resort to their creation after the adoption of an appropriate political decision.

Brazil refused to sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), considering it discriminatory against developing states because it banned peaceful nuclear explosions. NPT was characterized by Brazilian diplomacy as hegemonic, hindering the scientific and technological development of developing countries. The position of the countries that refused to sign and ratify NPT (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Yugoslavia, India, Pakistan) has been argued by the reluctance of the nuclear powers to make efforts to destroy their nuclear weapons, which was also provided by the provisions of the treaty. At the conference on disarmament in Geneva (February 1968), the representative of Brazil, Araujo Castro, said in connection with the signing of NPT that developing countries “will never sacrifice their right to research,

produce and put into practice the energy of the peaceful atom, including the production of peaceful nuclear explosions”.

By ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco, but without making the declaration on its entry into force provided in its text, Brazil, Chile and Argentina made it clear that they did not want any form of control over their activities in the nuclear sphere by the IAEA and OPANAL (Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America). In October 1967, by the decision of the National Security Council (NSC), the Brazilian Foreign Ministry was removed from the field of nuclear research, these responsibilities were transferred to the Ministry of Mines and Energy.

The controversy with the United States was not limited to Washington’s displeasure over Brazil’s refusal to sign NPT. In bilateral relations, Brazil experienced difficulties in exporting instant coffee, cocoa, sugar, footwear and textiles to the American market, while A. da Costa e Silva tried not to deepen the differences. The matter, however, came to a diplomatic incident, when, in response to the warning of the US Ambassador Lincoln Gordon that the marshal “could suffer the fate of J. Kubitschek, who was forced to seek political asylum in Portugal,” A. da Costa e Silva asked the ambassador to leave his office immediately.

In May 1967, J. Magallais Pinto announced that his country was observing strict neutrality in relation to the Vietnam War, despite the fact that the previous government of Castelo Branco sent humanitarian aid to South Vietnam and, according to some information, was ready to send Brazilian soldiers to the war in Indochina.

In 1968, the United States substantially cut military aid to Brasilia. Until the complete breakdown by Brazil of the bilateral military agreement with the United States in 1977, this assistance

was limited only to training programs for the Brazilian military with a complete cessation of the supply of American weapons. At the same time, Washington expressed its reluctance over the purchase of a batch of French Mirage fighters by Brazil. In 1969, the country closed its embassy in South Vietnam, transferring its functions to the embassy in Thailand.

In February 1969, Brazil invited all Latin American countries to act as a united front in trade and economic relations with the United States, and Washington reacted with a fair amount of nervousness. Integration plans in Latin America at that time stalled, the creation of the Latin American common market was hampered by the presence of numerous contradictions in their trade policy. In this regard, Itamaraty pinned special hopes on the "Group of 77", created on its initiative in March 1968 under the auspices of UNCTAD, similar to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). So, the military returned to the vision of the main axis of Brazilian foreign policy through the prism of North-South relations, which was the most characteristic feature of the diplomacy of J. Cuadros - J. Goulart.

This trend was confirmed by the intensification of ties with the countries of Western Europe, neutral and socialist states. As in the last years of J. Goulart's rule, when Araujo Castro was minister of foreign affairs, Brazil diligently avoided any ideological connotations, focusing exclusively on issues of economic benefits. In February 1968, the first trade agreement between Brazil and India was signed in Brasilia, and in September of the same year, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi paid an official visit.

Brazil condemned the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia, but in May 1969 a new trade and economic agreement entered into force, where Brazil and the Soviet Union agreed on a new system of mutual settlements. At the same time,

the Brazilian delegation took part in the international exhibition "Shoes" in Moscow, and in Rio- de -Janeiro, and Brazil opened several trade representations of Eastern Europe countries.

The scientific and technical cooperation between Brazil and the FRG deserved a special attention.

In February 1969, a technical mission of West German scientists visited Brazilian research centers in Rio-de-Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte and Brasilia. In March, German Minister of Science G. Stoltenberg visited the Institute for Nuclear Research in Sao Paulo, the Air Force Technical Center in Sao Jose dos Campos and the power plant in Tres Marias, near Brasilia. Stoltenberg met with the head of Itamaraty and with the Minister of Mines and Energy. As a result of the visit, a protocol of intent was signed in relation to the agreement on scientific and technical cooperation between two countries. In June, during the visit of Magallais Pinto to Bonn, this agreement was signed.

The contacts of 1969 will culminate in the signing of the Brazilian-West German agreement in the nuclear field, which will cause an extremely negative reaction in the United States.

The government of Marshal A. da Costa-e-Silva, who was forced to resign at the end of 1969 for health reasons, did not open any new line in Brazilian foreign policy. Rather, it continued the one that was interrupted by the military coup of 1964. This line will be followed by the government of General Emilio Garrastazu Medici (1969-1974), who previously served as director of the National Intelligence Service (SNI).

The “Enlightened Authoritarianism” by General G. Medici.

During the government of this leader, the world system was characterized, on the one hand, by an ever-increasing polarization of the world around two superpowers and the consolidation of a bloc of socialist states, on the other, by the beginning of detente in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Conflicts and local wars have moved to the periphery of global politics. The Six Day War in the Middle East, the introduction of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia and the ongoing war in Vietnam have become special events for the world community. As a result of fluctuations in export prices for the raw materials and the tariff policy of developed countries, the economic difficulties of developing countries have deepened.

The transfer of the Cold War to peripheral regions led to a noticeable increase in nationalist sentiment in Brazil. This was clearly illustrated by the example of the domestic policy that became tougher under Medici. His coming to power coincided with the “peak” of partisan activity of the left-wing radical formations of the “urban” (K. Marigella) and “rural” (K. Lamarck) guerrillas. Numerous leftist cells (ALN, MR-8, MNR, etc.), as well as splinter factions from the Brazilian Communist Party, promoted armed struggle. Many of the guerrilla cells stood on the Maoist platform, supported and funded by Cuba and China.

Just two days after the entry of E. Medici into the presidency - October 30, armed commandos from ALN and MR-8 kidnapped the US Ambassador to Brazil C. Elbrick, freeing him in exchange for 15 leftists, who were imprisoned in Brazil. Until the end of 1970, leftist groups kidnapped the ambassadors of Switzerland and West Germany, as well as the Japanese consul in Sao Paulo. A guerrilla movement flared up in the countryside of Araguaya.

In response, the military government, worried about the threat to national sovereignty, multiplied the repression. The censorship of the press was tightened, were created special detachments, trained to fight both the urban and the rural guerrilla, there appeared (not without the participation of the government) “popular” right-wing “death squads” (like the infamous CCC - Team of the hunt for communists). The country has begun to practice illegal detention, kidnapping and torture (often under the guidance of American instructors). At the same time, the force of reaction exceeded the force of action.

Ironically, all this happened on the background of an unprecedented economic boom, when the annual GDP growth rate in Brazil exceeded 11%, and in 1973 it was 13.97%. The most dynamic industries were automobiles, and shipbuilding, as well as petrochemicals. The percentage of technology-intensive goods in national exports rose to 32%. Brazil’s participation in global exports increased from 0.88% in 1968 to 1.2% in 1973. The country rapidly created a national military-industrial complex engaged in the production of light tanks and armored vehicles, multiple launch rocket systems and subsonic attack aircraft, which successfully found sales markets in Latin America, the Near and Middle East. New factories and plants were opened, and the infrastructure developed. With loans generously distributed by the government, large public-private corporations were engaged into national megaprojects: the construction of the world’s largest hydroelectric power station Itaipu, the Trans-Amazonian highway and the giant Rio-Niteroi bridge across the Gaunabara Bay. The Rondon Project, approved by the government, involved deep exploration and development of the Amazon, the world’s strongest and richest reservoir of minerals. The world started talking about the Brazilian economic miracle.

The country “breathed in the back” of the developed economies, getting ready to enter their prestigious club, which was closed to it. (Cervo A., Bueno C., 2010).

The impression was that under the influence of the new realities, Brazil began to behave on the world stage as already established “great power”.

E.-G. Medici and his Foreign Minister, career diplomat Mario Gibson Barbosa (1969-1974) shared two concepts - foreign policy and international politics. International politics was reduced to support for traditional principles such as sovereignty, equality, the right to self-determination and territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs. And foreign policy was supposed to promptly respond to all the challenges associated with national development and be engaged in the implementation of the Great Brazil project.

As the Brazilian political scientist Flavio Sombra Saraiva noted, “under Medici, Brazil’s foreign policy was guided by the principle of strengthening national power, expressed in “diplomacy of national interests”. This model was intended to facilitate the continuation of the economic miracle. Inside the country, the government tried to combine the economic growth with repression against opponents of the regime, and in the international arena - bilateralism with multilateralism. In pursuing “diplomacy of national interests” Brazil sought to act in a double incarnation, maintaining equal relations with both the developed North and the developing South. The strength of foreign and domestic policy during the Medici’s rule was obliged by the participation in decision-making not only the president and Itamaraty, but also the National Security Council which included all the top military. (Saraiva, 2005).

In November 1971, Brazil adopted the First National Development Plan (PND), which set ambitious goals for the country's economic development until 1974. The continuation of the "miracle" was still associated with the support of the state bureaucracy and the military, which almost completely subjugated the private sector. It strengthened the "socialist" character of the Brazilian economy.

In the context of the idea of a Great Power, the main task was to neutralize external and internal factors that could potentially limit the growth of national power.

In 1972 M. Gibson Barbosa defined the essence of Brazilian foreign policy:

1. Brazil is in favor of adopting new rules for international coexistence. It does not accept the existing positions of power and objects to the vicious thesis that history is developing in favor of some countries and to the detriment of others;
2. Brazilians believe that with the growth of their country's potential, its participation in decisions taken by the international community should also increase. We should not give up on this, keeping in mind the perspective of other peoples who, like us, strive for development and progress,
3. We believe that true peace cannot be identified as maintaining the status quo or as a result of an already established balance of power, which cannot be an instrument for reducing the distance separating rich countries from poor ones. On the contrary, the world should change the rules of international trade and improve the mechanism for distributing the fruits of scientific and

technological progress, for there can be no true peace without development;

4. Our position consists in active solidarity with developing countries, in stimulating our diplomacy to strengthen mutual understanding with those peoples who strive for development and progress;
5. Foreign policy should become global, from close cooperation with developing countries to intensive dialogue with developed ones. (Castro, 2009).

Commenting on this speech of the minister, P. Vizentini notes that “the strategy of Brazil was no longer anti - imperialism, but the search for a better place for Brazil within imperialism.” If this was the case, then Medici’s foreign policy was seriously different from both Cuadros-Goulart’s IFP and the policy of “servitude” by Castelo Branco, and from the policy of Costa-e-Silva, who saw Brazil “rising”, but not yet “ascended” giant. Brazil, in this case, - said P. Visentini, - viewed itself as a “friend” of the United States, allowing itself to have “pinpoint” disagreements with them on certain practical issues and trying not to bring matters to antagonisms. So, Medici’s diplomacy differed from the “messianism” of Castelo Branco and the altruism of Costa -e -Silva. (Vizentini, 2017).

Perhaps in order to clarify the new position of Brazil in the world, as well as to expand research in the field of international relations, in 1971 was created the Alexandri de Guzmão Foundation (FUNAG). The name of the Portuguese diplomat, the promoter of the principle “uti possidetis”, the “Father of Brazilian diplomacy”, has become the prestigious “think tank”, which has the necessary financial resources for holding international

conferences, publishing archival documents and scientific works of Brazilian and foreign authors.

Perhaps the contradictions between the “almost-already-great” Brazil and the continental hegemon – the United States, would not have been of such a “point” nature in those years if it had not been the rise of leftist movements in the countries of Latin America and what later became known as “revelry partisanship”. Brazil was forced to return partially to the policy of “ideological boundaries”, with the only difference that “sub-imperialism” seriously supplanted the “automatic alignment”. The country saw itself no longer as a vassal, but as an ally of the R. Nixon administration, which was engaged in the war in Vietnam. Brazil independently took on the fight against left movements in its region. According to the Condor Plan developed by the military, Brazil participated in the overthrow of the Government of Popular Unity of Chile (1973), as well as the governments of Bolivia (1971) and Uruguay (1972). (Oliveira, 2005).

At the same time, the ties with the countries of Asia and Africa continued to strengthen. Aware of the importance of oil supplies for its economy, Brazil, despite the pro-Israel sympathies of the United States, moved on to developing closer relations with Arab countries. However, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, which boosted oil prices, was one of the factors that brought the “Brazilian economic miracle” closer to an end.

With regard to the countries of the “Third World” Itamaraty continued to maintain an ambivalent position: speaking in words for “self-determination”, Brazil supported Portuguese colonialism in Africa. Solidarity within the framework of the Luso-Brazilian Community, created in 1967, did not yet allow looking at the real situation in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands with an inevitable perspective.

Nevertheless, the foreign policy of E.-G. Medici was the least ideologized and submitted to some kind of “common principles”. R. Ricupero associated this fact with the personality of the president himself, who did not trust liberalism in politics and economics and did not trust generals - intellectuals such as Golberri. Medici rejected any radicalism and adhered to the pragmatic principle of using only the amount of force that he considered necessary and sufficient. Even participating in Operation Condor, Brazil did not follow so much the doctrine of “ideological frontiers”, but had a simple unwillingness to exist in an environment of “unpredictable” and “dependent” left-wing governments. Brazilian researchers noted that in pursuit of the goal of getting into the “First World” under Medici, Brazil preferred to act alone. “An excessive emphasis on multilateralism could slam the cherished doors before it,” - said P. Vizentini. (2004).

One of the striking manifestations of this policy was the unilateral increase of Brazil’s territorial waters from 12 to 200 nautical miles. This decision, although it was built into the “Brazil is a power” paradigm, was quite unequivocally knocked out of the general tone of Brazilian-American relations.

The visit of President Medici to Washington in 1971 in order to achieve recognition of a certain “special status” for Brazil in Latin America was remembered by the phrase of President R. Nixon: “Wherever Brazil goes, the whole of Latin America will go there”. This phrase, which was supposed to replace some of Washington’s formal commitments to the “emerging great power”, ultimately did more harm than good to Brasilia’s Latin American policy.

In the Latin America, however, the new prospects opened up for the country, which could only be used with the next owner of the palace Planalto. Against the backdrop of a general decline

in US influence in Latin America, Washington gradually began to lose its former importance as Brazil's main foreign trade partner. Exports of Brazilian goods to the United States from 1968 to 1971 fell from 33% to 26%. Brazil steadily increased the importance of the markets of neighboring countries and markets outside the Western Hemisphere: European, African and Asian markets. (Vargas, 2006).

However, under Medici, the position of the National Security Council, which in many ways began to replace the functions of the Foreign Ministry, was rather closed and even "arrogant." It was best expressed by an experienced diplomat, former foreign minister Araujo Castro: "Brazil seeks cooperation with other countries of our hemisphere, but it no longer wants to be confused with any of them". The policy of the Medici government entailed a colossal growth of mistrust towards Brazil among its neighbors in the region. At the same time, the global politics was still quite constrained and adherent to stereotypes. A new page will be opened only with the coming to power of E. Geisel government.

The Policy of "Responsible and Ecumenical Pragmatism" by E. Geisel.

The four-year period of the presidency of General Ernesto Geisel (1974-1978) was very difficult for Brazil. The global financial and economic crisis, the stagnation of the detente process in Europe, the growth of conflicts in the third world countries: in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia have seriously complicated the international situation. The Vietnam War worsened the state of the American economy, which ricocheted into other developed countries. The sharp rise in oil

prices in 1974, when its price jumped from \$ 1.60 a barrel to \$ 9.30, with a 400% increase in its global consumption, had disastrous consequences for Brazil and the countries of the Third World, which led to a sharp increase of their external debt.

Brazil's foreign debt, which in 1966 amounted to \$ 3 billion 666 million, in 1973 increased to \$ 12 billion 572 million. It drew the line under the Brazilian "economic miracle". The country stopped in a step in front of the doors that gave it access to the coveted "club of the greats". There was a need to rethink the old model of entering the international space in order to adapt it to the changing situation against the background of the growing fatigue of the Brazilians from the long rule of the military and the lack of democracy. This sentiment was reinforced by the enactment of the 1979 amnesty law, which was put on the agenda after the crackdown on guerrilla activity in the country.

The growth of the social movement under the slogan "Direct elections - now!" became a symbol of coming changes. The problem was that the results of the "economic miracle" had little effect on poverty and social inequality in Brazil. The main wealth was still in the hands of 5% of the richest clans, who worked closely with the civil-military bureaucracy. The well-known words of Medici could serve as a characteristic of the current situation: "Everything is good with the economy, but, well, the people are still bad".

E. Geisel can be considered the successor of the foreign policy of President A. da Costa -e -Silva, in whose administration General held important posts. It is no coincidence that his government again began giving priority to relations with the countries of Western Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa, avoiding "automatic alignment" with anyone else, running, if necessary, only to partially correct this course. This approach has been

called the “Policy of Responsible and Ecumenical Pragmatism”. In this case, “ecumenism” was understood as “multi-vector”. The author of the wording was a professional diplomat, the most famous Minister of Foreign Affairs during the military governments, Antonio Azeredo da Silveira (1974 - 1979). His main quality as a diplomat was the ability to respond quickly to changing external circumstances. (Pinheiro, 2002).

Picture 20 - Antonio Azeredo da Silveira



Source: Author/Photographer - unknown. Arquivo Nacional.
Imagem do Fundo Correio da Manhã, 1964.

“Responsible pragmatism” was free from any ideological approaches that could set obstacles to the expansion of the country’s international relations, what approached it to the foreign policy of E. Medici. The difference was that it was based on a policy of a multi-vector for creating a comfortable space for Brazil in the international arena. This multi-vector was supposed to promote the growth of Brazil’s international presence in the region

and in the world in order to counter the instability generated by dependence on external factors. The main idea of foreign policy under E. Geisel was a departure from any rigid principles and an emphasized commitment to pragmatism.

At the same time, in practice, it turned out that this foreign policy demonstrated in practice the most daring and elaborate example of diplomacy of all military governments, which was implemented in the conditions of a gradual return to democratic rule. It was based on ensuring the country's long-term interests, in line with the traditional course of Brazilian diplomacy in the twentieth century.

The core of Geisel-Silveira's foreign policy, by analogy with the rule of J. Vargas, who sought to "give metal to the country", was the diversification of energy sources, because in the absence of large own oil reserves, its rapidly growing economy was suffocating. This goal was subordinated to the completion of the construction of the world's largest hydroelectric power station Itaipu (together with Paraguay), for which it was necessary to settle a difficult dispute with Argentina in this area (multilateral agreement Corpus-Itaipu, 1979). To this end, Brazil stood in solidarity with the Arab countries at the UN, recognizing the illegal nature of Israel's occupation of Arab territories, and in 1975 voted for a resolution (truly an unprecedented step!) that viewed Zionism as a form of racism. At the same time, Petrobras' subsidiary, the state-owned Brazpetro company, began to create joint ventures for oil production with Algeria, Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Brazil switched to active export of military-industrial complex products to these countries.

The decision to break, at last, with the hesitating attitude to the problem of decolonization of the Portuguese possessions in Africa gave the chance to expand relations with African countries.

In November 1975 Brazil recognized the governments of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau despite their “pro-Marxist” orientation. The fall of Salazar regime and the withdrawal of the Portuguese military from Angola and Mozambique led to an influx of about 18,000 new immigrants to Brazil. Recognition of MPLA government in Angola, which at first seemed a purely political gesture, ultimately justified itself economically. Imagine: if Brazil had not done this, could the Odebrecht corporation then undertake the construction of the entire Angolan infrastructure? Most likely, it would be some kind of American corporation.

At the UN, the Brazilian delegation supported numerous resolutions on decolonization, especially in relation to the territory of Namibia and Rhodesia, and later Zimbabwe. In 1976, Brazil began to export capital and technology to Africa: in the field of construction, consulting and maintenance of agricultural and industrial facilities. In 1978, a branch of Brazilian Banco Real was opened in Abidjan, as a direct flight between Rio-de-Janeiro and Lagos (Nigeria) and a shipping link between Brazil and the countries of the west coast of Africa. In international forums, Brazil reaffirmed its adherence to the anti-colonial position and condemned the apartheid policy pursued by South Africa. In August 1978, the country took part in the World Conference on Apartheid, in Lagos, as well as in the World Conference against Racism and Racial Discrimination in Geneva.

Brazil was represented at the World Conference in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia held in Maputo in May 1979, at the fourth annual meeting of the African Development Fund (ADF) in Mauritius. The exchange of high-level visits with African countries has intensified. So, in 1979, only from Nigeria, Brazil received 18 official delegations. In 1976, a trade agreement with Zaire entered into force, a trade agreement with

Liberia was signed, and an agreement on regular air services was concluded between Brazil and Morocco.

The restoration of diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1974, the opening of embassies in Jakarta, Dhaka and Kathmandu, support of the UN resolution on the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from the territory of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, in accordance with the principles of independence, integrity and self-determination of former colonial territories should be placed in the same context.

The abolition of the obligation to comply with the anti-Cuban sanctions of the OAS, which Brazil also voted for, testified to the country's reluctance to further fall out of Latin American context. Oil was more important than any ideological nuances, and cooperation was more important than geopolitical disputes. It is indicative that the chief of the presidential military administration (Casa Militar) was none other than the "gray eminence" in the government of U. Castelo Branco, the author of the theory of "hemicycles" General Golberi do Couto e Silva. Probably, a sophisticated theorist, on his own experience came to the conclusion that pragmatism is the best of all ideologies.

The main thing, however, was the search for non-traditional energy sources. The merit of the government of E. Geisel was the resumption of ethanol production, based on the processing of sugar cane waste, and the development of nuclear energy. But Brazil's intention to master full-cycle technology to create its own nuclear industry has met with strong opposition from the United States and worsened bilateral relations. The disagreements with the United States in the field of the nuclear issue, which remained in the background under Medici, turned into a major problem during the Geisel's administration.

Brazil's attempts to negotiate with the American company "Westinghouse" in 1965 ended in failure. Under Medici, there was created a new administrative structure – the Brazilian Nuclear Technology Company, which was reorganized in 1974 into Nuclebras. Moreover, in 1969, under the government of A. da Costa -e- Silva, a large-scale bilateral agreement on scientific and technical cooperation was signed with Germany, which also included cooperation in the development of the "peaceful atom".

In early 1974, "Westinghouse" supplied Brazil with a nuclear reactor for the construction of the first Brazilian nuclear power plant, Angra-1. However, the US Nuclear Energy Commission has imposed a ban on the supply of nuclear fuel. Thus, Brazil lost its independence in the development of this industry, and the United States became a monopoly on the promising nuclear technology market.

On June 27, 1975, the Brazilian-West German nuclear agreement was signed, which completely violated the plans of the United States. The agreement provided for Brazil to receive eight giant nuclear reactors worth from 2 to 8 billion dollars, the construction of a uranium enrichment plant and a plant for the production of reactors. It provided for the transfer of technology, which meant that by 1978 the production of equipment for the nuclear industry and reactor fuel would become national. The agreement provided for oversight by the IAEA.

The Brazilian-West German agreement stemmed from the general orientation of the foreign policy of military governments concerned about the fate of nuclear energy development against the background of rather contradictory events: the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on the one hand, and the "peaceful nuclear explosion" carried out by India in 1973. Brazil's desire to have

a developed nuclear industry date back to the days of J. Vargas and was intended to ensure its energy independence. For West Germany, cooperation with Brazil provided access to uranium deposits, freeing it in this regard from unilateral dependence on the United States. In addition, for West Germany it could become the first sign in terms of concluding such agreements in Latin America and in other parts of the world.

The US reaction was extremely painful and biased. At first, the Nixon-Kissinger administration, preoccupied primarily with the desire to smooth out the international effect of the defeat in Vietnam, reacted to this event rather “softly”. Paying tribute to realism, Washington, during G. Kissinger’s visit to Brasilia in 1977, tried to take into account the increased role of Brazil in the region. The Memorandum of Understanding, signed during the visit, provided for a mechanism for regular mutual consultations (which the United States does not have in relations with other Latin American countries). The situation, however, changed dramatically after John Carter’s administration came to power in the United States.

The concern of the new administration about the lack of democracy and the state of affairs with the protection of human rights in Brazil, which arose immediately after the change of leadership in Washington, many Brazilian researchers associate exclusively with the US reaction to the nuclear deal. After all, the United States not only did not react to much more gross violations of this kind under the governments of Castelo Branco and Medici.

D. Carter tried to pressure Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany to terminate the deal by sending high-ranking emissaries to Brasilia and Bonn. E. Geisel’s government declared not only the inadmissibility of such a step, but also the impossibility

of making any changes to the concluded agreement. In March 1977, Carter ordered "Chase Manhattan" and the US "Eximbank" to end all funding for facilities in Brazil. Allegations of human rights violations were brought against Brazil in the UN and the OAS and it was announced that it would stop selling modern weapons to it.

Brazil did not remain in debt. In response to accusations of human rights violations, A. da Silveira accused the United States of interfering in internal affairs. In September, the government of E. Geisel tore up the bilateral military agreement with the United States of 1952, as well as agreements on joint military and naval missions. 35 years of "special military relations" came to an end, which led to strategic contradictions between two countries and political distancing, although economic and trade ties were not weakened. This step was rather symbolic by nature, because since 1970 Brazil was able to ensure 80% of its own weapons. The remaining 20% of technically sophisticated weapons the country purchased in Western Europe.

Some softening in bilateral relations was outlined only in March 1978 during D. Carter's visit to Brasilia. "Government circles have interpreted this visit to mean that Brazil has already become so powerful that the United States is afraid of losing an important ally in the Western Hemisphere," - wrote Paulo Visentini (2004).

During the presidency of E. Geisel, the country's foreign policy becomes truly global. Brazil participates in numerous international meetings and conferences, concludes a number of agreements, conventions and treaties, both bilateral and multilateral, which cover international politics, trade, shipping, finance, culture, sports, science and technology.

Cooperation with the countries of Latin America is becoming more and more important. There have been many changes in the world: deterioration of the global trade, application of prohibitive or discriminatory measures on the part of industrialized countries against exports from developing countries, latter stimulate the raising of the question of adopting the rules of the New International Economic Order, the development of the concept of "economic aggression" and the adoption of a Code of TNC conduct. Brazil, together with the Group of 77 actively supports all these initiatives in the OAS and the UN. It establishes diplomatic relations with Grenada, Jamaica, the Bahamas, and as a result of meetings with the heads of state of Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela, signs a number of agreements on the joint development of natural resources, on borders, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation. In 1975, Brazil, together with 25 states of the region, signed an agreement on the creation of the Latin American Economic System - an advisory body designed to coordinate their policies in the field of trade, economics and finance.

In July 1978, after a series of preparatory meetings, Brazil signed the Amazon Pact with the countries of the Amazon Basin: Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana and Suriname. This pact provided cooperation in the field of navigation, hydrographic and climatic research of this vast area, development of its transport infrastructure and telecommunications, health care, technological and environmental research. The Amazon Pact made it clear to everybody, that the sovereignty of the countries of the Amazon basin over this region is undeniable, and that any attempts by the United States and its Western allies to achieve free navigation along the world's greatest river would be doomed to failure. The problem of joint development

of another large water basin, rich in natural resources and possessing a huge energy potential - La Plata, was resolved at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the countries of the La Plata Basin Treaty (1978). (Vidigal, 2012).

During that period, Brazil's relations with the countries of Western Europe and Japan, the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe continued to strengthen. Of particular note was the cooperation program between the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the Brazilian Agricultural Research Institute (EMBRAPA). This allowed Brazil to transform the scientific base of its agriculture in a short time, in order to become an "agricultural giant" - one of the world's leading agricultural producers in the near future. This made it possible for Brazil to receive the necessary capital and technologies for accelerated development, and in political terms - to guarantee independence from the United States. Rapprochement with developing countries helped Brazil to play the role of "bridge" between the "First" and "Third" worlds.

During the presidency of E. Geisel, Brazil established itself as a middle power capable of independent actions in the international arena. It was created a Commission for the Coordination of Diplomatic Activities, which was called upon to coordinate the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with foreign diplomatic missions, the government, the command of the armed forces and the Higher Military School. The Commission coordinated the tasks facing Itamaraty with national development plans. The diversification of political, economic, cultural, sports and other directions in Brazil's foreign policy favored the enhancement of its international image and created a good basis for the prediction of its soft power in the world arena. All these

advances, however, receded into the background in the face of deepening economic and social problems.

Summarizing the results of Geisel-Silveira's foreign policy, R. Ricupero wrote:

It continued the Independent Foreign Policy, expanding and concretizing it through longer-term implementation and more favorable internal conditions. Not all, but many of the plans were fulfilled and synchronized with the experienced historical moment. The best test of its vitality was that even after a deep internal political transformation in the country, which was associated with the departure of the military from power, it retained itself in its basic features as the basis for Brazil's modern foreign policy. (Ricupero, 2017).

J. Figueiredo's Diplomacy: Consistency in the Years of Crisis

The government of General João Bautista Figueiredo (1979-1984) was the longest of all the military governments in Brazil, which had been in power since April 1964. The result of his activities was the restoration of democracy and the provision of a peaceful transfer of power into the hands of a civilian government. This challenging task was carried out amid a sharp decline in GDP growth, increased external debt, inflation and unemployment. The country, along with the rest of Latin America, entered the "lost decade of the eighties." The Brazilian incident, however, had its own characteristics.

Rapid economic development of the 1970s served the military a disservice, conflicting with their ideological rigidity. From the outside, their difficulties were exacerbated by two oil crises (especially the second, 1979), which put an end to the “economic miracle”. The huge role of the state in the economy and restrictions on the inflow of foreign capital into the country, the formation of a closed ruling caste from the military, large industrialists and the state bureaucracy, trade protectionism - all this was a consequence of the military’s exaggerated ideas about the sovereignty and security of their country (the so-called “super-security”).

By the beginning of the 1980s among the first 50 largest corporations in Brazil, the first 7 places were firmly held by the state. Informatics, oil and metallurgical industries, production of new materials, pharmaceuticals, aircraft and automobile manufacturing were artificially closed to foreign competition, which means they were doomed to scientific and technological lag. The supporters of strengthening the public sector were not only the government and trade unions, but also many representatives of private capital, who preferred a “greenhouse” mode of existence in a comfortable environment without competition with the products of foreign firms. Taking advantage of the abundance of petrodollars on the world market, the military invested money in ambitious projects that did not give an immediate economic return – the Trans-Amazon highway, the construction of a nuclear power plant, a cosmodrome, the development of a project for a nuclear submarine, a ballistic missile, etc. The construction of large oil refineries, pulp and paper and metallurgical plants, which required more and more external borrowings, did not stop for a minute. The economy is overheated.

In early 1980, following the second oil crisis, the United States raised its bank interest rate to a record 20%. As a result, the cost of external borrowing has tripled. By the end of E. Geisel's government, Brazil's external debt amounted to 20 billion dollars, and by the beginning of the 1980s it reached a record amount of 90 billion! The growth rate of GDP changed from positive to negative (in 1982, minus 2.9%). With a population growth of 2.2% on average, this meant that per capita income fell by 12% during this period. The country finished 1983 with a record inflation rate of 200%. "History has shown that miracles cannot be counted on in the economy. Besides the fact that they are extremely rare and ephemeral, other generations have to pay the bills for them", - "Veja" magazine noted.

Economic failures have accelerated the re-democratization process. "The military, - Ricupero noted ironically,- missed an excellent chance to leave power in the mid-70s: at the "peak "of their economic success." (2017).

By that time, the democratization process could no longer be stopped. Strikes at the largest enterprises were gaining strength and the public movement "Direitas Já!" ("Direct elections - now!"). Left-wing radical groups raised their heads again, terrorist attacks took place in the largest cities of Brazil. In November 1979, the party system was fully restored. Instead of two official parties ARENA and MDB, created by the military regime, the Social Democratic Party (PDS) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) emerged. In those years, the name of the leader of the trade union of the metallurgists of the state of Sao Paulo, Luis Inacio da Silva, nicknamed "Lula", who became the founder of the leftist Workers' Party (RT), began to gain wide popularity. In Brazil, the activities of the Brazilian Trabalist Party (PTB), the Trabalist Democratic Party (PDT) and

the People's Party (PP) have been authorized. The first direct elections for state governors were held on November 15, 1982. The transition to democracy was guaranteed, but it was conceived and implemented as a gradual one.

Foreign policy occupied a special place in the activities of the last government of J. Figueiredo. A career diplomat, Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro (1979-1985), who had previously held an ambassador position in France, was appointed as the head of Itamaraty.

Picture 21 - Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro



Source: Author/Photographer - unknown.

Rubens Ricupero, who then worked under his supervision at the Foreign Ministry, described his boss as an original person, “able to fall asleep during his own speech”. An unimportant speaker, he at the same time possessed “an exceptional sense of reality in assessing the situation, high professionalism and the greatest ability to work”. The successes he achieved as head of Itamaraty spoke for themselves. S. Guerreiro’s “Universalism”,

which replaced A. da Silveira's "Responsible Pragmatism", "consolidated the presence of Brazil in all corners of the planet, filling many of the theoretical postulates of E. Geisel's foreign policy with practical content",- wrote P. Vizentini. (2004). Under S. Guerreiro, Brazil was especially characterized by such signs as a clear understanding of Brazilian reality in the international context; clear identification of the main goals and interests of the country in the international arena; a realistic understanding and assessment of the country's methods of action in accordance with its interests and capabilities.

Modern Brazilian analysts believe that the main foreign policy success of those years was the creation of conditions that ensured, after the transition to civilian rule, the signing of Mercosur Treaty. Mutual understanding with Argentina was not easy. After coming to power in Argentina the harsh anti-communist military government of General Videla in 1976, the old geopolitical feuds in the relations of two countries disputed among themselves the influence in the region of La Plata since the middle of the XIX century, only intensified.

Despite the anti-communism declared by the Brazilian military in 1964, their position now coincided more with the moderately pragmatic position of Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela. The matter was complicated by a long-lasting (11 years!) dispute over plans to build the largest hydroelectric power plants on the river Parana: Brazilian-Paraguayan Itaipu, and Argentinean Corpus. The Corpus-Itaipu agreement reached by R. Saraiva Guerreiro on October 19, 1979, eliminated the main problem that poisoned relations between two countries.

The final normalization of bilateral relations, however, was again postponed due to a dispute over the creation of the SATO or the South Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was actively

lobbied by Washington and supported by Argentina's military junta. According to the plan of the United States, concerned about the growing presence of the Soviet Navy in the South Atlantic, the military governments of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay and the apartheid regime of the South African Republic were to enter the SATO. Brazil, however, unequivocally rejected any prospect of joining an alliance with the racist South African regime. At the same time, its disagreements with Argentina over the flaring Central American crisis (1979-1990), where Buenos Aires supported the interventionist course of Reagan administration, accumulated, and Brasilia preferred a peaceful settlement of the American-Nicaraguan dispute.

Everything changed after the war in the South Atlantic because of the Malvinas (Falkland) and other islands, unleashed by the Argentina military junta in April 1982. During this fleeting conflict, Brazil, condemning the method of seizing the islands by force, recognized the "inalienable right of Argentina" to these territories, "illegally taken away" by Great Britain in 1833. Together with most Latin American countries, Brazil opposed the sanctions announced against Buenos Aires by the United States and Western countries at the UN and the OAS and took on the mission of representing Argentina's interests in London after the break of Anglo-Argentine relations. The internment of the British strategic bomber "Vulcan", which made an emergency landing in Rio -de -Janeiro during the outbreak of the conflict, became symbolic. Paulo Visentini in his book on the foreign policy of the Brazilian military governments, cites information about the secret sale by Brazil of several of its military aircraft to Argentina to compensate for the losses suffered in the air battles over the South Atlantic.

The 1982 war showed the borders of the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty, confirming the idea that the United States is an unreliable ally. It seems, however, that this idea was repeated by J. Vargas in the last years of his presidency, and the military, who came to power with confidence in the United States helping in implementing their “great-power” plans, had to return to it already in the early 70s.

The departure of the Argentina’s military from power as a result of massive violations of human rights, economic collapse and defeat in the war with England, opened up qualitatively new opportunities for Argentina-Brazilian cooperation, which will be realized only after the restoration of the civil administration in Brasilia.

Abstracting from the form of government, one could confidently assert that during the period of “late” military governments, Brazil’s foreign policy was characterized by pragmatism and democracy, inherent to the civil administrations of J. Kubitschek, J. Caudros and J. Goulart. This was especially characteristic of the last military government of J. Figueiredo and his foreign minister, R. Saraiva Guerreiro. This government did not offer any radical change in the country’s foreign policy, but only adapted it to the changed internal and external circumstances.

It should be specially noted that Brazil, despite its declared anti-communism, did not join the American sanctions against the USSR announced by the Carter administration in response to the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, and did not support the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. “Universality” of foreign policy was understood by the government of J. Figueiredo as the need to expand the country’s international contacts and increase its international prestige in the face of a sharp deterioration in the international situation and

the multiple strengthening of American interventionism after the Ronald Reagan administration came to power in the United States.

This interventionism manifested itself with particular force in Latin America during the American invasion of Grenada in 1983. Brazil, together with most other Latin American countries, condemned this act as contradicting the UN and OAS charters. At the same time, even in conditions of complications in the internal and external political situation, Itamaraty was distinguished not only by active reaction, but also by the desire to prevent impending conflicts or to peacefully resolve those that had already arisen.

In April 1983, a secret US mission headed by Reagan's emissary, General W. Clarke, arrived to Brasilia to persuade the Brazilians to take part in the joint US-Dutch military intervention in Suriname with the aim of overthrowing the military government of D. Bouters, who declared his solidarity with Cuba. Brazil recognized the potential threat on its northern border, but rejected the prospect of an armed intervention. Brazil, in turn, sent its emissaries to Paramaribo, who managed to convince D. Bouters to accept Brazilian economic, financial and military assistance as an alternative to Cuban, to which he immediately agreed.

A potential military conflict was nipped in the bud. In the same years, Brazilian diplomacy acted as a mediator, sought to achieve regulation of the Peruvian-Ecuadorian territorial dispute, which had been dragging on since 1941, and more than once led to armed clashes on the border between two countries, and actively supported the efforts of Contadora Group (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, 1983) with the aim of a peaceful

solution to the Central American crisis by preventing any foreign intervention.

Not being an active member of the Non-Aligned Movement (Brazil had observer status in the NAM), the country took an active part in NAM forums, exposing the actions of international political and economic structures that impeded the development of the Third World countries, and defended the right to development and overcoming of dependence. At the XI UN Special General Assembly (1980), Brazil initiated global negotiations in the context of a new formula for North-South dialogue. At a conference in Cancun (Mexico, 1981), a representative of Itamaraty condemned the protectionist policy of developed countries and expressed his solidarity with Cuba's position on this issue. Speaking at the opening of the XXXVII session of the UN General Assembly (1982), President J. Figueiredo condemned the policy of the superpowers, which dragged the countries of the Third World into the conflict between the West and the East. He criticized the world order that keeps rich countries at the expense of the poor, international "cooperation" that does not promote development goals, "interdependence" that deepens inequality, and international organizations that only listen to the rich countries. The president criticized the imbalances in the global financial system to the detriment of developing countries, saying that "the economic policies of the great powers destroy resources, giving nothing in return". (Castro, 2009).

It is no coincidence that Brazilian-American relations have deteriorated so much that the Brazilian Defense Ministry, starting in 1983, in the context of a qualitative improvement in relations with Argentina, began, according to some information, to regard the United States of America as a potential adversary. The differences between Brazil and the United States concerned

not only American interventions in Central America and the Caribbean and contradictions in the sphere of trade and economic relations, but also the main thing that the government of J. Figueiredo was betting on: gaining access to new technologies, primarily in the field of aircraft and rocketry, nuclear energy, informatics and pharmaceuticals.

In order to achieve independence in the technological field, it was created a special ministry of science and technology in Brazil, and under the ministries of the services of the armed forces, there were created special institutes and research groups to study problems in the most advanced fields of science. On October 17, 1969, there was created the Institute for Space Research (IKI), linked to the Ministry of the Air Force through the Aerospace Technical Center (ATC), which had previously been engaged in the development of solid-propellant rockets. The IKI and ATC specialists jointly came to the conclusion that it is possible to carry out an entirely Brazilian space program using a national launch vehicle. At the same time, Brazil began construction of the Alcantara cosmodrome in the state of Maranhão.

All these years, the military, despite the growing economic difficulties, continued to carry out the so-called parallel nuclear program under the auspices of the Institute for Energy and Nuclear Research (IPEN, 1956), associated with the Ministry of the Brazilian Navy. The latter had its own Research Center Aramar (municipality of Ipoero, state of Sao Paulo). The total number of people employed in the center and at the Almirante Alvaro Alberto uranium enrichment plant was up to 1,200 people in those years.

On January 31, 1983, following the results of the Treaty on cooperation in the field of science and technology, signed in December 1982 during R. Reagan's visit to Brasilia, a

Memorandum of understanding of cooperation in the aerospace field was signed between Brazil and the United States. However, the working groups for cooperation in the financial, economic, nuclear and aerospace spheres created under this agreement have not been able to achieve the expected results. Despite the Memorandum, the parties failed to reach an agreement on the joint production in Brazil of modern types of weapons based on American technologies.

On January 17, 1984, the first Brazilian nuclear power plant Angra - 1 was inaugurated. This success was achieved thanks to cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany and the own contribution of Brazilian scientists. However, in 1985 the USA refused to supply Brazil with the CYBER 860 supercomputer for operation at IPEN.

The US refusal to cooperate with Brazil in the field of high technologies related to the nuclear, military and aerospace fields, as well as in the fields of information science, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, could not be explained solely by Washington's concern about the situation with the "protection of human rights" in this country. The sabotage of all the efforts of the Latin American giant to get rid of scientific and technological dependence on the United States continued, and on an even larger scale, after the return of the country to a civilian form of government.

In these conditions, Brazil had no choice but to turn to the countries of Western Europe and Japan for help, while concluding agreements on military-technical cooperation and on the supply of its own multiple launch rocket systems, attack aircraft, armored personnel carriers, tanks with Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the countries of the African continent. In 1984, Brazil reached record levels in the export of arms, selling them

for the amount of 1.2 billion dollars and taking the 5th place in the world by this indicator. For example, under an agreement of January 5, 1980, Brazil undertook to supply Iraq with natural and low-enriched uranium for use in nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes. At the same time, the supply of high-tech equipment was not envisaged.

Summarizing 21 years of military government in Brazil, Rubens Ricupero noted that “almost everything that happened in it during this period was rejected or subjected to justified criticism. Foreign policy has become an exception against this background. Abroad, Brazilian diplomacy has awakened a sense of respect from numerous politicians and analysts, a respect that was not enjoyed by the regime as a whole. Domestically, the opposition identified itself with the foreign policy of its state much more than the authors of the 1964 military coup did in relation to Cold War Manichaeism. Tancredo Neves, who was elected as the country’s new president after the departure of the military, but who did not manage to take this post due to illness and death, said about its foreign policy: “If something enjoyed a consensus attitude towards itself in all layers of Brazilian society during military, so it was the activities of Itamaraty. “

P. Vizontini evaluates the legacy of the military era somewhat differently:

It must be admitted that the paradigm of subordinating foreign policy to the goals of accelerated development of the country, which the military put in the basis of its foreign policy strategy, has fully justified itself. Brazil, even

with all its socio-economic problems, has become the only country to south of the equator with a modern and diversified industrial park, ranking in the top ten leading economies in the world. The foreign policy of the military should be viewed in the context of the National Project, which aimed to raise Brazil in the world table of ranks through accelerated industrialization and transformation into a regional power. This project was the basis of Getulio Vargas's diplomacy, it was clearly seen in the "policy of national development" of the 1950s and in the Independent Foreign Policy of J. Quadros and J. Goulart, and it was embodied in life by the military regimes up to the transfer of power by them into the hands of the civil president - Jose Sarney. (Vizentini, 2004).

Increased attention was paid to Latin America, and, above all, to the development of trade and economic ties with Argentina, which in the early 1990s will lead to the creation of the integration association Mercosur.

In 1980, the Montevideo Treaty created ALADI (LAI, Latin American Integration Association), which replaced the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAST), which had existed since 1960. In LAI, all member countries were divided into three groups: more developed (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico), mid-level (Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, Chile), and less developed (Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador). The agreement between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina became an important basis for resolving the problem with the Itaipu border hydropower plant, and the Cartagena Consensus laid the foundation for a joint policy of Latin American countries to resolve the debt crisis. The contractual base with Latin American countries was constantly expanding, covering social issues, the legal sphere, trade and economic

relations, the sphere of transport, communications, culture, science and education.

Universalism and autonomy have become the main focus of the Brazilian military in the last 10 years, when they ruled the country. Their governments, starting with A. da Costa e Silva, translated the interests of national development into a multi-lateral strategy, while increasingly showing solidarity with the states of the Third World. In parallel, by combining sensible realism and pragmatism, Brazil has strengthened its regional leadership. (Castro, 2009).

Thus, the nationalist program of President J. Vargas (1930 - 1945, 1951 - 1954), an attempt by J. Kubitschek (1956 - 1961) to stimulate the development of internal regions, the desire for autonomy and the national reformist course of J. Cuadros - J. Goulart (1961-1964), as well as the “responsible pragmatism” of the military governments represented different, but at the same time, somewhat similar options for the country’s development. The diplomatic thought of Brazil played an important role in these processes, which gave it a certain rationality, traditionalism and consistency. The authoritarian regime established in the country for 21 years of its existence has undergone significant changes under the influence of this traditionalism. With the coming to power of the government of A. da Costa -e- Silva, and then Medici, foreign policy gradually began to return into important elements of the period that preceded the coup. The return to the diplomatic tradition was most vividly manifested during the period of E. Geisel, when “pragmatic realism” in many aspects de facto became a return to Independent Foreign Policy. At the same time, the most important innovation in E. Geisel’s foreign policy was the declaration of Brazil’s belonging to the Third World, which distanced it from two rival blocs.

Comparing IFP and the policy of responsible pragmatism, one can note a significant similarity in their main provisions. The difference lies in both the internal and the external context: during the years of military rule, the Brazilian economy has become more developed, polarization along the North-South line has deepened in the world, new influential associations of developing countries have emerged, their struggle for a new international economic order has intensified (NIEP). Brazil's foreign policy took on a global outline, and Itamaraty's activities increased in intensity and scope.

Chapter 5

THE “PROS” AND “CONS” OF A “PRESIDENTIAL DIPLOMACY”

“The Diplomacy of Results” by President J. Sarney.

The transition from dictatorship to democracy in Brazil in 1985 was carried out peacefully. As noted, professor L.S. Okuneva, it had the goal of

(c)reating a political structure that would be able to perceive and ensure technological progress, strengthen the country’s involvement in the world economy as its full-fledged subject, involve the masses in the political process, eliminate violence as a method of solving political problems—or to respond to the challenges of the time, dictating the need to carry out not only radical economic, but also social reforms. (Okuneva, 2008). (Okuneva, 2008).

This first, most turbulent and marked by many contradictions period of transit, which lasted 10 years: from 1985 to 1995, was associated with the activities of three presidents - Jose Sarney, Fernando Collor di Melo and Itamar Franco.

The beginning of the power transfer by the military into the hands of a civilian president was overshadowed by the death of President-elect Tancredo Neves, a veteran of Brazilian political battles who served as Minister of Justice in the government of J. Vargas (1951-1954), who did not manage to take office on March 15, 1985.

On April 22 of the same year, Jose Sarney (1985-1990), the head of the Party of the Liberal Front (PFL), who was elected in tandem with T. Neves as vice-president, took office as president.

Taking the presidency, J. Sarney, a native of the poor northeast, noted that by 1986 Brazil had moved far from the country that it was 25 years ago, when its exports were dominated by agricultural products. He saw the tasks of the new administration in carrying out reforms to overcome the consequences of 20 years of authoritarian rule, economic and social crisis, which was caused by inequitable distribution of income, hunger and malnutrition, a surge in violence, epidemics, disease and poverty of more than 30 million people.

The country convened a Constitutional Assembly to prepare a draft of a new democratic constitution, which was adopted in 1988. The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 (still in force) established the independent existence of the legislative, executive and judicial branches, provided for the free activity of all political parties and trade unions and university autonomy. Much attention was paid to the problem of environmental protection. The constitution determined the main lines in domestic and foreign policy.

The first chapter set out the following principles of its foreign policy:

- National independence,
- Human rights,
- Self-determination of peoples,
- Non-interference,
- Equality of states,
- Protecting the world,
- Peaceful resolution of conflicts,
- Condemnation of terrorism and racism,
- Cooperation between peoples for the progress of mankind,
- Granting political asylum.

There was a paragraph added to the text of the Constitution on the desire for economic, political, social and cultural integration of the peoples of Latin America, and the goal of forming a Latin American community of nations was set as a priority.

The restoration of democracy naturally expanded the set of values on the basis of foreign policy implementation. Henceforth, it had to be based on the values of democracy and tolerance, which were in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence and cooperation with all members of the international community. The departure from power of the military did not mean, however, a complete rejection of the fundamental principles of the policy of responsible pragmatism and universalism. On the contrary, the foreign policy profile of the New Republic still corresponded to the profile of a middle power on a planetary

scale in the understanding of the governments of E. Geisel and J. Figueiredo.

Continuing the logic of these governments, J. Sarney emphasized the need to “cut off” the negative effects of the international system for the country’s development, such as dependence on existing centers of power and world economic poles. He called for undermining the positions of the supporters of freezing the economic and political power of Brazil and those who advocate recessive formulas related to tax evasion and the export of net profits. The President believed that his country was facing extraordinary difficulties on the world stage, which required innovative approaches to diplomacy.

These difficulties were: economic and debt crises, rising unemployment and inflation, increased trade protectionism on the part of the United States and other developed countries. However, despite the efforts made by his government and the adoption of five Programs of economic stabilization - from 1986 to 1989 - the government of J. Sarney failed to break the fatal binomial “inflation - external debt” (Cervo A., Bueno C., 2010).

The growth of external debt went through two stages. The first one took place in 1974-1979, when the country’s resources were directed to the development of the economic base and invested in the creation of heavy industry enterprises, infrastructure facilities. Then the external debt increased from 12.5 to 49.9 billion dollars. By the end of the second stage - 1980-1987, it was already 115 billion dollars (about 40.8% of the country’s GDP). A prominent sociologist and politician, and later President of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, noted that a quarter of this debt was formed due to high interest rates on loans.

In his economic policy, J. Sarney tried to focus on the neo-liberal model aimed at curtailing the role of the state in the

economy. His plans included a resumption of GDP growth and a revival of industrial activity, attracting foreign capital to the country and increasing the competitiveness of Brazilian goods on international markets. However, the legacy of military regimes in the form of industries that were closed or partially closed for foreign capital remained for a long time in the Brazilian economy. The most prominent examples were computer science and pharmaceuticals.

Picture 22 - President J. Sarney



Source: Source: Author/Photographer - Presidents Gallery.
Official photo of José Sarney, president of Brazil, 1985.

Liberal ideology in the outside world has won one victory after another. The policy of “perestroika”, launched in the USSR, contributed to the relaxation of international tension. The democratization of Spain and Portugal with their subsequent entry into the EU and the fall of military regimes in a number of Latin American countries (the latter, in 1989, the military government of Chile left), assumed the inevitability of a renewal

of the foreign policy of the largest country in the Southern Hemisphere.

Democratic euphoria swept the entire world, but the United States, despite all its solemn declarations, was in no hurry to limit the interests of its corporations in order to keep afloat the recently revived Brazilian democracy. "At the end of his mandate, the president, who at first saw cooperation with Washington as one of the most important pillars of his foreign policy, was completely disillusioned with the prospects of establishing equal cooperation with it," - Ricupero noted. On September 7, 1985 (Brazil's Independence Day), the United States announced the beginning of an investigation into the law on informatics, passed by the military government, with the prospect of announcing anti-Brazilian sanctions. They began to consider the Brazilian policy in the field of intellectual property protection in a similar way. (Ricupero, 2017).

J. Sarney's visit to the United States in 1986 did not bring the desired results. The country was faced with a lack of understanding of its problems by the US administration, with Washington's indifference to the problems of Latin America, where an exception was made only for those topics that, in the opinion of the State Department, affected the national security of the United States: drug trafficking and crisis situations in Central America and the Caribbean.

In October 1987, the United States imposed a 100% tax on some Brazilian exports in response to the production in Brazil of certain types of medicine patented in the United States. "By insisting on changing Brazilian laws to please American entrepreneurs, the United States forced it, thereby, to change its position in the GATT, which was even more important for them than gaining some marginal advantage in the medicine market".

Bilateral relations were complicated by issues related to external debt repayments, which were imposed by US trade sanctions in response to the ban on US pharmaceutical companies from imposing their rules on the Brazilian market. (Ricupero, 2017).

Difficulties in relations with Washington and the need to re-fit the country that emerged from a long period of authoritarian rule into the changing world order laid the foundation for the presidential diplomacy.

Presidential diplomacy reflected the intention of the head of state to raise the country's international prestige by correcting it where it was needed (the legacy of the doctrine of ideological borders).

In its main provisions, it boiled down to the following:

- Conduct by the President, together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other interested departments, monitoring of the most pressing international issues, where the personal participation of the head of state could have a higher efficiency compared to the methods of conventional diplomacy;
- Ensuring his personal presence at high-level meetings in order to use protocol events as negotiating platforms;
- His participation in the maximum possible number of summits of the states of the Western Hemisphere to reconcile positions with other Latin American countries and remove their suspicions about Brazil's claims to regional leadership;
- Making the opportunities for him to formulate statements on topics of Brazilian foreign policy, as well as on issues that are of importance to the entire world community;

- His participation in the consideration and adoption of proposals for the reorganization of all structures, responsible for the foreign policy in order to fulfill better their tasks.

The first foreign minister of the New Republic was Olavo Setubal (1985-1986) – an engineer, a major banker and industrialist, a native of Sao Paulo. In the context of the new foreign policy goals set for Brazilian diplomacy, O. Setubal stated the need for flexible, creative and realistic “diplomacy of results”, the starting point of which was a clear understanding of our interests in terms of resuming growth and reducing external vulnerability. The implementation of “diplomacy of results” was planned in conjunction with presidential diplomacy, as required a more effective Brazilian presence at bilateral and multilateral meetings and conferences.

O. Setubal suggested that Itamaraty become a generator of new ideas, continuing the best traditions of solidarity and universalism, inherited from Baron Rio Branco. The new democratic spirit of the New Republic presupposed the maximum openness of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for public and parliamentary control, as well as regular consultations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with representatives of the business community and the academic world. One of its effects was the possibility of a more open dialogue with democratic countries, primarily with Latin American ones, contacts with whom improved after the military regimes left power there, as well as with Western democracies and developing states. Politically, Brazil has changed its image. Today we can legally advocate greater democratization of international relations, because we follow democratic rules in our own country.

The new look led us to a more critical understanding of the international situation. We can now speak more boldly about the establishment of an equitable world order, about ending poverty and underdevelopment and about reducing inequality between countries, as the social dimension has become an important element of our policies. Never before in the history of our independent nation “has there been such a strong connection with the outside world”, - said the Foreign Minister, speaking at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Congress on September 8, 1985. (CORTES, 2010).

The topics of human rights and environmental protection have become the new directions in Brazilian foreign policy. In 1985, J. Sarney introduced “The International Covenants on Human Rights”, developed under the auspices of the UN, and “the American Convention on Human Rights” for approval by the National Congress. Brazil has signed the Convention against Torture. At the end of this year, the President introduced “the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” and “the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” to Congress for ratification.

In 1985, Brazil participated in a regional meeting on the environment in Mexico. It joined the UN Environment Programs (PRUNA) and the study of the impact of greenhouse gases on the ozone layer of the atmosphere. The IV meeting of the World Commission on Development and Environment was held in Brasilia. At the summit on environmental protection in The Hague, the Brazilian delegation made a number of proposals to programs to combat environmental pollution and protect natural resources. The administration of J. Sarney nominated Brazil as the host country for the UN World Conference on Development and Environmental Protection, which was scheduled to take place in 1992.

In line with his presidential diplomacy, J. Sarney experienced an increased interest in the activities of Itamaraty, paying special attention to increasing the professionalism and competence of its employees. He established the post of special adviser to the president on foreign policy for closer coordination with the Foreign Ministry apparatus. In 1985, J. Sarney appointed the famous diplomat Rubens Ricupero, who previously was ambassador to Washington, to this position. In 1987 R. Ricupero became the head of the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the international organizations in Geneva. And a career diplomat L.-F. de Seixas Correa, who previously worked at the Brazilian Mission to the United Nations, and was Ambassador to Buenos Aires and Washington, became the next special advisor. Seixas Correa is the author of the most comprehensive studies on Brazilian foreign policy during the presidency of J. Sarney.

In 1986, Roberto de Abreu Sodre, the former governor of the state of San Paulo, was appointed as the new foreign minister, and held this position until 1990. R. de Abreu Sodre has tirelessly emphasized the organic connection of Brazilian diplomacy with the legacy of Baron de Rio Branco, which “is based on respect for the law, firmly grounded in ethics and law, strives for legitimate results and is persistent in seeking solutions by negotiations.” “Rio Branco’s diplomacy, - he believed, - “is a reliable pillar of Brazilian foreign policy,” which “should be respected and used with care in the ever-changing international environment.” And the minister defined the principal directions of Brazilian foreign policy as follows:

- compliance of the current foreign policy with its strong traditions;

- following in line with the changes that are taking place in the international arena;
- search for own clear profile in the international community of states. (Cortes, 2010).

In order to intensify scientific and technical cooperation with other countries, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) was established in 1987 under Itamaraty. ABC was a fundamentally new mechanism combining technical and foreign policy functions and was in interaction with more than 70 institutions and ministries. Its functions included the preparation of plans and the implementation of projects of scientific and technical cooperation. At the same time, the Institute for the Study of International Relations (IPRI) was created under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, closely associated with ABC and the Gusmao Foundation. Its responsibilities included studying Brazilian diplomacy, instilling public interest in foreign policy and international affairs, initiating discussions on issues of interest to Brazilian diplomacy, establishing contacts between the Foreign Ministry and the university and academic communities.

The personal participation of the head of state in international politics produced the desired effect. Foreign visits of the President (in total during his years in power, J. Sarney made more than 30 state visits and meetings and received in Brazil the heads of 23 foreign states), helped Brazil's rapprochement with foreign countries and marked the beginning of a qualitatively new stage of the integration process in the South America.

In 1989, J. Sarney made the first ever official visit of the President of Brazil to Moscow. The same year, he visited India, China, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Nigeria. Brazil has established diplomatic relations with Vietnam. Over the

years, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation with Japan, Germany, France, Sweden and the EU as a whole has been expanded. The country supported the people of Namibia in their struggle for independence and condemned the violent actions of South Africa, expanded ties with Iraq and other Arab countries, condemned the violence in the Middle East and supported the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

Brazil ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco on a nuclear-free zone in Latin America, and in 1986, within the framework of the UN, launched an initiative to create a Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS), free from an arms race, the presence of nuclear weapons and any form of confrontation, outgoing from other regions. All these years, Brazil has actively advocated the recognition of the UN supreme role in solving the disarmament problem (within the framework of the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament), emphasizing the special responsibility of the nuclear powers for this, while advocating, in parallel, the lifting of restrictions on the free use of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes.

The problem of external debt and economic development was actively raised by Brazil at the Uruguay Round of negotiations in the GATT / WTO, where issues related to the regulation of trade in services, advanced technologies and intellectual property were resolved. During the negotiations, the country spoke in favor of revising the rules of international trade and offered its own view on solving the problem of external debt, associated with the rejection of the growing marginalization of the Third World countries.

Brazilians, - stressed the President, - know that in the 21st century the division of the world into rich and poor people will be left behind.

Instead, the world will be divided into peoples who are doomed to cultural colonization and those who have advanced technologies. None of us thinks that Brazil, with its wealth, potential and determination, will remain a second-rate country as before. We have a completely different view of ourselves. (Cortes, 2010).

The “Dialogue of the Deaf” in relations between Brazil and the United States demonstrated the ineffectiveness of “Diplomacy of Results” in the North American direction, but the successes achieved on the Latin American track were impressive, however.

The greatest success has been achieved in relations with an old geopolitical rival, Argentina. Its foundation was laid by the activities of the government of J. Figueiredo, who managed to unleash an important knot of contradictions on the hydropower problem. The departure of the military from power in Argentina in 1983, followed by re-democratization in Brazil two years later, created new preconditions for the rapprochement of the countries. And before J. Sarney, many presidents, starting with J. Vargas, attached particular importance to relations with Buenos Aires and, in general, this sub-region. However, it was Sarney who gave a systemic character to the summit meetings with the leaders of Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, thereby facilitating the subsequent unification of these countries into the Common Market of the Southern Cone - Mercosur.

In November 1985, just a few months after the restoration of the civil form of government in Brazil, in the border town of Foz de Iguazu, the Presidents of Brazil and Argentina - J. Sarney and R. Alfonsin, signed the Iguazu Declaration, which marked the beginning of a new integration process in the countries of the Southern cone. It led to the signing in June 1986 of the

Argentine-Brazilian Integration Agreement and the Program for Integration and Economic Cooperation between countries. Later, the President of Uruguay, J. Sanguinetti, will join the presidents of two largest South American countries. The heads of these three states will continue to work to strengthen integration in the Southern Cone. Their rapprochement with Paraguay after the fall of the Stroessner dictatorship in 1989, will finally form the initial composition of the members of the future integration grouping Mercosur.

The most important innovation in Brazil's relations with Argentina was the achievement of mutual understanding in the field of nuclear technology, which was previously characterized by mutual mistrust and misunderstanding.

The years of President J. Sarney's tenure were characterized by attempts to

- a. – overcome the gap in this area with Argentina and,
- b. – support the intention of the military, who remained behind the scenes, to continue the so-called parallel nuclear program. The advantages of the parallel nuclear program, in their opinion, were its secrecy and a new method of uranium enrichment (the "ultracentrifuge" method), which opened up the possibility of its use in nuclear weapons. So, arose the need to strengthen confidence in two "threshold" states of South America.

There was of great importance the common visit by the presidents of two countries to the technological complex in Pilcaneu and the top-secret Argentine uranium enrichment plant during the visit of J. Sarney to Buenos Aires in June 1987.

R. Alfonsin's return visit to the Almirante Alvaro Alberto enterprise in Aramara took place the following year. The Sequential declassification of the most dubious aspects of their 'parallel' nuclear programs is one of the most impressive stories of the development of Argentine-Brazilian relations in our time. The mutual trust that they established in this area was continued without any deviations in the following years. This mutual openness allowed J. Sarney in September 1987 to disclose the fact of Brazil's mastery of the full nuclear cycle technology. This should have a positive impact on the country's foreign policy.

During the presidency of J. Sarney, diplomatic relations with Cuba restored and Brazil joined in 1985, together with the democratic governments of Argentina, Uruguay and Peru, into the Contadora Support Group. Itamaraty's attitude towards the Central American Crisis was finalized in late 1985.

Its main provisions were as follows:

- The crisis situation in the Central American subregion should not have been viewed from the angle of the East-West ideological confrontation, since it was caused by historical reasons, increased socio-economic inequality and the global economic crisis;
- to avoid translating local issues into the context of an East-West confrontation that could derail efforts to resolve the crisis;
- to look for a peaceful resolution of contradictions based on respect for the principles of non-interference and self-determination should be the basis for peace agreements;

- priority should be given to the interests of countries directly affected by the conflict, without outside interference;
- Efforts in the negotiation process were to be assigned to the countries of Latin America, firstly, to the states of the Contadora Group.

Speaking in Caracas in early 1986, the Brazilian foreign minister said that Latin American countries should continue their efforts to find a negotiated solution to Central America's problems, so that this regional conflict does not become broader due to the intervention of superpowers. In January 1986, the ministers of the Latin American G8 (Contadora Group: Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and Colombia + Support Group) reiterated their desire to solve the problems of Latin America on their own, without foreign intervention.

It was logical that both groups merged in December of the same year into a single Group of Rio de Janeiro, which became the first practical embodiment of the long-term struggle of Latin American countries since the time of ABC alliance to create their own organization, independent of the United States, dealing with political and security issues in their region. The mechanism of constant political consultations envisaged by the founders of the Rio Group has made the parallelism of the existence of the structures of Pan-Americanism (OAS) and Latin Americanism (Rio Group) a *fait accompli*.

In December 1989, the Rio Group condemned the invasion of US troops into Panama, advocated the immediate withdrawal of US troops from that country, and non-interference and self-determination in favor of strict observance of the Panama Canal Treaties. It is noteworthy that a similar resolution was adopted

by the OAS with 20 votes of Latin American states “for” and one “against” - the United States. The visits of President J. Sarney to Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, the rapprochement with Suriname and Guyana and the revitalization of the Amazon Pact have finally returned Brazil to the Latin American context, forcing its neighbors to forget about “sub-imperialism” and the doctrine of “ideological boundaries”. The Rio Branco Legacy has shown itself in a significant strengthening of Brazil’s ties with the states of its region.

Unfortunately, foreign policy and technological successes could not compensate the failures in the economy, or the general imbalance in international relations that was growing as the policy of “perestroika” in the Soviet Union developed, when the United States was turning into the only and indisputable world hegemon. “The government has lost control over inflation, conflicts and crises have corroded domestic politics. General demoralization and economic fiasco prepared a favorable atmosphere for adventurers,” - wrote R. Ricupero on this matter. In the first, since the end of the military direct presidential elections in Brazil, held on December 17, 1989, won the former governor of Alagoas, a newcomer to the “big politics”, Fernando Collor de Mello.

Fernando Collor and Itamar Franco: The ups and downs of the early 90s.

“At the turn of the 1980-1990s, Brazil came close to comprehending new economic and political realities, and above all changes of a global nature, which directly affected and largely determined the international and internal situation of the

country,” - noted the famous Russian expert on the history of Brazil, professor L.S. Okuneva. (Окунева, 2008). (Okuneva, 2008).

The radical changes in the international arena in the 1990s had a strong impact on Brazil, forcing it to adapt to a fundamentally new world order. A. Pinochet’s transfer of power to the civilian government in Chile and the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the subsequent Desert Storm operation, the destruction of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany and, finally, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the collapse of real socialism radically changed the international situation.

The debt crisis and economic recession – the consequences of the “lost decade” of the 1980s, deepened the economic dependence of Brazil, like a number of other Latin American countries on the United States and developed Western countries. Their political dependence on Washington has grown significantly.

The end of the cold war and the collapse of the bipolar system came as no less surprise to the countries of Latin America than to the rest of the world. During the Cold War, the countries of this region have learned to make good use of the bipolar confrontation. The USSR and the countries of the socialist community, as a rule, provided broad diplomatic support to the foreign policy initiatives of the leading Latin American countries, which were aimed at weakening their structural dependence on the United States. However, in the early 1990s, for the first time after the end of the World War II, the states of this region were again left alone with the only world hegemon in the conditions of complete domination of liberal values in the world. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Francisco Rezek

(1990-1992), the disappearance of the USSR meant the disappearance of the alternative pole of world politics, which, despite a series of dangerous crises of the Cold War era, provided a certain balance in international relations. (Cervo A., Bueno C., 2010).

The situation turned out to be especially difficult for Brazil, which, having entered the “club of the greats” with one foot in the early 1970s, by the early 1990s had become a “sick man of Latin America”. Against the backdrop of fairly successful neoliberal reforms carried out in Chile, the new status of Mexico as a full member of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the policy of “peripheral realism” by Argentine President Carlos Menem, Brazil in the conditions of an acute economic crisis, it seemed, could no longer afford the luxury of autonomous distancing. All the “niches of opportunities” that were skillfully exploited by its diplomacy in the past years, from now on, seemed to have disappeared. The country had to adapt with great difficulty to the new international scenario.

Brazil was faced with the need to modernize its foreign policy in parallel with solving the problems of inflation, external debt, crime and corruption. It was necessary to build a positive dialogue with the United States in solving such acute problems as trade protectionism, intellectual property, environmental protection, human rights and technology transfer. It was necessary to redefine Brazil’s profile in the Third World.

Picture 23 - Fernando Collor de Mello



Source: Source: Author/Photographer – unknown.
Official photo of Fernando Collor de Mello, president of Brazil.

Fernando Afonso Collor de Mello (1990-1992), who won the first direct presidential election, seemed to inspire a “sea of hope” in the voters. A young (41 years old) and photogenic millionaire, not associated with the oligarchy of the three leading states (before his election he was the governor of the small state of Alagoas in the northeast of the country), from a family with strong liberal traditions, F. Collor de Mello undoubtedly possessed bright charisma.

His campaign was replete with promise “kill the inflation’ tiger with one shot” and “end maharaj privileges forever,” that is, - large officials and oligarchs, which attracted a lot of voters to Collor’s side. He chose a neoliberal strategy to modernize Brazil, in line with the Washington Consensus, which manifested itself in denationalization and large-scale privatization, the final opening of the economy (including all its previously closed industries), and the use of shock therapy. In this latter, the young president was particularly successful.

The shock came immediately after the inauguration. Brazilians, accustomed to spending their salaries on payday, without waiting for the next rise in prices with inflation reaching 80%, are now faced with a “freeze” of their bank accounts for 18 (!) months. But, even having resorted to such not liberal methods in the economy, Collor still failed to kill the “inflation tiger with one shot”. By the end of 1990, inflation in Brazil had risen from 10% to 20%, while GDP contracted by 4.4%. The proceeds of large-scale privatization (including the symbol of the Vargas era - the Volta Redonda metallurgical plant) were not as high as the government had expected and could not patch the holes in the budget. The country was still under pressure from a huge external debt, which amounted to 40.8% of GDP. The “shot” was by no means a “tiger of inflation”, but the model of state-centric development that was chosen for Brazil in the era of J. Vargas. (Vargas, 2006).

As for the foreign policy, Roberto Campos, prominent Brazilian diplomat and statesman, wrote – “It might seem, that some directives were written for it at Harvard, and others at Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow”.

The truth, as always, had to be sought somewhere in between. Rubens Ricupero is certainly right when he thought that in an era of liberalism, when a man like Collor was at the helm of Brazil, its foreign policy could become much more pro-American. Only the diplomatic tradition of Itamaraty, imbued with the spirit of Baron Rio Branco, and the efforts of its diplomats did not allow Brazil to forget about the strategy of autonomization and slide to the level of “peripheral realism” of Argentina under President Carlos Menem. Unfortunately, the failure in the economic modernization predetermined the failure in the strategy of autonomization, since the indicators of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

still could not be separated from the indicators of the government as a whole.

Speaking at the graduation ceremony at the Rio Branco Institute in May 1990, F. Collor named detente, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the restoration of democracies in the countries of Eastern Europe, the successful resolution of regional crises and the beginning of the dismantling of the apartheid regime in South Africa as “indicators of a new era”. He stressed the need for more active Brazil’ participation in the adoption of important international decisions in the context of profound changes in the world and the universalization of international relations. In diplomacy, F. Collor emphasized the acceleration of regional integration, while emphasizing “the universal dimension of our foreign policy, where exceptional priorities cannot be established.” At the same time, President welcomed the Initiative for the Americas, launched by US President George W. Bush in 1990, calling it “bold, innovative and inclusive”, which will also allow “each country in the region to have its own options for development” and will open up “new horizons for strengthening solidarity”.

The well-known international lawyer Francisco Rezek was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of F. Collor (March 1990 - April 1992). In private conversations, he regretted the loss of balance in world politics after the disappearance of the alternative pole of the United States power. At the official level, F. Rezek emphasized the need to protect “critical realism” in foreign policy in order to strengthen Brazil’s international presence, reduce discriminatory conditions in world trade and conduct a broad dialogue with the world community. The main directions of foreign policy, according to F. Rezek, as well as C. Lafer, who replaced him in this post, and held his post

for only 5.5 months, were: regional integration, negotiations on the signing of free trade agreements within the framework of the “Bush Initiative”, promoting regional and continental cooperation in solving the problem of external debt, protecting the environment and ensuring human rights.

The head of Itamaraty Celso Lafer, proposed four new pillars: “operational partnership”, “exploiting niche opportunities”, “creative adaptation” and “perspective vision”. In the foreign policy, the priority was given to the development of relations within Mercosur, followed by relations with the United States, the EU and Japan. As a “niche of opportunities” that opened up after the end of the Cold War, C. Lafer tried to draw attention to the potential for the development of bilateral economic relations with Iran, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and other Arab countries, the Republic of Korea and Israel, and Eastern Europe. In the early 1990 Brazil continued to be active in the work of GATT and UNCTAD, advocating a fair economic order for less developed countries and providing them with greater access to advanced technologies. The country continued to strengthen ties with African and Asian countries, giving priority to the Portuguese-speaking countries. (Lafer, 2018).

At the UN, Brazil has taken an active position, advocating the institutionalization of sustainable development and democratization of the Security Council, proposing its candidacy for the seat of its new permanent member.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of the CIS, Brazil promptly recognized Russia as the legal successor of the USSR and began the process of recognizing the new independent states that emerged in the post-Soviet space. The same was done with respect to Slovenia and Croatia - countries that emerged after the breakup of Yugoslavia, whose hasty

recognition by Germany, Austria, the Vatican and Italy triggered a chain reaction of the Yugoslav crisis of the mid-to-late 1990. All this time, Brazil continued actively working in the -77 Group.

A number of researchers believed that the diplomatic service under F. Collor was excluded from the development of the conceptual foundations of foreign policy and did not take an active part in its implementation, since during his reign the traditions of presidential diplomacy, laid down under Jose Sarney, were strengthened. However, the personal merits of the “play-boy from Alagoas” in the diplomatic breakthroughs achieved during that period were probably not so many.

F. Collor’s fate as president turned out to be unenviable. The corruption charges brought against him by his brother (!) - Pedro Color, led to the creation of a special commission of inquiry in the Brazilian National Congress. On September 29, 1992 F. Collor was removed from office by the Chamber of Deputies, and on December 29 the same year he was subjected to impeachment proceedings by the Senate of the Republic. Vice-President Itamar Franco (1992-1994) was appointed President of Brazil. The political career of the first president, elected by direct popular vote according to the rules of the new constitution, ended shamefully and ingloriously.

In the monograph “**Brazil: Features of the Democratic Project**” professor L.S. Okuneva (2008) gave an accurate political and psychological portrait of Collor, accompanying it with an analysis of the circumstances that led him to power: “An ambitious millionaire from a provincial state, who has risen to the head of a huge country, uses power for the sake of personal enrichment, trampling in front of the whole society, which only recently enthusiastically welcomed his election, the norms of human morality and political ethics”. “We cannot discount the

peculiarities of the mass consciousness and political mentality of a society that has emerged from a rigid authoritarian system and is undergoing a democratic renewal: traditionalist ideas and hopes for the omnipotence of a charismatic leader, expectations of a quick “miracle” and a sharp change in mood, the desire not to break the daily routine of life and attempts to stop the unwinding spring of social crisis “with one blow”.

As for corruption, ingrained in Brazilian political culture, L.S. Okuneva writes:

The traditional corruption of the highest political and bureaucratic elites in Brazil took its roots from the depths of history – even from the time of the abolition of slavery and the beginning of the Republic. The omnipotence of the top, the omnipotence of the bureaucratic elites and their propensity for corruption were promoted by the traditions of clientelism, the remnants of traditional structures, on the one hand, and evolution “from above” in the absence of true democracy, on the other. (Окунева, 2008). (Okuneva, 2008).

These words will be confirmed in the future.

On March 26, 1991, in the capital of Paraguay, F. Collor, together with his colleagues from Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, signed the Asuncion Treaty, establishing Mercosur – the Common Market of the Southern Cone Countries. It was the result of the efforts undertaken earlier by the presidents of Brazil – J. Sarney and Argentina – R. Alfonsin, to bring these countries closer.

The Asuncion Treaty provided for the free movement of goods, services and factors of production between four countries,

their establishment of a single external tariff,¹⁷ the coordination of macroeconomic and sectoral policies, and the harmonization of legislative systems in areas related to the integrated economic sectors. Trade liberalization implied preferential treatment for the less developed members of the association - Uruguay and Paraguay. Mercosur was conceived by its founders as a model of open regionalism, the characteristic features of which were: openness for the accession of new members, the absence of rigid internal structures, the possibility of multi-speed integration and associated membership, an orientation towards interaction with other integration schemes, openness to the world market, and foreign capital.

With the formation of Mercosur, the fourth, after the EU, NAFTA and ASEAN, an integration grouping with a total capital of 1 trillion dollars arose in the world, representing 50% of the total GDP of Latin America, 50% of its population and 60% of the territory.

In the early years of its existence, Mercosur justified the hopes placed on it. In 1991 - 1997 the mutual trade turnover of the South American Quartet increased by 7 times. A solid foundation was created for cooperation in industry and infrastructure, in the humanitarian sphere, in matters of security and in the maintenance of democratic institutions. One of the main practical results of the agreement was the end of the long-term rivalry between Brazil and Argentina and the struggle between them for dominance in the La Plata.

17 The single external tariff (though with major exceptions) was established in 1994 by the Oru Preto Agreement, which formally made Mercosur a customs union.

The signing in 1991 of the so-called Mendoza Compromise was especially highlighted, according to which Brazil and Argentina on a bilateral basis forever renounced the production, acquisition and storage of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons.

By that time, these two countries of Latin America were already at fairly advanced stages of developing their own nuclear weapons. The staging of the uranium enrichment process at the Institute for Nuclear Energy Research (IPEN) corresponded to the prediction of the Brazilian physicist Jose Goldemberg that Brazil would be able to create an atomic bomb by 1990. By 1988, IPEN had succeeded in enriching uranium to 3% (a quality that allows it to be used in nuclear power plants). By the end of the 1980s, this percentage was increased to 20%, which made it possible to use it in the reactors of nuclear submarines. Finally, the expansion in 1989 of the facilities of the experimental plant in the city of Aramar made it possible, according to the Brazilian press, to enrich uranium up to 93%, which was enough for the production of nuclear weapons.

Brazilian diplomats opposed the logical conclusion of the parallel nuclear program launched by the military during the years of their authoritarian rule, calling on the great powers to begin more actively the process of reducing nuclear arsenals. Ambassador M. Castrioto directly linked Brazil's refusal to produce nuclear weapons with the need to radically defuse international tension: "We are ready to become a disarmed country in the disarmed world, but we will never agree to become a disarmed country in the armed world."

In April 1990, the international attention was drawn to the details of a nuclear deal between Brazil and Iraq, under which a Latin American country allegedly transferred three batches of

uranium enriched at the Almiranti Alvaro Alberto plant to Iraq. Brazil officially rejected the fact of such a transfer, but suspicions of cooperation with the regime of Saddam Hussein dealt a blow to the country's democratic image and to the radical rapprochement with the United States, which F. Collor had envisioned.

Brazil's nuclear ambitions looked anachronistic against the backdrop of the euphoria in international relations over the "End of History". Speaking at the 45th session of the UN General Assembly, F. Collor announced his intention to stop immediately all work related to the creation of nuclear weapons. On September 18, 1990, he symbolically filled up a mine up to 320 (!) m deep and 12m in diameter in the remote place of Kashimbu (State of Para), which, as reported in the media, was intended to detonate a nuclear device.

The signing of the Mendoza Compromise following the ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty and the consolidation of its nuclear-free status in the 1988 Constitution was the next step in Brazil's refusal to acquire the status of a nuclear power. As a result, Brazil and Argentina in July 1991 established a joint Argentine - Brazilian Agency for the Control of Nuclear Activities, after which they agreed to extend the IAEA guarantees. Brazil's long refraining from signing the NPT will end in the year of 30th anniversary of this treaty, in 1998, when it finally signs and ratifies the main international instrument on nuclear non-proliferation. It should not be forgotten, however, that the beginning of the Argentine-Brazilian in this area was laid by the visits by Presidents J. Sarney and A. Alfonsin to the closed nuclear facilities of their countries.

The logical culmination of the policy of the previous presidents was the event, which received truly global significance, as the holding in Rio- de- Janeiro of the UN World Conference on

Environment and Development (1992). It adopted the conventions on climate change and biodiversity, a declaration on tropical forests and two policy documents: the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21.

The Rio 92 conference, which was attended by representatives of 183 countries (of which more than 60 heads of state), was a major success for Brazilian diplomacy, strengthening Brazil's image as a consistent fighter for environmental protection and a champion of a sustainable development strategy. "In this situation, Itamaraty was able to "raise "the prestige of the country, which was seriously affected by failures in the economy and as a result of a corruption scandal," - wrote R. Ricupero. (2017).

Vice-President Itamar Franco (1992-1994), who took over as head of state after the impeachment of F. Collor, continued the implementation of foreign policy, the main goal of which remained economic development, strengthening the foundations of democracy and ensuring social justice. According to R. Ricupero, I. Franco, who lost to F. Collor in terms of "photogenicity" and personal charisma, managed to bring Brazil out of a protracted crisis and direct its development into a "calm channel". In many respects he managed to do this thanks to the efforts of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (October 1992 - June 1993), and then the Minister of Economy (June 1993 - 1995) Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

Professor of Political Science at the University of Sao Paulo, F.E. Cardoso was forced to leave Brazil after the 1964 military coup. He taught at Cambridge, Sorbonne, universities in Chile, Argentina, Mexico and some other countries of the world. Among his numerous articles and scientific works, the particular mention should be made to the monograph "Dependency

and Development in Latin America. Essays on Sociological Interpretation” (1970), co-authored with E. Faletto.

As Foreign Minister, Minister of Economy, and later - President of the country, Fernando Henrique Cardoso pursued the goal of turning Brazil into a global trader - a country whose interests are present throughout the world. The universal nature of his foreign policy was based on deepening regional integration and rapprochement with the “whale countries” (“*paises - baleias*”) - China, India and Russia, which was previously considered in the works of the famous Brazilian sociologist and Elio Jaguaribe (1923 - 2018). Since then and to this day, both of these directions are clearly present in the foreign policy of the Tropical Giant.

Speaking to the National Congress in March 1993, F.E. Cardoso outlined his vision of the foundations of universalist foreign policy:

Brazil must discover new opportunities, learn to play in different venues and strive for strategic partnership and good neighborliness. This will require new strategic planning, skillful forecasting and creative adaptation from the Foreign Ministry. Foreign policy should be inspired by realism: we cannot change the existing rules of the game, but we cannot leave the stage. A fairer and more democratic international order, more transparent in the long term, needs to be pursued. While preserving traditional coalitions, we also need to look for new ones. The universal approach makes it easier to vary the partnership relationship. Brazil is capable of a multi-vector policy. (Cardoso Fernando Henrique. *Política Externa: fatos e perspectivas. Política Externa*, -v.2, n 1, junho 1993.-p.10.)

Thus, F.E. Cardoso developed the thesis of “autonomy through participation”, which was put forward earlier by C. Lafer. The Foreign Minister noted the particular importance for Brazil of its Latin American neighbors and highlighted the role of Rio Group in strengthening democratic institutions and regional integration.

In October 1992, negotiations began with the countries of the Amazon Basin (Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana and Suriname), and already in December, at the VI Rio Group Summit in Buenos Aires, Brazil came up with an initiative on the creation of a free trade zone between these countries within the framework of the Amazon Pact. The country proposed lifting the blockade against Cuba and renewing the agenda in relations with the United States. Brazil expanded trade ties with the EU and China, helped to resolve internal conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, and participated in the annual Ibero-American Summits, the World Food Forum in Rome and the World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen, held since 1991.

F.E. Cardoso, who held the post of head of Itamaraty for only eight months, shortly before being appointed to the post of Minister of Economy, outlined the most important directions for the development of the country. These are an open economy, reform of the state apparatus, attraction of foreign investment, adoption of a law on patents, normalization of relations with international financial organizations, consistency in pursuing a policy of protecting the environment and ensuring human rights.

He used many of these postulates for the Plan Real to stabilize the country’s economy, which was the first successful attempt in the fight against inflation and in the implementation

of effective policies in the tax and currency areas. There was a clear interdependence between the President and his Minister of Economy: “Without Fernando Henrique and his economic team, Itamar Franco would never have been able to curb inflation. And without Itamar, as President, Fernando Henrique would not exist as Minister of Economy”. At the same time, in the economic model of the government of I. Franko - F.E. Cardoso R. Ricupero clearly discerned the features of President Getulio Vargas approaches: the state as a producer of steel and goods for the people, constructive nationalism as a state ideology, social programs and an increase in the minimum wage as a political stability.

The success of Plan Real was shown up by the end of 1994. Brazilians, tired of long years of cohabitation with high inflation, felt themselves free people for the first time, having got on a new national currency – the real, which was initially quoted above the dollar. And this is without any “shock therapy”! At the same time, very important steps were taken to settle the external debt and agreements were reached with international banks and the Paris Club of creditors. This allowed Fernando Henrique Cardoso to run for president of the country.

In July 1993, a career diplomat and professor of political science at the University of Brasilia Celso Amorim was appointed the new head of Itamaraty. Prior to his appointment to this post, C. Amorim was Secretary General of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry and served as Ambassador to Great Britain.

Picture 24 - Diplomat and Professor Celso Amorim



Source: TVGazeta, 2020.

Having assumed the office of minister, C. Amorim put forward the concept of *diplomacy of three “d”*: “development” “disarmament”, “democracy” (desenvolvimento, desarmamento e democracia- in Portuguese). In an article entitled “**Diplomacy and Development**” (1993), C. Amorim wrote that the main task of diplomacy is “the search for optimal options for the development of the country, the formation of democratic values, the preservation of peace and international security, the struggle for a more just global political and economic order”. In his speech at the opening of the 48th session of the UN General Assembly, the head of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry condemned protectionism and the tendency to revise the principle of sovereignty by powerful powers. Brazil supported the return of Cuba to the OAS and did not support the American intervention in Haiti.

Speaking at a meeting of the Security Council, the minister outlined his country’s detailed position on reforming this main

body responsible for maintaining global security. It boiled down to the following:

1. Brazil was part of those states that signed the UN Charter in 1945;
2. The need to enhance the role of the UN Security Council in peacekeeping or peace enforcement presupposes a broader representation in it of the states of the developing world and, first of all, Brazil;
3. Brazil pursues an active and constructive foreign policy with a constant line of promoting international cooperation and the peaceful resolution of all international contradictions;
4. Brazil traditionally contributes to the maintenance of peace and security both through participation in international peacekeeping operations and through mediation in international conflicts, carried out both within the framework of the UN and at the regional level,
5. Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world in terms of population, the fifth in terms of its territory and the ninth in terms of economy,
6. Brazil has made a historic contribution to the definition of the universal principles set out in the UN Charter; it works actively to achieve the goals of the Organization and takes an active and constructive role in all its forums. This is, for example, the work of Brazil in the UN development structures - UNCTAD and UNIDO. The Brazilian tradition of multilateral diplomacy brings it well-deserved recognition at the global and regional level,

7. Brazil is among the top ten countries in terms of the size of the regular contribution to the UN budget. Brazil's contribution surpasses China, Argentina and Mexico combined.
8. In its region, Brazil has maintained peaceful relations with its neighbors for over 120 years along the entire 16,000 km border. These borders were established peacefully, during diplomatic negotiations, and there is no other country in the world with a similar history;
9. Brazil is a key country in terms of the consolidation of South America, the region with the least weapons in the world, free from tensions and threats. Brazil is the center of stability, peace and progress;
10. Brazil is building fruitful cooperation with its neighbors, as evidenced by La Plata Treaty, Amazon Pact, Mercosur, etc;
11. Brazil develops diplomatic activity on other continents, in particular in Africa, advocating for peace and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as in the case of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic, and strengthens the cultural identity of African peoples, as in the case of Commonwealth of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPS),
12. Brazil is dynamic. It is capable of building consensus with other countries both inside and outside the UN, as evidenced by its work at the Rio 92 conferences, at the Vienna Conference on Human Rights and during the Uruguay Round negotiations;
13. Brazil is an example of harmonious multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious coexistence;

14. Brazil is the least spending country in the world on defense, spending less than 1% of its GDP on military expenses;
15. The active position of Brazil, consistently advocating the elimination and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, has received a worthy assessment throughout the world;
16. Brazil has established a truly democratic system of government; its economy is developing on a market basis. (Amorim, 2017).

The problem of reforming the UN and, first of all, its Security Council with the inclusion of Brazil as its permanent members, is now becoming one of the most important “checkpoints” of its foreign policy. Another important direction was the search for an independent position in relation to the idea put forward in 1990 by President George W. Bush of the creation of an All-American Free Trade Area (in the Spanish abbreviation - ALCA).

At the beginning of the 1990s, all Latin American countries enthusiastically welcomed this proposal, which, as it seemed them, resurrected the ideals of F.-D. Roosevelt and Alliance for Progress of J. Kennedy, allowing them to avoid the threat of marginalization in the world economy and politics. Clinton’s new democratic administration took up the idea of the Republicans, seeing in ALCA project the prospect of creating a global megabloc capable of consolidating 32 countries of the Western Hemisphere around the United States (with the exception of Cuba) and resisting the growing competition from the EU and China.

F. Collor's government actively supported ALCA project. At the same time, the signing of the Mercosur Treaty in 1991 indicated that Brazil has its own views for the development of integration processes in the Western Hemisphere.

Brazil took part in the First Summit of the Americas (Miami, USA, 1994), where it was decided to complete negotiations on the establishment of the ALCA till 2005. However, already at that optimistic stage in the development of the American project, the candidates for the presidency of Brazil - F.E. Cardoso and Lula da Silva, expressed reasonable doubts about the prospects for its compatibility with Mercosur and plans to extend the influence of the latter to the entire South American economic space.

During the presidencies of F. Collor and I. Franco (1990-1994), Brazil attempted to join the new post-Cold War international system and build an agenda for itself based on its own objectives. Overall, given the moment of "unipolarity" in the world at the beginning of the 1990s and his almost total fascination with the phantom of "The End of History", Brazil managed to maintain autonomy in decision-making and high diplomatic activity. In this regard, one should agree with the opinion of C. Amorim, R. Ricupero and others, who consider the foreign policy of Brazil of that period, especially under President I. Franco, to be more "authentic" than "neoliberal".

Among the achievements of that period, it should be noted the finding of mutual understanding with Argentina, the creation of Mercosur and the proposal to form a Free Trade Zone of South America on its basis, the signing of Ouro Preto Treaty on the Mercosur Customs Union, the revitalization of Amazon Pact, efforts to form the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, holding the conference "Rio-92", the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding between the EU and Mercosur

(1995), etc. During this period, Brazil strengthened its position in South America and the relations with the main international actors (USA, EU, Japan), promoted the search for more dynamic forms of cooperation with African countries, began building relations with ASEAN, with Australia and New Zealand. Brazil continued to actively advocate for nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, acted in favor of protecting the environment and ensuring human rights. Finally, by the mid-1990s, Brazil was able to cope with two main problems that complicated the pursuit of a more active foreign policy: the problem of inflation and external debt. The country entered the second half of the 1990s full of new hopes.

The Presidential Diplomacy of F.E. Cardoso (1995 - 2002): “Autonomy Through Integration”

F.E. Cardoso carried out profound institutional reforms in the economic and social life of Brazil, implemented financial stabilization, and helped to restore Brazil’s confidence and enhance its international prestige abroad. Fernando Enrique (Brazilians shorten his name and surname to a simple FEC), became a “rare bird” on the political scene in Brazil, since he combined the qualities of a world-renowned scientist and an outstanding politician, without being an amateur in none of their roles.

Picture 25 - President Fernando Henrique Cardoso



Source: Author/photographer – Agência Brasil -
Official photo from Brazilian Government, second term of FHC, 1999.

The election of F.E. Cardoso, - writes L.S. Okuneva, -

(w)as a major milestone both on the path of economic and social modernization of the country, and - let us emphasize this especially - on the path of establishing democracy in Brazil, symbolizing the end of the transitional period - democratic transition (1985-2002) and the country's entry into the era of "consolidated democracy. (Okuneva, 2008). (Okuneva, 2008).

Thanks to Plan Real, FEC won already in the first round of the presidential elections, more than doubling the number of votes cast for him compared with the popular trade unionist Lula da Silva. People hoped that successfully launched the currency stabilization plan would be carried through to the end, and the country would achieve again high rates of economic growth.

The success provided the newly elected president with a wide “free hand” in domestic and foreign policy. Rubens Ricupero’s comparison of his first 100 days in office with the first steps of President F.D. Roosevelt in the United States can probably be considered too strong, but it reflects part of the Brazilian reality of those years.

In the economy, FEC operated according to a liberal scheme, which, however, did not coincide with the rules of the “Washington Consensus” in those years. His liberalism was selective. On the one hand, it met the needs of economic development, on the other hand, it reflected national specifics. Foreign capital was allowed into such previously closed or partially closed industries as petrochemicals and telecommunications, gas and service sector. National and foreign enterprises were equal in rights. At the same time, the state created agencies to regulate the activities of foreign companies: Anatel – in the field of telecommunications, Aneel – in the power industry, ANP - in the petrochemical industry, Anvisa – in the field of sanitation, Ana – in the field of water management. The transformations in the economy, achieved through modernization, were ultimately more significant than the incomes that were obtained through privatization.

Reelection for the next presidential term (1998 - 2002) did not present any difficulties for Fernando Henrique Cardoso. However, the discussion about whether it was worth amending the constitution in 1994 on the possibility of re-electing the incumbent president for a second term, had an ambiguous opinion. On the one hand, one period of four years was too short for the completion of the former and implementation of the new plans of FEC. On the other hand, in the internal political struggle for the adoption of this amendment, his administration had to go

to a number of all kinds of deals and forced compromises, which in the future will lead to abuse of power and to the spread of corruption among legislators and the highest state bureaucracy. In addition, by the end of the 1990s, the foreign policy situation had also changed.

With the coming to power of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the strategic goal of Brazil's foreign policy: increasing competitiveness in a globalized economy, increasing macroeconomic stability, more active participation in regional and global decision-making processes, has not changed.

Professional diplomat Luis Felipe Lampreya (1995-2001) was appointed as the foreign minister. Before this appointment, L. F. Lampreya worked as ambassador to Washington and Lisbon and headed the country's mission at the UN office in Geneva. When taking office, the minister stressed that Brazil "must make changes in its foreign policy in order to match better the changes that are taking place in the world, on the continent and in our own country". Conceptually, he defined this foreign policy as "the search for autonomy through integration", the beginning of which was laid by C. Lafer. Fernando Henrique Cardoso's presidential diplomacy made a decisive practical contribution to the implementation of this policy.

The focus on 'participation' was defined by the Brazilian researcher Gelson Fonseca as the desire to influence the agenda with values characteristic of the Brazilian diplomatic tradition and to participate in the formation of a new world order in the direction of those unique perspectives that correspond to our national perception. In other words, through active participation in international processes that are taking place in different parts of the world, it was supposed to create favorable conditions for

achieving the main goal – to ensure the strong and sustainable development of Brazil (FONSECA, 1996).

Opening the debate of the 50th session of the UN General Assembly, L.F. Lampreya voiced the foreign policy goals formulated by F.E. Cardoso:

- expansion of democracy within the country and in international relations,
- combination of economic freedom with social justice,
- reform of the UN Security Council,
- general disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,
- prohibition of nuclear weapons tests,
- recognition of the international projection of the role of the Commonwealth of Portuguese-speaking countries,
- fight against terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime,
- expanding the process of South American integration,
- protection of the environment, human and minority rights,
- crises management in Angola, Guinée-Bissau, East Timor,
- fight against financial instability.

Inside Itamaraty, L.F. Lampreya reorganized some of the structures, created the Cabinet of Ministers and the Department of Diplomatic Planning. The most serious change was the creation of the Foreign Policy Council, a collegial body whose duties included strengthening the administrative unity of the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, assisting to the most authoritative diplomats and scientists associated with the formulation and adoption of foreign policy decisions, resolving personnel issues and distributing budget funds.

The government of F.E. Cardoso began revising some of the traditional foreign policy directions that had been stubbornly defended by previous governments, such as, for example, the negative attitude towards the NPT. Having signed and ratified the NPT in 1998, Brazil, according to L.F. Lampreia, however, did not stop considering the treaty “out of balance” and “in need of modernization”. However, by taking this step, Brazil dropped all suspicions and opened for itself full access to nuclear technologies. At the same time, the country joined the Missile Technology Control Regime.

During two presidential terms, F.E. Cardoso made full use of the levers of presidential diplomacy. He visited other countries (in the first three years of his presidency, FEC visited 26 countries, during the second term - more than 27), participated in many international conferences and signed a number of important international agreements. Presidential diplomacy has turned into a tool for activating Brazil’s foreign policy at the regional and global level, for building partnerships with the EU and Japan and generating a positive dialogue with the United States. At the global level, Brazilian diplomacy has expanded its activities in the UN, WTO and other international organizations.

Brazil unambiguously advocated the formation of a multi-polar world, highlighting the following main directions of its creation: overcoming the lack of governance at the global level and establishing a new world financial architecture; building a new multilateral system of fair and balanced trade; correcting imbalances in political and institutional processes remained outside

the framework of globalization; consistent affirmation of values such as human rights and sustainable development.

The main efforts of presidential diplomacy focused on strengthening Mercosur and consolidating the South American economic and political space. Mercosur became the main direction of the policy of “autonomy through integration”, and two accompanying directions - the execution of ALCA agreement and the signing of the FTA agreement with the European Union.

After the conclusion of the Ouro-Preto Protocol in 1994, Mercosur became the second common market in the world, and received international legal personality and the ability to negotiate on its own behalf in the international arena. At the same time, the South American bloc is rapidly building up its authority and negotiating capabilities in its area. The growth of intrazonal trade within the Mercosur amounted to: 4.1 million dollars in 1990, 20.5 million dollars in 1997 and 18.2 million dollars in 2000. During the same period, the total exports of member countries increased by 50% and imports by 180%.

Brazil made no secret of its intentions to expand Mercosur, which is institutionally open for the accession of other countries, up to the creation of the South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA) to include the countries of the Andean Community of Nations (ACN), Chile, Suriname and Guyana. This strategy seemed to justify itself with the accession of Bolivia and Chile to Mercosur in 1996 as associate members. It looked understandable against the background of Mexico’s entry into NAFTA - the North American Free Trade Area (1994). The natural attraction to NAFTA of the countries of Central America and the Caribbean indicated the possibility of the formation of two FTA: NAFTA, led by the United States, in the north, and in the south of the Western Hemisphere, led by Brazil.

The South American direction has acquired a special character. Brasilia took a firm stand during the series of political crises in Paraguay (1996, 1999, 2001), insisting on the preservation of democratic government in this country. Itamaraty supported the legally elected President of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, during the attempted anti-constitutional coup of 2002, inspired by the United States.

In 1998, Brazil took an active part in resolving the border conflict between Peru and Ecuador, which lasted since 1942 and was marked by a number of serious armed clashes. The peace agreement of October 26, 1998, signed in Brasilia by the Presidents of Peru and Ecuador in the presence of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, put an end to one of the most protracted conflicts in South America in the 20th century.

This circumstance played an important role in the signing of the Framework Agreement between Mercosur and ACN in 1998. At the 2000 Mercosur Summit in Brasilia, the idea of a future merger of the two associations was supported. At that time, few doubted that Brazil, the largest and most powerful country in South America, was doomed to become the locomotive of the future FTA. Brazil itself, saw in Mercosur a project that goes far beyond a simple trade agreement, and the primary task of FEC was deepening and expanding integration within the framework of Mercosur. The All-American Free Trade Area (ALCA) project was viewed not as a new opportunity, but rather as a threat to this task.

Strengthening the position of Mercosur at the Third Meeting of Trade Ministers of the Western Hemisphere in May 1997, where the basic principles of negotiations on the creation of the ALCA were determined, automatically reinforced Brazil's position. Discussion of the ALCA project at the Second Summit

of the Americas in the Chile (Santiago, 1998), was a new success for Brazilian diplomacy, relying on the increased authority of Mercosur. With the adoption of the decision to hold negotiations on the principle “block by block”: Mercosur – NAFTA, the competition between two integration projects: the continental one and the South American one, took on quite distinct outlines. New Foreign Minister, Celso Lafer, who was appointed in January 2001, and previously held this post in the government of Itamar Franco, expressed Brazil’s attitude to these two projects: “Mercosur for us is destiny, ALCA is just an option”.

At the Third Summit of the Americas (Quebec, 2001), Brazil began perceiving the North American project as a threat, not as a complement to Mercosur, believing that trade liberalization across the continent will destroy a number of advanced industries in Brazil itself and in other countries of Latin America. Similarly, it was read in Brasilia that the promised “opening of markets” in the US and Canada for agricultural products from the countries of the region, when Washington and Ottawa flatly refused to stop subsidizing their farms, turned into fiction. The specifics of real negotiations revealed new sharp contradictions: in the field of public procurement, social policy, intellectual property, the practice of resolving trade disputes, on the issue of environmental and social dumping, on limit control over capital, etc. In these conditions, even the withdrawal of the negotiation regime on a 1 x 1 scale (USA - Brazil) could not lead to success.

The failure of ALCA negotiations in 2005 through the fault of the United States, which, as in a number of previous cases, did not live up to its own promises, and the subsequent splitting of the previously unified project into a number of bilateral FTA agreements between the United States and individual Latin American countries, was inevitable.

All these years, Itamaraty made efforts to create an FTA between Mercosur and the European Union. The First Summit of the EU - Latin American Caribbean States (Rio- de -Janeiro, 1999) was attended by the heads of 48 European and Latin American states. In the final document, the parties announced a strategic partnership and identified three main areas of cooperation: political dialogue, economy and trade, financing of joint development programs. There were identified the areas of common interests: the fight against poverty and social inequality, environmental protection, the development of education, combating crime, drug trafficking and terrorism. The decisions of the 1999 summit contributed to the revitalization of the European-Latin American dialogue, which was reflected in the process of gradual liberalization of trade exchange.

The second summit opened in 2002 in Madrid. It discussed issues related to the economic crisis in Latin America and international terrorism. The Madrid Commitment outlined the intention to cooperate in the protection of human rights, in the information technology and in the fight against social inequality. These summits had a strategic perspective and gave hope for the development of favorable trade relations in the future. In the present, however, the creation of the world's first transcontinental FTA has been hampered by the reluctance of Europeans to open their markets to cheap agricultural products from Latin America and other technical issues. The FTA agreement between Mercosur and the EU will be signed only in 2020.

After 1998, Mercosur entered a period of crisis. The process of lifting tariff restrictions, which previously developed without any particular problems, affected the sensitive industries of the largest countries - Argentina and Brazil. Industrial cooperation, which became an incentive for the development of Western

European integration, was practically absent in Mercosur. Against this background, the difference in strategic vision of this association began to be seen more clearly. While Brazil saw it as a means to maximize the limits of its autonomy vis-a-vis the United States and strengthen its regional leadership, Argentina considered it only as a means to guarantee free access for its goods to the markets of Brazil and neighboring countries.

The policy of “peripheral realism” adopted by Argentine President K. Menem provided for the almost complete subordination of its foreign policy to the interests of Washington. In the context of this policy, the Argentine Navy (2 ships) took part in “Operation Desert Storm”, and in January 1998, Buenos Aires received from Washington the status of a “privileged NATO member outside the alliance,” standing on a par with such US allies like Israel, Egypt and Japan. This move, not previously agreed with Brazil, caused mixed feelings in that country. Former President J. Sarney said that by doing so the United States intended to split Mercosur. There was no doubt that Argentina’s acceptance of this dubious “status” further overshadowed the differences in the approaches to Mercosur of its two main participants.

The 1998 crisis, which affected the economies of some countries in Southeast Asia, reached Brazil. The forced devaluation of its national currency, the real, seriously reduced the cost of its exports, which upset the fragile balance in trade with Argentina. But there were also systemic reasons that contributed to the crisis in Mercosur. This is the lack of clear coordination of macroeconomic and financial policies, the failure of industrial cooperation plans, poor internal structure, the absence of permanent bodies of operational control and resolution of emerging disputes, etc.

In January 2002, when the question of reforming the integration model arose, the Council of Mercosur adopted a “Restart Strategy”, which outlined the main reforms: strengthening macroeconomic coordination, improving the mechanism for resolving disputes, removing barriers to mutual trade, developing measures to strengthen trade discipline.

The crisis in Mercosur postponed the entry as permanent members Chile and Bolivia, as well as the planned merger with the Andean Community. Accordingly, the potential of Mercosur in negotiations with the EU has also weakened.

Since the second half of the 1990s, there was a renewed interest in the problems of ensuring national security in Brazil. The ephemerality of the “End of History” paradigm at the beginning of the decade and the arrival of a harsh reality in the form of a unipolar world, forced the authors of the document entitled National Defense Policy, signed by President in 1996, to state the following: Today, despite the fact that the risk of a general nuclear war faded into the background, the unpredictability of world politics has increased. The importance of traditional pillars of world politics as sovereignty, self-determination and the preservation of national identity was preserved. Among the zones to protect from the point of view of ensuring the sovereignty of Brazil, the document mentioned the waters of the South Atlantic and the Amazon region.

The Amazon region, which occupies about 52% of its national territory and is one of the world’s largest reservoirs of natural resources (12% of the world’s fresh water reserves, 30% of the total biodiversity of the planet, etc.), began attracting close attention even during the reign of J. Vargas. However, the prospects for its integrated development, taking into account the ecological peculiarities of this area, were outlined only in

the Amazon Pact of 1978. In the 1990s, the security issues were closely related to the issues of ecology and development, first of all, the protection of this area from the penetration of smugglers, illegal armed groups and organized crime groups, as well as the problem of protecting the Indian tribes living there.

In the late 1990s, Brazil, with the participation of the neighboring states of the Amazon basin - Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Panama and Ecuador, with technical assistance from the United States, began the construction of the Detection and Control System in the Amazon Region (SIVAM). It included a number of stationary and mobile radars located around the perimeter of the Amazonian Forest, as well as special squadrons of combat and reconnaissance aircraft.

The Mercosur agreement, which allowed Brazil to distract from the rivalry with Argentina, untied the hands of the military, who were able to transfer part of the military contingents from the south - from the border with Argentina, to the north - to the Amazon. However, their arrangement there required large investments in the infrastructure of the region, which for a long time was considered a deep periphery of Brazil. The economic development strategy also required investments in infrastructure. A country where almost 90% of economic activity was concentrated in the south, and almost all of the largest cities were located along the Atlantic coast, could not confidently develop without full access to the central regions and neighbors to the east, which bordered on the Pacific Ocean - the center of the world economic growth.

On August 31, 2000, took place the Summit of the Heads of South American States in Brazil, dedicated to the 500th anniversary of Brazil' discovery by Portuguese navigator Pedro Alvares Cabral. The geographic selection excluded the presence

of the presidents of the United States and Mexico. The main outcome of the summit was the decision to accelerate the physical integration of the South American subcontinent, primarily in areas of transport and energy. The South American Regional Infrastructure Integration Project (IIRSA) was initiated, bringing together several country and regional infrastructure projects. During the years of FEC presidency, within the framework of this project, the construction of a gas pipe from the Bolivian city of Santa Cruz to Sao Paulo was completed, was built a highway that connected the capital of the state of Amazonas - Manaus with the Venezuelan border and was opened a highway that connected the Amazon state of Acri with the Pacific coast through the territory of Peru.

The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent interventions by the United States and its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq were events that further emphasized the importance of ensuring security for a country like Brazil.

Like the rest of Latin American countries, Brazil expressed solidarity with the United States, which was subjected to an unprecedented terrorist attack. A consultative meeting of OAS foreign ministers (September 21, Washington), supported the United States' policy of suppressing al Qaeda in Afghanistan under Article 3 of the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty (Rio Pact). On this basis, Brazilian Foreign Minister C. Lafer proposed again to consider Rio Pact in force.¹⁸

It should not have been considered that Brazil and other Latin American countries decided again to return under the roof

18 The Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty of 1947 was "frozen" at the initiative of the Latin American countries after the US refused to support Argentina in its war with England over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in the summer of 1982.

of the United States. The level of self-awareness and organization of the states of the region, which had seriously changed in comparison with the beginning of the 1950s, no longer allowed Washington to use this treaty as an instrument of its policy. According to the comments that took place, this step was intended to become a practical expression of the solidarity of Latin American countries in the face of growing international terrorism.

Another important decision taken at the meeting was the resolution on the preparation of the Inter-American Anti-Terrorism Convention, which was supported by all OAS member states. Unfortunately, despite the insistence with which some Latin American countries (including Brazil) proposed to provide a legally meaningful definition of terrorism in the forthcoming convention, the United States refused to do so under the threat of its non-participation in the development of the document. Thus, the Inter-American (Bridgetown) Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (2003) was adopted without such a definition.

During the years of Fernando Henrique's second presidential term, internal and external constraints began to exert an increasing influence on Brazil's foreign policy. A wide range of economic, political and social reforms carried out by the president took place in the context of an acute political struggle. The deepening political crisis, the complexities of the neoliberal economic strategy, and the post-September 11 downturn in the global economy affected the Brazilian economy. Mercosur problems, which have deepened since the unprecedented crisis in Argentina in 2001, negatively affected the Brazilian economy. Social reforms were sacrificed to economic liberalism, what exacerbated the situation in the country.

Upon taking office in January 2001, the new head of Itamaraty C. Lafer spoke about “diplomacy of concrete actions”, setting the task of institutional reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, matching its personnel with an adequate understanding of international problems and emphasizing the importance of civil society participation in the process of making foreign policy decisions. “Diplomacy of concrete actions” had to take into account not only general, macroeconomic approaches, but also microeconomics, oriented to the needs of people. He placed particular emphasis on such topics as human rights, the environment, disarmament, and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Picture 26 - Celso Lafer



Source: Author/photographer - Wilson Dias, 2017.

In the speech at the International Conference on Financing for Development (2002, Monterrey) C. Lafer noted that the most dramatic problem in Latin America and, in particular, Brazil, is poverty, and to solve the problem additional sources of financing

are needed. He mentioned about domestic resources, external development assistance, restructuring external debt and the international financial system, increasing the role of developing countries in the IMF and strengthening global governance. The problem of fighting poverty will take center stage in the domestic policy of the next Brazilian government, headed by Lula da Silva.

The crisis in Mercosur did not affect the activity of presidential diplomacy. During FEC reign, Brazil finally stabilized relations with Cuba, opposing the American economic embargo, supporting Cuba's reintegration into the Latin American community, its return to the OAS and its entry into the Latin American Integration Organization (LAI). In keeping with the principle of non-interference, the Brazilian delegation to the UN has traditionally refrained from formally condemning human rights violations in Cuba, China and Iran.

During the eight years of Fernando Henrique's presidency, Brazil has expanded ties with such important partners as China, India, Russia and South Africa. The year of 2002 was marked by an intensive growth in trade with China, the second foreign trade partner of Brazil. Brazil supported China's accession to WTO, actively developing political, economic, scientific and technical ties with the Celestial Empire. Space exploration has become an important area. In conditions when Russia in vain was looking for mutual understanding with the West, China wasted no time. The Celestial Empire helped Brazil to put the first Brazilian-Chinese satellite, Cerbis, into low-Earth orbit, followed by a series of new joint launches. In order to familiarize better the Brazilians with the Asian country, the PRC has made it a rule to hold regular fairs of Chinese goods in Brazil.

On January 12, 2002, Fernando Henrique Cardoso visited Russia. This was FEC's fifth visit (but the first official one). In Moscow are well remembered the words of the president of the largest Latin American country: I often repeat - Brazil is tropical Russia. This is certainly not a scientific conclusion. People are very similar, very funny, great romantics, but a little disorganized. And the countries are huge, with great potential, a sense of patriotism. We are in the phase of creation, and we are bound by the need to fight for our interests. In addition, we can achieve a lot together.

In Brazil, through the efforts of the outstanding theoretician, sociologist Elio Jaguaribe and President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the idea of deep global cooperation of the so-called "whale countries" ("países baleias") began to crystallize: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Through the efforts of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia E.M. Primakov (1996 - 1998), it will be successfully implemented in the BRICS format.

The trip of E.M. Primakov for a number of Latin American countries, including Brazil in November 1997, is remembered for the document, signed in Brasilia together with F.E. Cardoso: Declaration on the principles of Russian-Brazilian relations aimed at the XXI century. It noted the similarity or coincidence of the positions of both countries on the cardinal issues of world politics and economics. The signing in 2000 of the Agreement on Partnership Relations between Brazil and the Russian Federation formed the basis of the strategic partnership between countries.

In addition to efforts on the South American and global tracks, the country was engaged in the construction of civilizational and cultural ties within the framework of the Commonwealth of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), created in 1996, and regularly took part in the Ibero-American summits held annually

since 1991. Within the framework of WTO, Brazil adhered to the tactics of “coalitions of variable geometry”, which were formed for solving certain problems in world trade, the need for a fair resolution of conflicts and a clear settlement of trade disputes.

In the Messages of President F.E. Cardoso to the National Congress during the period 1995-2002 there were noted the main achievements in foreign policy:

1. Participation of Brazilian peacekeeping contingents in peacekeeping operations in Central America, the Balkans, Angola, East Timor;
2. Participation in the World Summit on Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995);
3. Participation in the settlement of the border conflict between Peru and Ecuador, which ended with the signing of a peace agreement on October 26, 1998;
4. Participation in the first meeting of the presidents of South American countries (Brasilia, August 31 - September 1, 2000);

Speaking at the Rio Branco Institute on December 18, 2002, a few days before leaving his post, Celso Lafer summed up the work of the Foreign Ministry:

We managed to avoid the risk of Brazil's isolation, taking into account the tendencies of the international system. It should not be hidden that the risk of isolation exists, including for a country of such a scale as Brazil (...) whose whole history is built on the use of “soft power” in foreign policy, trust and a set of positive diplomatic presence. Autonomy today is achieved

not through isolation, but through expanded participation in world affairs. This participation and the quality of our international positioning depends on our ability to develop those norms and standards of behavior that can influence the actions of other international actors. This statement is true for both economics and politics. (Lafer, 2018).

Instead of “distance autonomy” from international problems, Brazil, despite the difficulties in Mercosur, began approaching their solution, seeking to find new alternatives. The active presidential diplomacy of F.E. Cardoso and well-coordinated interaction with Itamaraty allowed him to realize his concept of “autonomy through integration”, which stimulated the internal development of Brazil and the growth of its international authority. Speaking about the second presidential term of Fernando Henrique, which was characterized by the growth of difficulties in the economy and external relations of Brazil, Rubens Ricupero believed that during the difficult period the president was able “to demonstrate his perfect managerial qualities, which guaranteed the maintenance of stability within the country, and ensured its respect from foreign partners”.

The professionalism and deep knowledge of the national identity of Brazil helped Fernando Henrique and his team to make the foundation for the progressive development of the country in the next decade.

Chapter 6

“AUTONOMY THROUGH DIVERSIFICATION”: BRAZIL IN THE “LEFT TURN”.

The Parallel Diplomacy of Luis Inácio Lula Da Silva.

The victory in the presidential elections on October 22, 2002 by the Party of Workers (PT) candidate L. Inacio Lula da Silva (“Lula”), a metalworker and trade unionist, whose childhood and youth were spent in poverty, became natural. The realization by the poor of the fact that for the first time in the history “one of them” became president - a man who throughout his life was starving and did not have the opportunity to get an education, ensured this victory. If earlier psychological attitudes were triggered ... that “a millionaire ... knows better how to solve the problems of the poor (this phenomenon was fully perceived by Collor in the 1989), now there has been a turn in the minds of the very poor: they believed, that this person, coming from the very midst of the people, will be able to help, feed, solve all problems, - noted professor L. S. Okuneva.

Picture 27 - Luis Inacio Lula da Silva



Source: Author/photographer - Ricardo Stuckert / Presidência da República. - Agência Brasil (Secretaria de Imprensa e Divulgação), 2007.

Looking ahead, we note that the Brazilian poor, and Brazil as a whole, were not mistaken in their choice. This is how the authors of the collective monograph “**Contemporary Politics of the Left**”, published in St. Petersburg in 2014, summed up the results of Lula’s rule:

Lula’s eight years in office have not only changed the socio-economic face of Brazil in many ways, providing high rates of economic growth and real progress in the fight against poverty and sharp socio-economic inequalities. 20.5 million Brazilians who, thanks to his social programs, managed to get out of poverty and 30 million who joined the “new middle class”, created a good social base for maintaining internal political stability and continuing the course of reforms.

During the eight years of the “people’s president”, the country turned into the seventh world’s economy, with a long-term system of national development. An agreement was reached with the United States, which for the first time had to recognize the regional leadership and “global responsibility” of Brazil. During Lula’s presidency, a number of new regional and trans-regional projects (Unasur, IBSA) were successfully initiated. Brazil became a member of BRICS and G20, strengthened its presence in UN peacekeeping missions, and with greater energy began to defend its rights to a permanent seat on the Security Council.

Building on these achievements, Foreign Minister Celso Amorim stated in 2007: “We recognize that the assertion of Brazilian values and interests in the world is and will be global. Whether someone likes it or not, Brazil is not a small country. It does not and will never carry out the foreign policy of a small country”.

However, this did not at all mean that the path of Brazil’s transformation into a “great power” was now straightened as much as possible, and that it had finally entered the road of non-stop economic development and social progress. As a prominent representative of Brazilian political science said in an informal conversation with one of the authors of this book: “Our country is developing quite confidently, but very specifically: taking two steps forward, for some reason it takes a step back.” Unfortunately, it will happen this time too.

To begin with, it should be noted that without financial stabilization and economic recovery during the presidency of F.E. Cardoso Lula would hardly have been able to achieve such results in his social policy. That is, despite all the exclusiveness of the coming to power of the workers party, the policy of its leader – Lula, largely became a continuation of the policy of FEC. There

were, of course, nuances in domestic and, especially, in foreign policy, but they were not of a fundamental nature. In any case, they differed sharply from the ultra - radical calls that abounded in the early campaign speeches of this former trade union leader (before that Lula ran for president three times and was defeated three times: one from F. Collor and two from FEC).

In the economy, the changes were not as significant as expected. Brazilian socialists followed the path of their colleagues from France, Italy, Spain and other countries, which, having come to power after the collapse of “real socialism” in the USSR, refused to nationalize banks, railways and heavy industry enterprises and agreed to the rules of a market economy. Lula and his closest associates have also shown themselves to be supporters of “real politics” in the economic sphere. At the same time, they took the conscious risk of alienating that part of their party members who continued to adhere to “revolutionary rhetoric”.

The recession of panic in business in connection with the coming to power of “people’s president” (and some already predicted the fate of Cuba or Chile in Brazil during the reign of S. Allende), was noted even before the second round of the presidential elections, when in June 2002, the PT leaders has published a Letter to the Brazilian People. Lula promised the Brazilians a “transitional period” and “gradual change through negotiations”. His choice of a candidate for the post of vice president also spoke in favor of balance. It was the prominent industrialist and textile magnate Jose Alencar. Lula’s meetings with bankers and businessmen, with diplomats from the countries of Mercosur convinced everyone that PT leader wasn’t going to break with the past and bring additional discord to Mercosur,

but would also be able to neutralize those circles in his own party that were preparing to speak from more radical positions.

The calm in the business environment brought an increase in investment, which gave the Brazilian economy, ready to resume growth, the necessary impetus. From 2004 to 2007, the country's GDP grew by an average of 4.3%. In 2010, this figure reached 7%. Inflation all this time fluctuated within a moderate range from 4 to 5%. In two years - from 2002 to 2004, Brazil's exports grew from \$ 60.4 billion to \$ 95.5 billion. To a large extent, this was achieved due to a sharp increase in exports to China of Brazilian iron ore, non-ferrous metals, oil and food products, mainly soybeans. In 2010, China became the main foreign trade partner of the Tropical Giant, pushing the United States of America into second place.

In 2006, President Lula paid off Brazil's debt to the UN in the amount of \$ 108 million. Additional budget revenues made it possible to start an active fight against the main scourge of Brazil and other Latin American countries - terrible social inequality and a sharp division into rich and poor. Lula's social programs, which were no longer limited, as before, to a simple distribution of money to the poor, but were associated with specific obligations of recipients of state aid, had overwhelming success. At the very beginning of the Bolsa Familia (Family Wallet) program in 2003, 3.5 million families were lifted out of poverty. By 2010, this figure had risen to 12.8 million.

However, here too, one felt the legacy of Fernando Henrique, whose administration in recent years began to pay more attention to the fight against poverty. As a result of the implementation of his Plan Real, the number of the "extremely poor" in Brazil fell by 30.9%. The achieved successes allowed Brazil to start successfully "selling" its image abroad, actively using the

image of a democratic, rule-of-law state, a champion of the principles of social justice as a lever of “soft power”. This should have been facilitated by a new, active foreign policy.

Its novelty consisted in the fact that Brazil’s foreign policy under Lula acquired a pronounced ideological coloration, similar to the anti-communist policy of wartime “the doctrine of ideological boundaries”, only now with the “opposite sign”. It was in the field of foreign policy, which did not impose on the “left” government equally tough obligations. Lula believed, that this government could demonstrate its ideological “specialness”, maintaining unity in the ranks of its party and without causing accusations of “renegade” by other Latin American “left”, first of all -Bolivarians.

Rubens Ricupero speaks in this context about the so-called “parallel diplomacy” of Lula. It assumed the need to link into one package two almost non-contiguous foreign policy courses: the pragmatic, which was carried out by the Foreign Ministry and its head Celso Amorim, and the ideological, which was imposed on him “from above” by the chief of the international department of the presidential administration, Marco Aurelio Garcia (MAG, as he was called in the government). This famous intellectual, one of the leaders of the Workers’ Party, who stood at the origins of its creation, was often called the “Brazilian Machiavelli”. The opposition to the government noted that the seat held by MAG in the cabinet underscored the special ambitions of the ruling party in the international arena and that by inviting him to the Foreign Ministry, Lula broke the tradition of balanced decision-making in Itamaraty by opening up space for the participation of “party groups”.

Picture 28 - Marco Aurelio Garcia



Source: Author/photographer - Antonio Cruz/ABr, 2007.

In any case, the contradictions between the “ideological department” of the PT and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not reach the level of mutual misunderstanding that existed between the Soviet People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the COMINTERN in the 1920s and 1930s. Celso Amorim did his best to strengthen the pragmatic direction in foreign policy, but he did it without unnecessary confrontation with the PT apparatus and in line with the traditional line of preferential cooperation with developing countries. In addition, the strategic goal of both the diplomats and the “party members” was the same.

C. Amorim insisted that Brazil is an important player in the international arena due to its size, political and economic importance and its own identity, while recognizing at the same time that it belongs to developing countries that suffer from economic and social vulnerability. The minister defined Lula’s foreign policy as “national, which never ceased to be international”. Celso Amorim was named the “the best foreign minister” in the world by Foreign Policy magazine.

In response to a question about possible disagreements with Itamaraty, MAG replied: “We are doing one common thing, we have a single attitude, and there are no contradictions between our department and Itamaraty. All problems are solved through discussions, but the conductor of foreign policy, as well as of all politics in general, is the president of the republic, I am his adviser, and the ministers are simple executors”.

Prominent diplomat Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães was appointed to the post of General Secretary of Itamaraty. He, in fact, became the “mediator” between the Foreign Ministry and the PT apparatus, who managed to smooth out the contradictions that arose. Pinheiro Guimarães proposed his strategy for overcoming the challenges facing the country, which consisted in:

1. Economic and political strengthening of the South American pole of world politics - Mercosur, contrary to plans to accelerate the creation of ALCA;
2. Inclusion in the global decision-making centers in the global governance system (UNSC, G-8),
3. Strengthening the armed forces, necessary and sufficient to protect the territory, population and industrial potential of the country,
4. Development and use of advanced technologies in the civil and military spheres,
5. Preserving autonomy by fighting to reduce inequalities, eliminate vulnerabilities and realize the potential of Brazil,
6. Strengthening the multipolar nature of the world system.

There was nothing extraordinary in this list of declared goals or that would fundamentally distinguish Lula's foreign policy goals from those of Fernando Henrique Cardoso's administration.

Like FEC, Lula also used the presidential diplomacy, which became his personal brand. During the first two years of his reign, the President visited 35 countries: all the states of South America, ten African countries, seven in the Middle East, India, China, and European countries. During his two terms of presidency (2003-2010), Lula da Silva visited more than 80 countries and held a huge number of bilateral negotiations and summit meetings. To the best of his ability, he tried to be a "convenient figure" for the West and the East, for the North and the South. In the world community, Lula soon began to be perceived as the personification of Brazil itself.

In 2003, the Brazilian government created a Department for International Relations and National Security, whose tasks were to formulate the country's doctrines and goals in the international arena, and also established the post of Special Adviser to the President on Foreign Policy, to which was appointed Marco Aurelio Garcia in 2007.

Considering that the foreign policy of the previous government was formed without the full participation of the National Congress and civil society, MAG believed that until now it lacked a clear understanding of national goals. Their search and fixation, in his opinion, required the implementation of a new foreign policy, that included three main components: social inclusion, wider democracy and the assertion of national sovereignty within the framework of the Latin American context. Brazil's foreign policy should be based on internal transformations, which will be

successful only with a new quality of the country's relations abroad and, especially, with neighboring Latin American states.

President Lula's foreign policy was characterized as "autonomy through diversification", unlike to "autonomy through integration" by Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Behind the "diversification", however, was hidden it's great, in comparison with FEC line, ideologization, since the idea of Lula and his foreign policy adviser assumed strengthening the international influence and authority of Brazil by strengthening South-South cooperation and concluding agreements with non-traditional partners in Latin America, Asia and Africa. According to representatives of the opposition, this unconventional foreign policy strategy was developed by the PT due to the collapse of ties with developed states. This policy reminded them of the Independent Foreign Policy of Cuadros – Goulart and, in part, the "responsible pragmatism" of E. Geisel. However, when discussing the "ideologization" of Brazil's foreign policy under Lula, it is necessary to take into account the general situation in Latin America at the beginning of the 21st century.

Even before Lula's victory, the radical "left" came to power in Venezuela, and soon after - in Bolivia and Ecuador. This, given the victories of the "moderate left" in Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, make a unique situation in favor of leftist movements in Latin America. This situation made it possible to strengthen the "parallel", ideologized direction in Itamaraty's foreign policy "to the detriment" of traditional pragmatism and even non-interference. Nevertheless, the foreign policy of the left party in the current left environment could have been completely different, unlike more ideologized, declarative, anti-American, than the one that Brazil actually pursued under Lula.

It was precisely this policy that inspired Brazil to endure, in the words of S. Pineiro Guimarães, «pin pricks” by other “leftists” (Bolivia, Argentina, etc.) in the hope of strengthening the “united left front”. Such a policy had an unprecedented character in the history of our foreign policy, and its initiators clearly contrasted in spirit with those advisers to the country’s presidents, as a rule, career diplomats, who were guided by the spirit and traditions of Itamaraty.”

Picture 29 – Lula da Silva and Celso Amorim



Source: Author/photographer - Mauricio Lima / AFP / Getty Images, 2008.

And the Foreign Ministry was forced to follow this dual line, trying to combine, at times, multidirectional vectors. In November 2006, C. Amorim said that the main priority of the Lula government is the need to preserve the ability of a sovereign Brazil to defend its development model, and in May 2007 he criticized the previous governments of the country for their desire for “excessive power” that forced Brazil to adapt to an unusual line of behavior, instead of its inherent tactics of persuading and

negotiating. In March 2008, the minister noted the changes in foreign policy, saying that under the leadership of the president, active work is underway to strengthen the emphasis on multipolarity. It should without undue enthusiasm, but without shyness or servility, change the direction of globalization in favor of the majority, adding that Brazil does not fit the convenient position of a peripheral country that awaits favors and protection from the strongest.

In September C. Amorim said that Brazil “should be present everywhere”, since “demand” for it is growing in the world. In June, he noted that Brazilian diplomacy under Lula had become “less timid”, and this increased Brazil’s share in the world, as it became an active participant in international relations, combining its vocation as a global actor with its own interests and responsibilities in all parts of the world. The minister criticized the opinions of those who considered such a large-scale foreign policy wasteful and even dangerous, despite the fact that by the end of Lula’s second term in office, this criticism intensified many times over.

The “overriding task” of Lula’s foreign policy, as was repeatedly pointed out in the PT’s selection program, was to attract the masses of Brazilians to an active discussion of foreign policy problems. This also, in addition to the special emphasis on the development of relations with the countries of the developing world, was the difference between Lula’s presidential diplomacy from a similar FEC. The latter was more “elite”, besides, Fernando Enrique, even introducing something “of his own” (for example, an idea of cooperation of “giant countries”, later picked up by Lula), had to adapt to the views of representatives of the liberal-democratic camp, who are used to putting pragmatics above ideas.

Liberals and right-wingers zealously criticized Lula for “third worldness”, “squandering of funds”, “disconnection from reality”, and, perhaps, in some way they were right. The increased activity of Brazilian diplomacy in the Afro-Asian direction, Lula’s visits to India, the countries of the Arab East and Cuba, the holding of meetings along the lines of South America – African countries, South America – the Middle East did not give immediate material benefits in the form of an increase in trade, loans, investments. India, which only under Lula began its formation as one of the main foreign trade and foreign policy partners of Brazil, at the beginning of 2000 accounted for only about 1% of Brazilian trade. However, the meaning of the PT foreign policy was not immediate money-making, but the maximum expansion of the circle of foreign policy partners in order to strengthen the global vector of Brazilian foreign policy and strengthen the PT’ position within the country.

All of the above fit into the framework of the previous constructions: Brazil’s becoming a “great power” and getting a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Only the accents were now slightly different. In this sense, summing up the foreign policy results of Lula’s eight-year rule, it can be argued that when the emphasis was shifted from the country’s short-term interests to long-term ones, innovation quite coexisted with conservatism, and idealism with pragmatism.

The Latin American direction under Lula acquired much greater dynamism. The priority areas remained the strengthening of Mercosur and South American integration, with the goal to create a “politically stable, socially just and economically prosperous South America”. The top priority was to overcome the crisis in Mercosur, and it was confirmed by the increase of Lula’s visits to neighboring states, the beginning of negotiations with

the ACN in 2004, and the attempts to restructure Mercosur in 2002-2003.

In 2002, the Council of Mercosur adopted the “Restart Strategy”, which defined the main directions of reforms of this association: strengthening macroeconomic coordination, improving the mechanism for resolving disputes, removing barriers to mutual trade, developing measures to strengthen trade discipline. In 2003, there were planned measures to create a more durable Customs Union; in 2007, the Parliament of Mercosur begins its work. Created in 2004, the special Fund for Structural Modernization (FOCEM), the main sponsor of which is Brazil, is going to finance the development programs of the member countries of the block. Integration is developing “in breadth”, diversification of external relations is underway. In 2003, Peru becomes an associate member of the bloc, in 2005 - Ecuador and Colombia, in 2006 - Venezuela.

In 2004-2009, trade agreements were signed between Mercosur and India, the South African Customs Union, Egypt, Morocco, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Jordan, Cuba, Malaysia and Israel. In 2004, an agreement on a free trade zone with the ACN was signed, and in 2010 negotiations with the EU were resumed with the aim of concluding a full-scale agreement on economic and political cooperation.

By 2010, the situation in Mercosur had significantly improved. The volume of intraregional trade, which amounted to \$ 17.829 billion in 2000, increased to \$ 44.239 billion in 2010, while intrazonal exports increased by 14.9%, and imports by 14.5%.

Table 2 - Main trading partners of MERCOSUR in 2011 (\$ billions)

	Export	Import	Balance
EU	68,8	60,1	8,7
NAFTA	41	55,6	14,6
Intraregional trade	53,7	51,6	2,1
China	51,1	48,4	2,7
Japan	3	9,7	- 6,7
Andean Community	12,5	7,1	5,4
Chile	10,8	5,9	4,9
Venezuela	6,8	2	4,8

Source: European Union, Trade in goods with Mercosur¹⁹.

Brazilian trade with Mercosur has shown positive dynamics over the years. In 2000 Brazil's exports amounted to \$ 7.739 billion, in 2010 it was already \$ 22.607 billion, and imports, respectively, increased from \$ 7.796 to \$ 16.620 billion.

However, since the second decade of the 2000s, Brazil's tactics have gradually shifted towards the formation of broader coalitions. This was due to several reasons. First, despite the reforms, the crisis in Mercosur, associated with the problem of further liberalization of trade in goods in the most sensitive industries in Brazil and Argentina, has not been overcome. Secondly, after the signing bilateral agreements on FTA with the United States by Colombia and Peru, the small countries of Mercosur – Uruguay and Paraguay – expressed wish to do the same. In this case, the immediate goal of Brazil - the creation of a customs union (CU) of all South American countries based on strengthening the CU that existed in Mercosur, became problematic.

19 URL.//http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_111832.pdf

For the sake of the unification, as well to provide a semblance of political unity in South America, Brazil under Lula was forced to overlook troubles from its partners – “Bolivarians”, which ran counter to its national interests and aroused criticism from the opposition.

On May 1, 2006, the government of Evo Morales in Bolivia, in violation of previous agreements, nationalized the assets of the Brazilian company Petrobras, introducing troops into the territory of oil development. In addition, the “socialist” government of Brazil in a special note remarked that Bolivia “has the sovereign right to dispose of its natural resources”. “Bolivia, - as noted R. Ricupero, -had no reason to accuse Petrobras of “imperialist intentions”, since there were clear bilateral agreements between two sovereign states on this matter”. The lack of proper reaction from Brazil testified, in his opinion, that solidarity with the government of Evo Morales outweighed in the minds of the PT the interests of the Brazilian state in the person of Petrobras. (Ricupero R. 2017).

Lula’s support for the ousted President of Honduras M. Zelaya and granting him political asylum at the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa in 2010 (despite the ambiguous attitude of Brazilian and world public opinion to the events in this Central American country), forced the press to talk about Brazil’s accession to “Bolivarians”, which, of course, was not true. However, the most serious mistake that exacerbated the crisis in Mercosur and dealt a blow to the plans to create the SAFTA was Lula’s insistence on admitting Venezuela.

The idea to accept the Bolivarian Republic into Mercosur, according to R. Ricupero, belonged to the then President of Argentina, Nestor Kirchner. Lula’s agreement reflected, in his opinion, “the political interests of the PT rather than the

pragmatic interests of Brazil". But the desire of the "petists" to see the "Bolivarians" in Mercosur ran into opposition first in their own parliament, and then in the parliament of Paraguay. As a result, Venezuela became a member of Mercosur, at the cost of temporarily suspending Paraguay's membership there and deepening the split in its ranks between Brazil and Argentina, and its junior members, Paraguay and Uruguay.

In the dispute between Uruguay and Argentina over the construction of a pulp and paper mill on the opposite bank of the river Uruguay in 2006 – 2010. Brazil, despite a long tradition of mediation in inter-Latin American disputes, chose to refrain from any diplomatic steps to resolve the dispute under the pretext of "non-interference". The real reason, which seriously hit the reputation of Brazil and Mercosur in general, was, according to R. Ricupero, "Brazil's fear of making a mistake", so as not to completely spoil the relations with its partners in the bloc.

The division of the "left turn" in Latin America into two "lines": "moderate pragmatists" and "revolutionaries – Bolivarians" seriously impeded Brazil's implementation of its foreign policy in the region. R. Ricupero noted the inconsistency of the "parallel diplomacy" of the PT, which in a number of cases deviated from the diplomatic tradition of the Foreign Ministry and was not so scrupulous about the principle of non-interference in the affairs of Brazil's neighbors. At the same time, he mentioned the attempts of "people from the inner circle of Lula" to influence the elections in Bolivia, Argentina, Paraguay and Peru. In addition, he believed, that the government did not hide the fact of its unconditional support for Venezuela in its difficult relations with Colombia. The diplomat's conclusion is simple: the result of Brazil's flirtation with the "Bolivarians" - Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Cuba and Nicaragua, was its insufficient attention to

the “liberal reformers” of Chile, Peru and Colombia, as a result of which the latter entered not into Mercosur, but together with Mexico formed their own integration association in 2013 – the Pacific Alliance.

Brazil’s response to the crisis in Mercosur was UNASUR - the Union of South American Nations, which, in addition to the “Quartet” of Mercosur, included the countries of the Andean Community of Nations (ACN), Chile, Guyana and Suriname (12 countries in total).

The idea of creating a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA) has dominated the minds of Brazilian politicians for a whole decade, and at the third summit of South American countries (December 2004, Cuzco), it was decided to create the South American Community of Nations (SACN). The goals of the new association were:

- the development of a single South American space,
- the strengthening of diplomatic and political coordination,
- the deepening of economic ties between Mercosur, ACN, Chile, Suriname and Guyana.

In the “Declaration of Cuzco”, the SACN was presented as an economic union according to the European model, followed by the introduction of a common currency, a common parliament and a single passport.

At the first meeting of the heads of state of the SACN (September 2005, Brasilia), there were identified 8 priority tasks: the development of political dialogue, common infrastructure, a unified energy system, the creation of an FTA, accelerated

social development, assistance in the development of health care, education, culture, science and technology, and in the protection of the environment. Since 2003, have been implemented 43 projects within the framework of SACN, for which Brazil has allocated more than \$ 2 billion.

At the first South American Energy Summit (April 2007, Venezuela), SACN was renamed UNASUR. The summit's declaration said that the idea of forming the Union was associated with a change in the approach to the idea of integration. From now on, the emphasis is on the development of all areas of cooperation, but, first of all, on political interaction.

In May 2008, UNASUR was formalized. At the summit in Brasilia, was adopted the Constituent Agreement, which outlined the main goals: to promote the integration processes and the formation of a union of the countries of South America in the cultural, social, economic and political spheres. The tasks of UNASUR included the implementation of joint projects in health, education, culture, science and technology, energy, transport and communications, infrastructure, sustainable development and security. The Bank of the South, created to finance and stimulate integration projects in the region, was called upon to play a special role.

The institutionalization of UNASUR was completed in 2010 with the appointment of a Secretary General and the establishment of a headquarters and secretariat in Quito (Ecuador), the South American Parliament in Cochabamba (Bolivia), Bank of the South in Caracas (Venezuela) and the South American Defense Council (Buenos Aires). The creation of UNASUR meant that Latin American countries would take independent positions in world politics based on the principles of international law and

democratic multilateralism". At the same time, the political component in UNASUR clearly prevailed over the economic one.

UNASUR took its first test of strength in March 2008, when Colombian troops, violating the sovereignty of Ecuador, seized the base of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) located on its territory. This incident, which could lead to the war between Ecuador and Venezuela, was successfully resolved through the mediation of UNASUR.

Observers, however, noted the shortcomings of the new association: firstly, because it consolidated Brazil's hegemony in the South American political space, and secondly, that it did not fully meet the aspirations of the "Bolivarians" led by Venezuela. They sought to spread influence in the region of their bloc – the "Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas" (ALBA), created in opposition to ALCA in 2004. Finally, UNASUR did not enjoy much sympathy from Colombia, which focused on the United States. The US was suspicious of the formation of a new potential center of power in South America. At the same time, it became clear that the first violin in it would be played by countries of the "left" orientation. South American integration caused legitimate concerns in the North, since it could well become an alternative (in relation to NAFTA) center of economic attraction and an independent center of political power in the Western Hemisphere.

These suspicions became the reason for Washington's decision to recreate the 4th US fleet that existed during World War II, whose area of responsibility included the South Atlantic, the Caribbean Sea and the southeastern Pacific Ocean along the coast of South America. Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela protested against this move.

Brazil expressed particular concern, since the permanent presence of the American fleet in the South Atlantic violated

the UN General Assembly resolution adopted on its initiative in 1986 on the creation of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZOCAPAZ), which, in addition to Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, included 24 countries of the western coast of Africa: from Cape Verde to South Africa.

On December 16, 2008, at an extraordinary UNASUR summit in Salvador (Brazil), was created the South American Defense Council (SADC) - an advisory and consultative mechanism of South American countries for holding mutual consultations in the field of joint defense, security and reducing tensions in South America. In the adopted Charter of the SADC, attention was drawn to such goals as strengthening cooperation in the defense and exchange of information, exchange of experience in peacekeeping operations, building confidence and promoting the conflict resolution by peaceful means. In 2009, the Center for Strategic Studies was established with headquarters in Buenos Aires.

As noted in Brazil, SADC was the response of the South Americans to the reconstruction of the US IV fleet. Despite the fact that most of the member of UNASUR rejected Venezuela's proposal to create a South American army, the emergence of SADC was deeply symbolic. It became the first body in the Western Hemisphere to deal with defense and security issues without the participation of the United States. The emergence of UNASUR and SADC made the parallel existence of two systems there: Inter-American and Latin American, a fait accompli.

During Lula's presidency, Brazil's trade with South America exceeded its trade with the United States for the first time. In this regard, the Regional Infrastructure Integration Initiative (IIRSA), adopted in 2000 at the First Summit of South American Heads of State, received additional development. The development of

energy, transport networks and communications have become three main factors for the further cooperation. IIRSA envisaged the creation of a single infrastructure of twelve members of UNASUR, designed to connect all countries with transport interchanges and new highways. South America was divided into ten strategic axes of integration and development and seven sectors of integration: the facilitation of investment and the improvement of the investment climate, the creation of coordination mechanisms, the harmonization of border policy, rules for the passage of maritime borders and access to national airspace, the development of information technology and communications. Plans for the energy integration of the region were considered separately.

In April 2010, was held the first Brazil-CARICOM summit, where were discussed cooperation projects, corresponding to the growth rates of trade relations (in 2002 the volume of trade between Brazil and CARICOM states was \$ 660 million, in 2008 it was already \$ 5.2 billion). There were signed 60 memorandums of understanding, including 47 bilateral agreements on technical cooperation, on cooperation in health, education, culture, energy, agriculture, transport and tourism, protection of civilians, and disaster management.

Brazil expressed its desire to become a member of the Caribbean Development Bank and proposed the creation of Brazilian Fund for the Caribbean Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) to facilitate coordination. Brazilian President Lula came up with the idea of concluding FTA between Brazil and CARICOM and deepening relations between Mercosur and the Caribbean Community. The start of bilateral Brazilian-Mexican negotiations on the Strategic Economic Integration Agreement became Lula's promising initiative.

In February 2010, was created the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) at the CARICOM-Rio Group summit. Its creation was officially announced in 2011 in Caracas. CELAC united 33 countries of the region, including Cuba, with a total GDP of \$ 5.2 trillion (for 2011). In the adopted declaration, the new association was called upon to become a mechanism of political consultations, capable of ensuring the integration of the member states and the coordination of their foreign policy. Nevertheless, accomplishing this task will face serious difficulties in future.

Due to the multidirectional political will of the UNASUR members, even Brazil with its regional weight and authority was not able to overcome the differences between the “Bolivarians” and “moderates”, “liberals” and “conservatives” within this association. In addition, the trade and economic contradictions in Mercosur did not make it possible to bring a reliable economic foundation under UNASUR. Washington, due to the failure of the ALCA project, was forced to temporarily surrender the initiative in South America to Brazil, and Brasilia had the opportunity to organize a counteroffensive.

Brazil’s relationship with the United States during Lula’s presidency was distinctive. In 2004, the mutual trade between these countries reached \$ 31 billion, American investments in the Brazilian economy amounted to \$ 34 billion, and Brazilian investments in the United States - \$ 2 billion. Brazilian trade with NAFTA from 2002 to 2011 doubled – from \$ 30.3 billion to \$ 75.9 billion.

The main difference between the “parallel diplomacy of the PT” from the policy of the “Bolivarians” was the absence of harsh anti-American rhetoric in it. However, George W. Bush’s stay in power in the United States, which worsened Washington’s

relations with many states of the planet, of course, had an impact on US-Brazilian ties.

In 2003, Brazil, like all leading Latin American countries, condemned the invasion of Iraq by the US-led coalition forces. Not long before that, President Lula had come up with an initiative to convene a world conference on Iraq under the auspices of the UN, but his appeal was ignored. The intervention sparked concern in Brazil and a heated debate in the National Congress that revolved around the topic: can Brazil resist American aggression if the United States is determined to seize its natural resources?

The answer was the adoption in 2008 the Strategy of National Defense (SND), where among the potential adversaries of Brazil were listed a state or a coalition of states with multiple military superiority. According to the SND, by 2025 - 2030 Brazil intended to create a “modern and powerful armed forces” as the armed forces of the great powers and planned to achieve independence in the development and creation of all modern weapons systems: a nuclear submarine, a fifth-generation fighter, aircraft carriers, ballistic missiles, etc. These provisions were then reaffirmed in the 2012 National Security White Paper.

In an attempt to overcome the growing contradictions around the ALCA treaty and on the Iraq problem, as well as taking into account the growing influence of China in foreign trade with Brazil, George W. Bush administration proposed an “ethanol alliance” to Brazil. The development of ethanol, a biofuel obtained from the processing of sugar cane, began in the 1930s, under Getulio Vargas. By 2000 Brazil has become the world’s leading ethanol producer, providing cheap and environmentally friendly biofuels up to 86% of the country’s car park.

The United States, which relied on corn processing for ethanol production, was the world's main exporter of this product. However, the idea of "dividing markets", joint production, sales, etc., proposed by George W. Bush, turned out to be disadvantageous for Brazil: American product was not only more expensive, but also less environmentally friendly. In addition, the use of corn as a raw material could affect the state of global food security. In addition, by offering the deal, Washington did not intend to open its domestic market to cheaper Brazilian ethanol. The beginning of the industrial development by Brazil of large oil deposits on its continental shelf (subsalt sediments on the seabed) de-actualized, at least temporarily, the ethanol discourse.

The coming to power the Obama administration in the United States, who "personally sympathized" with the Brazilian president, seemed to give a new impetus to relations between two largest economies of the Western Hemisphere. However, it did not happen. The discrepancy between the countries' positions on the coup d'état in Honduras, around the creation of American military bases in Colombia (Plan Colombia) and the contradictions over the Doha Round of WTO negotiations were superimposed on trade and economic problems inherited from the early 1990s.

The "peak" of the American - Brazilian contradictions was the removal of Brazil from the attempt to solve conceptually the Iranian problem. According to the majority of Brazilian analysts, the joint Brazilian-Turkish proposal on the Iranian nuclear program was an important application of the "middle hand" powers to join the solution of global problems and an attempt to confirm in practice the concept of a multipolar world. This move was the culmination of Lula's foreign policy, which reflected all its strengths and weaknesses.

On May 17, 2010, the President of Brazil and the Prime Minister of Turkey issued a joint statement that offered to Iran to enrich uranium on their territory in order to avoid the risk of developing Iranian nuclear weapons. This proposal was in line with the ultimate goals initially put forward for this country by the Group of Six (the “five” permanent members of the Security Council + Germany). 24 hours later, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton rejected it, saying that it does not correspond to Washington’s course of announcing anti-Iranian sanctions. The Security Council with a unanimous vote of the Big Five adopted them. Brazil, Turkey and Lebanon abstained. The situation remained in limbo until 2015, when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for the Iranian Nuclear Program was adopted. Rubens Ricupero expressed the disappointment of Brazil:

The rejection of the Brazilian-Turkish declaration by the world community has shown those obstacles, perhaps insurmountable, that lie in the way of building a world order based on law and common sense, and not on the instruments of power. It proved how premature it was to count on the creation of a multipolar world without the support of the “middle” powers on the part of the “great”. (Ricupero, 2017)

In our opinion, R. Ricupero was not entirely right, considering the failed demarche of Brazil and Turkey to be the “culmination” of Lula’s foreign policy. This, undoubtedly, should have been considered the entry of Brazil into the BRIC (S) association.

Brazil joined BRIC (along with China, India and Russia) in 2009 and was one of its founders. The idea of cooperation between the “whale countries” arose in the 1990s thanks to the publications of the famous Brazilian analyst Elio Jaguaribe.

It was developed in November 1997 in the “Declaration on the principles of Russian-Brazilian relations aimed at the XXI century”, signed by the foreign ministers of Brazil and Russia - F. Enrique Cardoso and E. M. Primakov.

At the first BRIC summit (Yekaterinburg, 2009), there were discussed issues important for all four states: global food security, the situation in the economy and problems of world development. There was adopted a declaration “Prospects for dialogue between Brazil, Russia, India and China”.

At the second summit (Brasilia, 2010), in the “Document on the Development of Cooperation between Brazil, Russia, India and China” it was told about overcoming the consequences of the financial and economic crisis, creating a new world financial order, and fighting poverty and about the problem of climate change. Brazil’s trade within the BRIC increased from \$ 6.9 billion in 2002 to \$ 93.5 billion in 2011, having increased more than 13 times. However, trade was far from the main thing that attracted the Tropical Giant in this informal union of states - civilizations.

Whichever side one considers the Brazilian-Turkish initiative, but just the participation in BRIC has become a springboard for Brazil into the “big” world politics. Reliance on the “rising” giants of the world economy, on three nuclear powers, two of which are permanent members of the Security Council, objectively could not but strengthen the negotiating potential of Brasilia. So far, this support has not been so reliable, as shown the results of the Security Council vote on the Iranian nuclear program.²⁰ However, even the vague framework of the “strate-

20 Russia and China spoke in unison with the rest of its permanent members, Brazil abstained. This, according to R. Ricupero, spoke of the “unwillingness” of these two countries to put themselves on the same level with Brazil in strategic matters.

gic partnership” that was established in relations between the “Quartet” and then “Five” BRIC - BRICS (in 2011, at the Third BRIC Summit in the Chinese city of Sanya, South Africa was admitted to this organization) allowed Brazil to undertake a number of important global initiatives.

Against the background of BRIC (S), Brazil’s relations with Russia, China and India have developed noticeably.

Brazil has recognized the market nature of the Chinese economy and the “one China policy”. In April 2004, the bilateral trade increased from \$1 billion (1998) to \$ 8 billion, and in 2008 increased to \$ 36.5 billion. In 2010, China became Brazil’s first trade partner. Chinese investments in strategic sectors such as energy, telecommunications, infrastructure in 2010 reached \$ 7 billion. In 2010, was established the Joint Defense Committee of Brazil and China in accordance with the concluded Agreement on cooperation in the field of defense, which raised relations in this area to a new level.

From 2000 to 2002 the trade between Brazil and India increased by 250%. In 2003, it amounted to \$ 1.2 billion, and in 2009 it was already \$ 5.6 billion. The relations with this country, which previously occupied a very insignificant place in the foreign policy of the Latin American country, became the best response to criticism of Lula’s foreign policy on the part of the liberals, dissatisfied with the “squandering of foreign policy assets” of the country. Brazil and India have shown mutual interest in ethanol production, joint ventures, cooperation in biotechnology, informatics, nanotechnology, nuclear power and space exploration.

As for Russia, the trade in 2005 amounted to \$ 2.5 billion, having increased over the next two years to \$ 5.4 billion. During the visit of L. I. Lula da Silva to Moscow in October 2005, the

countries decided to conclude a technological alliance. At the same time, it was signed a contract to send the first Brazilian cosmonaut to work on the Russian segment of the space station ("Progress). This flight was successfully completed in 2006.

The visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Brazil in December 2006 considered as a continuation of their strategic partnership. In July, the Brazilian president was invited to the G8 summit in St. Petersburg. The countries noted the progress in the work of the high-level bilateral Commission and expressed satisfaction with the signing of the Memorandum of Mutual Consultations between the EU and Mercosur. In 2004 - 2006 Russian investments in the amount of \$ 200 million came to Brazil. The countries started negotiations on the supply of Russian helicopters to Brazil for the needs of the Brazilian army and the monitoring and control system of the Amazon (SIVAM).

Two visits to Brazil by Russian President D. Medvedev (2008, 2010) marked with the agreements on the visa-free regime and direct air communication between the two countries. Since 2008, regular interagency contacts on security issues have begun between Russia and Brazil. On the Russian side, these meetings were chaired by the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, on the Brazilian side - by the Secretary of the Presidential Secretariat for Strategic Issues.

During the visit of the Brazilian Defense Minister to Russia in February 2008, additional prospects opened up for the establishment of military-technical cooperation. Bilateral ties in the energy sector have intensified. During L.I. Lula da Silva visit to Moscow in May 2010 Gazprom negotiated cooperation in the development of oil fields in the Brazilian economic zone. The parties have shown interest in the joint development of space

and bio-technologies, including ethanol fuel, in nuclear energy, informatics and microelectronics.

Analysts noted, however, the “excessive declarativeness” of Russian-Brazilian relations, which often outstripped trade and economic realities. The trade reached \$ 8 billion before the 2008 crisis, but dropped to \$ 6 billion afterwards. In addition, although Brazil has become the main trade and economic partner of Russia in Latin America, the mutual investments left much to be desired. In the system of their foreign economic relations, Russia and Brazil continued to play the second roles for each other, despite the significant intensification of foreign policy contacts and the constant statement of similarity or coincidence of positions on major international problems.

In 2011, South Africa joined BRICS. The most active initiator of the inclusion of this country was Brazil. In 2003, in Brasilia, was signed a document on the creation of IBSA trilateral forum, which, like BRICS, was intended to become a forum for consultation and coordination of actions on the most important economic and political issues of its three participating countries: Brazil, India and South Africa. Their common desire for the safety of oceanic transport arteries was important here: Brazil and South Africa – in the South Atlantic, India - in the Indian Ocean. No wonder one of the first decisions of IBSA was the decision to conduct annual IBSAMAR naval maneuvers with its own naval forces.

IBSA Summits (2006 - Brasilia, 2007 - Pretoria, 2008 - New Delhi, 2010 - Brasilia, 2011 - Pretoria) strengthened this interregional alliance of 1.3 billion people and countries with a GDP exceeding \$ 3 trillion. An important role was assigned by the participating states to the special IBSA Fund for Fighting Poverty, which was established in 2004 and operates under the

leadership of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). IBSA has united the countries actively striving to take the places of new permanent members in the UN Security Council,

In the early 2000s, Brazil's activity in relation to the reform of the Security Council increased. Itamaraty's concept on this issue was outlined in the speech of Foreign Minister C. Lafer at the UN: "It is impossible to achieve order or governance in the international arena without the participation of those who represent the majority of humanity in this process". Within the organization, an informal "Group of Four" (G-4) was formed consisting of India, Brazil, Japan and Germany, nominated candidates for the Security Council. The attitude of the "old" permanent members to new candidates was ambiguous from the outset. The very principle of representation in the Security Council of large countries - leaders of the developing world, did not cause any doubts. However, in Latin America Mexico and Argentina were willing to challenge Brazil's candidacy. There was no unity among the "old" permanent members either. Russia was not against the admission of Brazil and India, but the expansion of the Security Council at the expense of Japan or Germany was not in its interests. The question about China's attitude towards Japan's candidacy was read in a similar way. The question of the veto power for its potential new members also remained open.

In an effort to get a place of permanent member of the Security Council, Brazilian diplomacy during the presidency of L.I. Lula da Silva had developed unprecedented activity in the worldwide organization and in its specialized agencies. In 2004, Lula launched the Fome Zero initiative at the United Nations. It was supported by France and Chile, later 110 countries joined it. The country sought to extend the experience of its well-established social programs to the international sphere. At the same

time, Brazilian diplomats at the UN have worked hard to create UNITAID, an international center for the procurement of drugs to fight AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in developing countries, also using their own successful experience in the fight against AIDS.

At the World Economic Forum (Davos, 2003), France, Chile and Brazil launched the Movement against Hunger and Poverty (Geneva Declaration), which expressed the need for a global alliance to fight hunger. In 2008, Brazil participated in the FAO Regional Conference for Latin America and the Caribbean, followed by the FAO Rome Summit on Food Security, Climate Change and Renewable Energy. In 2009, Brazil took part in the World Summit on Food Security in Rome.

It should be noted the activity of Brazilian diplomats in the Working Group on the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was adopted in 2007, and in the UN Human Rights Committee. There, Brazil advocated the creation of new mechanisms for monitoring the provision of human rights around the world, for greater transparency and a reduction in the politicization of this problem. In 2004, Brazil ratified two additional protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and in 2007, an additional protocol to the Convention against Torture. In 2008, the country submitted a National Report to the UN Human Rights Council, where it made a comprehensive overview of the human rights situation in Brazil.

Since 2005, the country participates in the work of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC), established to promote dialogue between all world religions and cultures. The alliance brings together more than 135 countries and international organizations. At its forums (2008 – Madrid, 2009 – Istanbul, 2010 – Rio-de-Janeiro, 2011 – Doha), representatives

of the participating countries spoke out for tolerance, against the clash of civilizations and extremism, talked about the impact of globalization on national identity and overcoming civilizational and cultural differences.

At the forum in Rio-de-Janeiro, Brazil presented a national action plan that included long-term objectives to disseminate knowledge about the cultural and religious diversity of the world, to promote humanitarian values and a “culture of peace”, to respect migrants and to promote the social adaptation of marginalized population groups in Brazil.

Lula da Silva’s diplomacy focused on environmental issues. Brazil participated in the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002), supported the Convention on Climate Change (Buenos Aires, 2004), the Convention on the Conservation of Biological Diversity and enhanced cooperation under the Amazon Pact. The establishment of UNEP office in Brazil (2004) became part of the UN strategy to better respond to environmental challenges and help address regional and sub-regional sustainable development challenges. The country took part in the UN Conferences on Climate Change (2007, Bali Island, Indonesia), (2009, Copenhagen), as well as in the Cancun conference (Mexico, 2010) and the Conference on Climate Change in Durban (2011).

The country adopted the National Plan for Combating Climate Change, which spoke of the need to reduce the deforestation of the Amazon by up to 80%. By 2020, Brazil has demonstrated significant achievements in the renewable energy sources, in the production of ethanol and biofuels, which became an important factor in the country’s innovation profile and served to multiply its “soft power” in the world.

However, the most significant “flag display” of Brazil at the UN during Lula’s presidency was the fact that in 2004 it was assigned to lead the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH) in Haiti. The mission was staffed by the Brazilian military (2,366 in total) and police officers (2,533) and lasted until 2017. MINUSTAH was headed by a Brazilian general, and the international prestige of Brazil during this period reached its highest point.

In 2003, Brazil, along with a number of other developing countries, participated in G8 Summit in Evian (France). This gave impetus to the development of a consultative mechanism between G-8 and G-5 (Brazil, South Africa, China, India, Mexico). A logical continuation of this trend was the formation in 1999 of G-20 - the union of the 20 largest economies in the world, as a tool for crisis response. G-20 was created in response to the global financial and economic crisis of 2008, which shook the whole world. The goals of this new global association were: prevent of financial and economic crises, ensuring balanced development and reforming the architecture of global governance in accordance with the realities of the 21st century. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico were included in the G-20 from Latin American countries.

Under Lula, contacts between Brazil - the EU, Mercosur - the EU, and Latin America - the EU have intensified. In 2002, the EU Commission and Brazil signed a Memorandum of Understanding to develop bilateral cooperation until the end of 2006. Since 2007, the annual Brazil-EU summits have begun.

At the First Summit, held in July 2007 in Lisbon, Brazil received the status of a strategic partner of the EU. It also formulated a strategic framework for EU cooperation with Brazil for 2007-2013. At the Second summit, held in Rio de Janeiro in

December 2008, a Joint Action Plan was adopted, which identified specific areas of cooperation for 2009-2011 on a wide range of issues - from the problems of promoting peace and security to education, culture, governance, human rights. In the same period, there were formed the instruments of bilateral interaction: Brazil-EU High-Level Commission and Brazil-EU Mixed Commission. At the meetings of the Mixed Commission there are considered the activities of 19 sectoral committees, and developed specific initiatives for the bilateral cooperation.

The third Brazil-EU summit (Stockholm, October 2009) was held in the context of the global financial and economic crisis, which became one of the main issues, along with the problems of global climate change and environmental protection. The Fourth summit (Brasilia, September 2010) marked the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Brazil and the EEC (1960). The Treaty on Certain Aspects of Cooperation in the Field of Civil Aviation and the Treaty on Flight Safety were signed there.

Bilateral trade from 2002 to 2011 grew 3.3 times: from \$ 29 to \$99, 5 billion. European investments in the Brazilian economy in 2007 amounted to 15.3 billion, in 2010 - 43.9 billion, in 2011 - 28.4 billion, and in 2012 - 16.1 billion euros. If the whole South America accounted for 9.3% of European investments, Brazil accounted for 7.8% of this share. 56% of EU investments were directed to the development of communications, electricity networks, gas and water supply, trade and financial structures; 40% - in the manufacturing sector (food, electrical and electronic equipment), and 4% - in the extraction of raw materials (oil and natural gas). In turn, Brazilian investments in the EU countries were also very significant, amounting to 10.2 billion euros in 2010 and 3 billion euros in 2011. (BARRETO de MELLO, 2012).

As part of the broader EU-Mercosur and EU-Latin America summits (in 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010), Brazil negotiated to sign an agreement to establish a transcontinental FTA. The complexity of the dialogue between the EU and Latin American states was revealed during the interregional summits that began in 1999. It was associated with asymmetry in integration processes, inequality in trade flows, political and economic heterogeneity of Latin American countries and stagnation of negotiations between Mercosur and the EU. At a meeting of foreign ministers of the EU and 17 Latin American states in Luxembourg in May 2005, the Europeans expressed their readiness to meet Latin American partners halfway in opening markets for their agricultural products.

However, in the decade that has passed since the signing of the framework agreement, it was not possible to create a transcontinental FTA. Negotiations on the EU-Mercosur track were repeatedly interrupted due to the unwillingness of Europeans to increase quotas for agricultural products from South America. Some progress was made only in May 2009, during the fifth summit, when it was announced the creation of a financial mechanism to support joint projects in the field of energy and infrastructure.

At the Summit of Iberoamerican Community of Nations (ICN) and the Commonwealth of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), Itamaraty sought to promote the solution of migration, social development, innovation and technology exchange, education and social inclusion. The same work was carried out on the interregional forum FEALAC (East Asian-Latin American Forum), where Brazil participated together with other Latin American countries since 1999.

The innovative practice of trans-regional forums acquired a significance, in some respects similar to the forums of the Non-Aligned Movement of the past. Representatives of 54 African and 12 South American states attended the First South America - Africa Summit – ASA (Abuja, 2006). As a result, there were adopted the “Declaration of Abuja” and “Action Plan”, aimed at expanding partnership and cooperation between two regions in various fields, especially in the energy sector.

At the 2nd Summit (2009, Margarita Island, Venezuela), there was adopted the strategic “ASA Agenda 2010-2015”, aimed at expanding trade, investment, tourism, infrastructure development, transport, energy cooperation, agriculture, economy, environmental protection, education, science, technology and media. As part of the summit, seven South American countries, including Brazil, announced the creation of the Bank of the South, with a \$ 20 billion initial capital to fund joint South-South projects.

The course of “preferential policy towards Africa” in the framework of South-South cooperation assumed the transition from a policy of non-interference to a “policy of indifference”. During the visit to South Africa in 2003, Lula added an ethnic element as a kind of “compensation” for the period of slavery and to motivate further cooperation. Strengthening relations with African countries, especially with Portuguese-speaking ones, has acquired a special character. Much more attention was given to the social aspects of cooperation, especially emphasized the humanitarian component of Itamaraty’s African course.

From 2003 to 2010 Lula made 28 visits to Africa, visited 23 countries, some ones - several times: South Africa 5 times, Mozambique 3, Angola 2. There were opened 16 new embassies in Africa, its number on the “black continent” reached 37. Rapid economic growth in Africa South of the Sahara (5.4% in

2010, 5.2% in 2011, according to the IMF), made it an attractive market for Brazilian agricultural and agricultural products, as well as a special area for the activities of Brazilian corporations Petrobras, Oderbrecht, Vale and others. Brazilian Translatinas²¹ actively worked in the field of infrastructure, energy and mining, expanded investment cooperation.

In 2002, the volume of trade between Brazil and Africa was \$ 5 billion, and in 2011 - \$ 27.6 billion, showing an increase of 5.5 times. By 2008, Africa has become Brazil's fourth trading partner after the United States, China and Argentina. By 2010, the country was implementing about 300 scientific and technical projects in 37 of 53 African countries. The Brazilian corporation EMBRAPA²² opened a laboratory in Ghana, where it carried out a number of projects in the field of tropical agriculture. The Fio Cruz Corporation contributed to the development of the health care system, the fight against infectious diseases and AIDS, and improved systems for the prevention and control of the epidemiological situation.

Brazil signed 55 agreements with 20 African countries on educational cooperation. A number of Brazilian universities accepted African students to study. Since 2001, nearly 5,000 young people from 20 African countries received higher education in Brazil. In 2010, was opened the Federal University of Luso-Afro-Brazilian Integration (UNILAB). President Lula da Silva, signing the decree on the establishment of this university, said that UNILAB "will repay the debt to the African people", whose contribution to the history and development of the

21 The term applied to transnational corporations of the countries of Latin-Caribbean America, mainly Brazilian and Mexican.

22 EMBRAPA is the National Research Organization for Agriculture, established under the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture in 1975.

Brazilian nation 'is often overlooked'. (Борзова, 2016) (Borzova, 2016).

In May 2005, Brazil, home to more than 10 million people from Arab countries, hosted the First South America-Arab Summit (ASPA) in its capital. It was attended by the leaders of 12 UNASUR member countries and 22 - the League of Arab States (LAS). The aim was to strengthen trade and economic cooperation and achieve consensus on the most important world problems. At the end of the summit, the Brasilia Declaration was adopted. Subsequent ASPA summits (Doha, 2009, Lima, 2012) contributed to the deepening of political coordination of the countries, the development of cooperation in economy, culture, education, science, tourism, innovative technologies, environmental protection, sustainable development and peace consolidation.

Brazil has repeatedly expressed its concern about the level of violence in the Middle East. Traditionally, its position boiled down to recognizing the independence of the Palestinian state and recognizing Israel's right to a secure existence within internationally recognized borders. In August 2006, during the International Conference on the Humanitarian Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Brazil announced the allocation of \$ 500 million for UN humanitarian projects in this territory. Itamaraty's position on the Middle East problem found understanding and support among the Arab countries. In the period from 2002 to 2011, Brazil's trade with them has grown 5 times: respectively, from \$ 3.7 to 18.3 billion.

Towards the end of his eight-year tenure in power, Lula decided not to hide his emotions, describing the US administration's Middle East course as an overall "failure". He condemned Washington for a "one-sided" approach to resolving the Middle

East problem and called on the international community to find a collective solution to this protracted conflict.

During the presidency of L.I. Lula da Silva Brazil's foreign policy activity reached its peak, perhaps comparable only with the era of Baron de Rio Branco's tenure as foreign minister in 1902-1912. This was a foreign policy that came as close as possible to the policy of a "great power", and would have become such, if not for a few "buts". Firstly, Brazil failed to get a permanent seat on the Security Council. Secondly, its joint initiative with Turkey on Iran's nuclear program did not pass the "approbation" of five permanent members, and, finally, thirdly: Brazil, although it acquired a solid "soft power", still did not have a sufficient power component, to pursue the foreign policy of a great power. In addition, although the intention to create such a component had already been announced, the costs of foreign policy activity, with a strong ideological component introduced into it, later turned out to be too high for the PT party.

The new ruling stratum of the country formed after 2003, which consisted of the trade union bureaucracy and business elites and positioned itself "slightly to the left of the center", aimed to achieve the "greatness" of Brazil relying on its economic achievements, natural resource and human potential, based on the widest possible inclusion in regional and global connections. In the memoirs of C. Amorim "Acting Globally", which was published in 2017, the idea that the radical expansion of Brazil's presence on the world was explained by the fact that the world needed "active, reasonable and careful diplomacy" was a red thread. While agreeing with the ex-minister that

Brazilian diplomacy developed unprecedented activity under Lula, Rubens Ricupero, however, does not recognize its “rationality and caution”.

As a result of the policy of “autonomy through diversification”, by 2010 Brazil had 132 embassies, 12 missions to international organizations, 3 special missions, 54 consulates and 15 vice-consulates abroad. 30% out of 216 representative offices (62 offices) appeared under President Lula. In Africa alone, there were opened 16 new embassies! Accordingly, the number of diplomatic missions accredited in Brazil has increased (114 diplomatic missions, 41 representations of international organizations). Under Lula, Brazil established or substantially intensified relations with such countries as North Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Singapore, Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, East Timor, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Countries that, under Fernando Henrique, were classified as simply “priority”, under Lula moved into the category of “strategic”. This status was given to Venezuela, Paraguay, Japan, India, China, South Korea, France, Portugal, Spain, England, Italy, Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, South Africa.

All these years Brazil has been an active participant in South-South cooperation projects in more than 80 countries. The amount of humanitarian assistance provided by Brazil through this cooperation tripled under Lula, while the country continued to spend colossal funds at the national level on extensive social programs.

Strengthening such areas in foreign policy as environmental protection, human rights, the fight against organized crime, hunger, poverty, etc. demanded close interaction between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and various power structures,

coordination of the activities of these structures within the country and in the international arena. So, if in the period 1968-1987 there were created 23 inter-ministerial commissions in Brazil (six were with the participation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), then in 1988-2007 there were already 38 (17 with the participation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). To expand interaction with other government agencies from 1988 to 2007 750 Itamaraty officials went to serve in other federal departments, while 77 employees from other ministries went to serve in the Foreign Ministry.

The reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, carried out in 2006, led to an increase in the number of diplomats. In 1946 – 2005 the number of Itamaraty employees increased by 400 people, in 2006 the replenishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by 400 people was approved in four years. The opening of more and more representative offices abroad and the swelling of the ministry's personnel could not but affect the budget and, ultimately, the prestige of Itamaraty.

R. Ricupero considered the reason for Brazil's entry into a new streak of failures after 2011, which once again forced it to "step back" as "an excess of self-confidence, complacency and an atmosphere of reverence for the national leader, which created the false impression that everything now depends only on him".

The victories won "under the curtain" of his, at first glance, such a successful reign: the decision to hold the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016, brought, as this author believed, "glory to Lula, and tears – to his successor", so far as excessive budget spending led to a drop in investment, and PT party was finished off by a corruption scandal.

A Step Back? The Political Drama of Dilma Rousseff.

Brazil made its “step back” after the victory in the presidential elections in 2010 by Dilma Vana Rousseff, who previously served as Minister of Energy (2003-2005) and head of the presidential administration. Dilma Rousseff’s candidacy for the highest government post received a “blessing” from “Lula himself,” so few doubted her election. Dilma’s charisma was complemented by her participation in the revolutionary movement during the years of military rule and the torture she endured in the dungeons of the secret police.²³ In her election campaign, Dilma spoke for agrarian and political reforms, supported racial quotas, religious freedom and same-sex marriage, and opposed the death penalty and the legalization of soft drugs.

In the second round of elections, October 31, Dilma Rousseff, gaining 56% of the vote, became the first woman in the history of Brazil - the president of the republic. Referring to this circumstance and all subsequent events, Rubens Ricupero noted with characteristic sarcasm that “it would be better if Lula’s political career ended in 2010”. (Окунева, 2013). (Okuneva, 2013).

The reasons that made Brazil temporarily forget about its ambitious plans during the reign of Dilma Rousseff were both

23 Dilma Rousseff was born in Belo Horizonte in 1947 in the family of Pedro Rousseff, a Bulgarian immigrant, and Dilma da Silva, a teacher. In 1967, she joined the youth organization of the Socialist Party of Brazil, and then became a member of its radical faction, the National Liberation Team, which defended the idea of an armed struggle against the military dictatorship. Although Dilma Rousseff was a member of underground armed organizations for several years, she did not take a direct part in the hostilities. At the age of 22, Dilma was captured by the military and kept in prison for three years, subjected to torture. At the end of 1972, she was released and continued her political activities, in 2000 joined the ranks of the Workers’ Party (PT) of Lula da Silva.

objective and subjective. It must be added that the successes of the previous administration undoubtedly exerted psychological pressure on the new president, forcing her, at times, either to be overly cautious, or to strive for success at any cost.

By 2010, Brazil became the world's second largest producer and exporter of agricultural products, the third largest exporter of mineral resources and the fifth in terms of attracting foreign investment, ranking seventh in the world economy. The country made remarkable strides in tackling social inequality and unemployment, expanding the middle class by 30 million. The spread of AIDS was stopped and a huge work was done to develop health care, education, culture and sports, to protect human rights and to improve national legislation in this area. During the years that PT party was at the helm of the country, the international prestige and "soft power" of Brazil increased many times over.

Picture 30 - Dilma Vana Rousseff



Source: Author/photographer - Official photo of President Dilma Rousseff taken at the Alvorada Palace, 2011.

The country relatively safely passed the global financial and economic crisis of 2008. Brazil's GDP grew by 7.5% in 2008, and in 2010 it decreased by 2.7%, but this was not crucial for it. In conditions of a stable inflow of foreign capital, an unchanged tax policy and a positive trade balance, the country continued to solve successfully internal problems. In addition to Lula's ongoing social programs, Dilma introduced the Brazilians to her ones: "Brazil, the country of education", which provided for equal access to education for all segments of the population, and announced the allocation of one hundred thousand scholarships to educate Brazilian students in the best universities of the world. At the same time, a law was passed, according to which 75% of royalties and 50% of the oil fund were to go to education, and 25% to healthcare.

The fall in prices for raw materials and foodstuffs in China was critical for Brazil. Stable filling of the budget with export proceeds helped Dilma to continue the social programs of the previous government. On this way, however, she met a number of unpleasant surprises. Firstly, in order to fulfill obligations on the increasingly expensive social sphere, it was necessary to increase raw materials exports to China, which in 2010 became Brazil's main trading partner.

This, however, doomed the country, which had previously been able to improve exports through the development of advanced industries, to return to the position of a supplier of mineral resources. The policy of increasing raw material exports played a significant role in the unfavorable change in the structure of production, contributing to the degradation of a number of manufacturing industries, which were deprived of investment support. The expansion of China in Latin America gradually began to displace Brazil from the regional market of technical

products, including Mercosur, and to undermine the positions of national manufacturers in the domestic market.

Second, the slowdown in growth rates in China in 2014-2015 (closer to the second term of Dilma's presidency) and the process of structural reforms in the economy, based on the transition from material-intensive industries to capital-intensive and high-tech ones, reduced its need for importing raw materials, which hard hit world purchase prices. In 2014, Brazilian exports to China decreased by almost 12%, sales of iron ore fell by 22.8%, crude oil - by 13.9%, sugar - by 38.3%, soybeans - by 3%. Against the background of a worsening economic situation, a decrease in domestic demand and a drop-in entrepreneurial activity, the growth rate of Brazilian GDP in 2014 decreased to 0,1%, external debt rose to 15,9% of GDP, and the national currency, the real, fell by 13%.

In 2014 D. Rousseff entered the second presidential term. During the electoral campaign it was presented a liberal foreign policy concept by the Social Democratic Party (PSDB) presidential candidate Aécio Neves. He advocated the refusal of excessive state intervention in the economy, for closer relations with the United States and developed Western countries, which, in his opinion, was preferable for Brazil as a guarantee of its development and becoming a "great power".

In the speeches of the representatives of the liberal opposition, one could see the conviction that Brazil has "outgrown" its third world environment (especially the "Bolivarian" one) and needs closer and more productive cooperation with the recognized leaders of the world economy and politics. Such well-known figures in the country as former President F. Enríque Cardoso, prominent diplomats Celso Lafer, Rubens Ricupero, and others also advocated a less ideological course.

The victory of D. Russeff, who led the coalition “For Brazil to Continue Changes” led by the Labor Party (PT), was achieved with an advantage of only 3% over her opponent, reflected the complexity of the socio-economic situation in the country. A. Nevis’ candidacy was supported by 48.55% of voters, concentrated mainly in the economically developed industrial regions of the southeast, south and center, especially in the state of Sao Paulo. Rousseff’s victory was ensured by the votes of the poor in the north and northeast, who significantly improved their living conditions during the 12 years of PT party in power.

But, the same 2014 was a fateful year for Brazil, because the problems in the economy were added the coolly greeted in society the World Cup (with the defeat of Brazil in the semifinals from the German national team with a scandalous score of 1:7), the promotion of a new corruption scandal²⁴ associated with the Petrobras company (the so-called “Operation Lava Jato”), a record drought that hit agriculture and electricity production, as well as mass demonstrations on the streets of major cities that have not abated since 2013.

Social protests associated with the irrational, in the opinion of many Brazilians, spending on sports megaprojects, increased taxes and public transport fares reached top in 2014. The “new”, created during the reign of Lula, “medium class”, acutely felt the instability of his new position, becoming a hostage to the political games of various, including criminal, elements. All of them actively used social networks for anti-government propaganda, trying to build up political capital for themselves amid the growing corruption scandal.

24 Corruption is an old “disease” in Brazil, which marked the short reign of President F. Color, and touched the rule of Lula. In 2005, allegations of corruption forced some of his closest associates, the most likely candidates for the PT in the 2010 presidential election, to leave the government, which “freed up” a seat for D. Rousseff.

Since January 2015, Mauro Vieira has been appointed to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was the Brazilian ambassador to the United States, and headed the embassy in Argentina for six years. The new minister was faced with a difficult task: to improve relations with the president and to contribute to the restoration of the financial situation and the growth of the prestige of the diplomatic service in the country and in the world. The structure of Itamaraty was changed, the number of general secretariats increased to nine.

Foreign Ministry offices were opened in different states of the country (in Rio Grande-do-Sur, Minas Gerais, Parana, Bahia, as well as in Rio-de-Janeiro, Sao Paulo, etc.). The new structure was supposed to meet the goals of national development and consolidation of the country as an independent pole in a multipolar world, asserting its regional leadership and diversifying foreign economic relations. The impeachment of President D. Rousseff in August 2016, however, prevented the fulfillment of many of the goals set.

Picture 31 - Mauro Vieira



Source:URL: Author/photographer - Wilson Dias/Abr, 2011.

In December 2014, the Brazilian prosecutor's office filed corruption and money laundering charges against 22 top managers from the country's six largest construction companies who were executing orders from the Petrobras corporation. They were suspected of a cartel conspiracy, as a result of which Petrobras provided kickbacks to politicians, including members of the government, federal deputies and senators, in the amount of over \$ 4 billion (!). Suspicions of conniving at corruption fell on Dilma Rousseff, who served on the board of Petrobras when she was energy minister. They also cast a shadow over the ex-president, Lula da Silva, which diminished the PT's chances of winning the 2018 elections.

In 2015, the situation in the economy and social sphere continued to deteriorate steadily. Unemployment in the country increased to 6,4%. Under these conditions, the government of D. Rousseff was forced to reduce social benefits and increase taxes, which hurt the poor. This was reflected in the position of the "new middle class", most of whose income was now spent on repaying the accumulated loans. Its protest potential grew steadily, and the intensity of anti-government demonstrations in the country intensified.

In September 2015, the opposition accused D. Rousseff of violating tax laws and manipulating state funds during the 2014 election campaign. In December, parliament initiated a procedure to impeach the president. On April 17, 2016, the lower house of the National Congress voted in favor and referred the issue to the Senate. On August 31, by a 61vote against 20, D. Rousseff was removed from office and her presidential powers were transferred to Vice President Michel Temer. All this time, the economic situation in the country continued to deteriorate, and the social situation showed more and more clear signs of a split.

Legally, it was hardly possible to present any claims to the impeachment process of D. Rousseff. She was accused of proven cases of uncontrolled spending of budgetary funds and unjustified postponement of financial payments to some state banks. But, according to D. Rousseff herself, she did nothing, “which before her did not do each president of Brazil”. Left-wing governments in Venezuela and Ecuador condemned Rousseff’s impeachment as a “coup d’etat” and temporarily recalled their ambassadors from Brasilia.

Against the background of deepening economic and social problems during the reign of D. Rousseff, Brazil’s foreign policy activity, which reached its peak under Lula, naturally began to decline. However, in order to answer the question: why this reduction has acquired an unprecedented character, it is necessary to involve in the analysis not only objective, but also subjective factors.

To say that presidential diplomacy under Dilma differed from that under her predecessor, both in the number of diplomatic visits and their regional distribution, would mean to hide the fact that her presidential diplomacy de facto existed with a negative sign.

Unlike Lula, who understood and accepted the traditional place and role of Itamaraty in the alignment of internal political forces and willingly listened to the advice of high-ranking diplomats, Dilma Rousseff was unable to establish contact with them. R. Ricupero accused her of “arrogance”, “authoritarianism” and unwillingness to listen to other people’s opinions, believing that for D. Rousseff foreign policy, “was of much less interest than domestic”. In her first, relatively more prosperous presidential term, she made half as many foreign trips as her predecessor in this post: in 2003-2005 Lula had 81 trips abroad, in 2007-2009.

- 124 trips; and Dilma in 2011 -2013 - 61 trips. During five years in power, Mrs. President replaced three foreign ministers.

President Lula da Silva paid attention to the countries of Latin America, having made more than 10 visits only to Argentina and Venezuela, and visits to other countries in the region. Dilma also gave priority to the countries of Mercosur (visits to Argentina - 3 times, to Venezuela and Paraguay - 2 times), but in general the number of such visits during this period was less than that of her predecessor.

Dilma willingly traveled to Europe (Germany, England, France, Portugal), the United States, Turkey, the BRICS countries and African Portuguese-speaking states, but did not make a single visit to North Africa or the Middle East. The number of new embassies and consulates opened abroad also decreased, which could be explained by economic considerations. The number of new employees hired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also decreased.

Picture 32 - Embassies and diplomatic corps of Brazil.

Year	President	Number of Brazilian Embassies	Changes	Diplomatic positions (ambassadors, consuls)	Diplomatic corps	Changes
2002	F.E. Cardoso	91		150		
2010	L.I. Lula da Silva	131 (+40)	An average of 5 embassies were opened annually	217 (+67)	630 new posts	Average growth per year 8,37
2013	Dilma Rousseff	139 (+8)	An average of 3,4 embassies were opened annually	227 (+10)	104 new posts	Average growth per year 4,28

Source: (Борзова, 2016). (Borzova, 2016).

The subsequent deterioration of the economic situation after 2012 made Itamaraty almost the main victim of austerity policies: the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to decrease, the financing of Brazilian embassies and consulates suffered, the country's debt to international organizations began to increase, official visits were canceled more often, and reduced efforts to promote Brazil's soft power abroad.

The discussions regarding the means and methods of foreign policy and ensuring the country's security interests have intensified in the academic and political environment, as well as in the media. R. Ricupero in his monograph "Diplomacy in the History of Brazil" characterized D. Rousseff's diplomacy as "not prestigious" and "routine". Added this author,

"Unlike Lula, who did not hesitate to consult with the diplomats, Dilma, behind her apparent aloofness and even coldness in relations with them, tried to hide her lack of confidence in her own abilities, lack of the gift of communicating with people, ignorance of foreign languages and foreign policy topics in general. In our history we still need to look for a head of state who is so little prepared for his mission, at least in terms of foreign policy". (Ricupero, 2017).

In support of this thesis, R. Ricupero cites facts that many foreign ambassadors had to wait months for their credentials to be handed over, that Itamaraty employees "survived from bread to water" and so on. He blames Dilma for "dragging" Venezuela into Mercosur by excluding temporarily from it one of the founders of the association - Paraguay, a diplomatic conflict with Bolivia, as a result Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota (January

2011 – August 2013) was forced to resign. After his transfer, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was headed by the qualified professional, Luis Alberto Figueiredo (Aug 2013 – Dec 2014).

The removal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from participation in two important projects of the country: “Science without Borders” and “More Doctors” and a decrease in the regulatory function of Itamaraty reduced the traditional influence of Brazilian diplomacy in society.

Picture 33 - Antonio de Aguiar Patriota



Source: Author/photographer – unknown. Mrebrasil, 2013.

In our opinion, R. Ricupero is not entirely fair to Dilma Rousseff’s foreign policy, considering it almost completely “failed”. In any case, the responsibility for all these failures would have to be shared between her and Marco Aurelio Garcia, who continued to retain his post as chief foreign policy adviser and active conductor of PT diplomacy.

Under Dilma, several prominent Brazilian diplomats were appointed to a number of key positions in international organizations. Ambassador Roberto Carvalho de Azevedo took over as Director General of the WTO, Ambassador Jose Graciano da Silva became Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). In 2011, Roberto Oliveira Silva became Executive Director of the International Organization of Coffee Producers (IOC), which regulates coffee prices based on supply and demand. In 2012, Braulio Ferreira de Sousa Diaz became Chair of the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity under the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and Ambassador Figueiredo Caldas was elected to the OAS Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

Dilma managed if not to increase, then at least to preserve all the important foreign policy developments: Mercosur, UNASUR and South American Defense Council, to promote the creation of new financial structures in BRICS, to maintain a dialogue with the United States.

The visit of US President Barack Obama to Brazil in March 2011 did not mark the beginning of a “new stage” in relations between two largest economies of the Western Hemisphere. R. Ricupero (2017) noted with regret that the Brazilian-American relations “initially had the stamp of a curse: as soon as they announced their entry into the phase of “brilliant” development, immediately followed by a phase of skepticism and disappointment. An unfavorable background for this visit was the discrepancy between the countries in the UN Security Council, when Brazil, together with the rest BRICS members and Germany, refrained from adopting a resolution against the Gaddafi regime in Libya. The United States and other Western countries voted in favor.

Speaking at a banquet in honor of the American guest, D. Rousseff spoke in favor of establishing a “long-term partnership” between countries on the condition that it would be “absolutely equal” in nature. At the same time, Dilma did not hide the serious contradictions between Brazil and the United States in the trade and economic field. B. Obama, in his response, was forced to recognize the “outstanding achievements” of Brazil in the economy and social sphere.

The Brazilian media, however, drew attention to the fact that the US President preferred to get off with general phrases to the question about granting Brazil a permanent member of the UN Security Council. There were ten agreements signed during the visit and they mainly concerned only the prospects for cooperation (energy, biotechnology, aviation and space spheres), without touching on topical trade and economic problems that were brought up for discussion at the WTO. In an interview given at the end of Barack Obama’s visit, D. Rousseff said that Brazil is “a country that the United States should look at with respect”. She criticized the US position on Iran and said that “the issue of human rights cannot be one-sided”, reminding Washington of its human rights violations at Guantanamo prison.

Many American scientists who “programmed” the deterioration of US-Brazilian relations as humanity “grows in” in the 21st century, were not mistaken.

Using its “soft power”, Brazil in 2009-2011 and 2013-2015 was elected to the Human Rights Council, where some progress was made in protection of human rights. In OAS, Brazil conducted an active dialogue with the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, participated in the compilation of the Universal Periodic Reviews in human rights protection in each country. Building on the experience during the

leadership of the peacekeeping operation in Haiti, Brazil moved on to provide technical assistance to a number of countries in the implementation of international norms in this area.

The operation of the United States and NATO in Libya, a regime change in this North African country, the assassination of its leader, M. Gaddafi, and massive civilian casualties put at the forefront of the UN debate on the so-called concept of “responsibility to protect” (R2P), which was intended to replace “humanitarian intervention”. In contrast to R2P, which was abstracted away from the fate of specific people when conducting operations to “enforce peace”, Brazil’s concept of “responsibility while protecting” or RwP drew attention to the responsibility of states to protect the populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. At the same time, Brazil launched at the UN an initiative “Friends of Mediation”, which proceeded from the premise that the best solution to conflicts is preventive diplomacy.

In the Security Council, Brazil initiated a discussion on security and development issues. At the meeting on 11 February 2011, Brazil, as its chairperson, prepared a statement stating the relationship between security and development and between the economic, political and social aspects of conflict resolution, as well as between peacemaking, consolidating peace and taking concrete steps for sustainable development.

In Brazil under D. Rousseff was opened the headquarters of the International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG), whose activities were coordinated with the Academic Forum (“the Academic Forum: a policy Dialogue”), and with the Poverty Group of the Bureau for Development Policy. The creation of this Center was the result of joint work between the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Brazilian government to

study the problems of poverty and inequality in the developing world and to develop recommendations for their reduction. The Center received the right to publish the results of its research on individual countries of the world in the journal "Poverty in Focus".

Brazil's "Agenda 21" proclaimed as a common goal not just measures to protect the environment, but the gradual achievement of sustainable development that will combine a balance between economic growth, social justice and environmental protection. At the Rio + 20 Conference in 2012, the country proposed global goals for sustainable development (SDGs) and economic progress for 2015-2030, in line with the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. In 2013-2014 Brazil participated in the preparation of the post-2015 development agenda, which included 17 goals and 169 targets.

New hopes for improving relations with the United States were associated with a return visit of the Brazilian President to Washington, which was scheduled for October 2013. However, it was thwarted because of the information of E. Snowden about the secret wiretapping by the US National Security Agency (NSA) of Dilma Rousseff's confidential conversations. Unlike the Federal Republic of Germany, where the NSA's wiretapping of Chancellor Merkel's conversations did not provoke the same sharp reaction, Dilma's cancellation of a planned visit to the United States looked rather harsh. Through the efforts of Mauro Vieira, the new foreign minister appointed by Dilma, the visit to the United States was made only in mid-2015. However, the government of D. Rousseff, which was "in agony" by that time, could no longer extract any positive from it. The main priority of Brasilia's foreign policy continued to be the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

By 2012, it seemed that Mercosur crisis had finally been overcome. The South American Quartet expanded cooperation in the development of infrastructure, telecommunications, education and agriculture, in the field of scientific and technical relations, environmental protection, cross-border cooperation and the fight against drug trafficking. Intrazonal trade in 2013 reached \$ 60 billion (15% of the block's global trade), showing an increase of 300%. Mercosur began to account for 47,6% of all foreign FDI in Latin America.

Brazil was able to revitalize the Fund for Structural Modernization (FOCEM), the Fund for the Development of Family Farms and the Fund for the Development of Small and Medium Enterprises of Mercosur. From 2007 to 2014 FOCEM has implemented 45 investment projects worth \$ 1.450 million. The South American bloc managed to expand its external relations by signing free trade agreements with Lebanon, Tunisia and the countries of the Pacific Alliance (Peru, Colombia, Mexico, Chile). All these years, negotiations continued with the EU on the creation of FTA.

The political aspects of cooperation in Mercosur, however, again prevailed over the economic ones. In 2012, Venezuela joined this bloc, and in 2013 a protocol on a similar intention of Bolivia was signed. Chile, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana and Suriname already had the status of associate members in 2013. At the same time, not all of these countries ranked themselves as "left turn" and not all (Paraguay, Colombia, Peru, Chile) were "delighted" with the admission of the anti-American-minded government of "Bolivarians" to the bloc.

Slightly less ideological than the "Chavist", but still insufficiently pragmatic foreign policy of PT contributed to the emergence of a special Mechanism of Political Dialogue and

Economic Cooperation in Mercosur in July 2014. There was a goal to establish a single economic space with the countries of the “Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America” – ALBA (Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, etc.), as well as with the states of Petrocaribe, who received Venezuelan oil at subsidized prices, and with CARICOM. Permanently present in the minds of Latin Americans “a reference to the Panamanian Congress of S. Bolivar of 1826”, did not allow even such conservative countries as Colombia, to ignore initiatives related to strengthening Latin American integration.

On March 11, 2011, the UNASUR Constituent Treaty entered into force, which noted that integration is a decisive step for strengthening multilateral cooperation and establishing the rule of law in international relations in order to create a multipolar world. The organizational structure of UNASUR, along with the summits of heads of state, councils of ministers and the general secretariat, includes 12 sectoral councils dealing with integration problems:

- South American Council of Economics and Finance;
- South American Infrastructure and Planning Council;
- South American Council for Science, Technology and Innovation;
- South American Board of Education;
- South American Cultural Council;
- South American Council for Social Development;
- South American Defense Council;
- South American Health Council;
- UNASUR Council for Free Elections;

- South American Council for Public Safety, Justice and Coordination of Action against Transnational Organized Crime;
- South American Council against the Drug Problem;
- South American Energy Council.

At the VI UNASUR Summit, there was adopted the Strategic Plan for 2012-2022, which identified 31 priority projects for infrastructure development and socio-economic development, especially in border and agricultural regions, with an investment volume of \$ 17 billion.

The decisions of the UNASUR summits showed the desire of its founders, primarily Brazil, to endow this structure, in addition to the most important function of conflict resolution and peacekeeping, with all other functions previously inherent only in such an inter-American structure as OAS. This de facto made the “parallelism” of the existence in the Western Hemisphere of two systems - the Inter-American and the South American, a fait accompli.

As for the Latin American structure - CELAC, where the weight and authority of Brazil was leveled by the participation of Mexico, at the First Summit of this organization in Santiago de Chile (January 28, 2013), there were adopted a joint Declaration and Action Plan, which included issues of sustainable development, integration and coordination of actions on the world stage. In the “Declaration of Havana”, adopted at the Second CELAC Summit (2014), Latin America and the Caribbean, by analogy with the “Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic” (ZOCAPAZ), were declared a Zone of Peace. The action plan for 2014 identified priorities for cooperation in various areas, including food security, farming development, education,

culture, science, technology and innovation, finance, energy, environmental protection, migration, combating drug trafficking, organized crime and corruption.

Brazil's most notable contribution to the work of CELAC was the first CELAC-China Forum, held in Brasilia (June 2014), to promote cooperation in infrastructure, energy, agriculture and education. In January 2015, Beijing hosted the CELAC-China Response Forum at the level of foreign ministers, and it was adopted a cooperation plan for 2015-2019.

Focusing on its policy on Latin American platforms, Brazil did not remove from the agenda to expand cooperation with African-Asian countries, regional and global integration associations and cooperation structures: the African Union, BRICS, IBSA, the League of Arab States (LAS), EU, ASEAN. The development of Russian-Brazilian ties continued. However, as Brazil entered the series of events associated with economic and socio-political crises, this development began to slow down.

Cooperation with African countries was carried out in the framework of the South America - Africa (ASA) summits, in line with the IBSA, as well as through the Community of Portuguese Speaking States (CPLP). The third ASA summit, attended by representatives of 63 countries, was held in February 2013 in Malabo (Equatorial Guinea) under the slogan "Strategies and Mechanisms for Strengthening South-South Cooperation". There were identified mechanisms for financing programs and projects outlined in the "Strategic Agenda 2010-2015" and in the "Plan 2010-2015 on the development of relations between two regions". In the adopted Declaration Malabu there were identified 27 projects in agriculture, innovative technologies, energy, education, health and environmental protection. The goal was to create an Interregional Trade Forum.

Development of cooperation continued within the summits of the countries of South America and the Arab states (ASPA). At the third summit in Lima (Peru, October 2012), held under the slogan “Culture of Peace, Inclusion and Development” shortly after the “Arab Spring”, the special attention was paid to agreeing joint positions on conflict situations in Libya, Syria, Darfur and around the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands. The delegates unanimously supported the right of Palestine to establish an independent state. The Lima Declaration set the tasks of expanding the political dialogue and multilateral trade, scientific and technical, economic, cultural, financial and investment cooperation, interaction against desertification and climate change. On the sidelines of the summit, it was reached an agreement to create a Joint Chamber of Commerce, which was implemented in 2013. Between 2005 and 2011 the trade between UNASUR and LAS increased by 101,7%.

As a result of this summit, there were opened a library and the Center for Arab Studies (BibliASPA) in Sao Paulo, where festivals of Arab culture, film festivals and exhibitions were organized. The number of translations into Spanish and Portuguese of outstanding literary works of Arab culture increased. In July 2012, Brazil hosted a seminar “Hand in Hand for Maintaining Peace in the Middle East: The Role of Diasporas,” which explored the role of Jewish and Arab diasporas in the Middle East peace process.

During the first meeting of the energy ministers of two regions in 2013 in Buenos Aires, there was adopted an action program for mutual investment in oil and gas exploration, exchange of experience and new technologies, and joint projects. In April 2014, Peru hosted a meeting of ministers of health from Latin American and Arab states and adopted an action plan

for 2014-2016, with the development of specific steps to combat diseases. Brazil presented its achievements in this area and in solving social problems.

Through the Forum for East Asia and Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC), Brazil continued to cooperate with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. During the presidency of D. Rousseff, were made efforts to strengthen its institutional foundations and develop plans to improve political, trade, economic, investment and scientific and technical cooperation. Brazil took the initiative to create a network of universities in the Asia-Pacific and Latin America under the auspices of the FEALAC.

Under D. Rousseff, cooperation within BRIC acquired strategic importance. At the III Summit (2011, Sanya, China), South Africa was admitted to the organization, the geographical representation in BRIC expanded, and BRIC turned into BRICS. The summit adopted a Declaration and Action Plan, which was aimed at deepening cooperation and defining new areas of interaction within the framework of the Millennium Declaration.

The IV Summit (2012, New Delhi) deepened the coordination of actions of the BRICS countries in international forums and within the group and laid the foundation for the third pillar of trans-regional cooperation - financial. There was made a fundamental decision to establish the BRICS Bank in order to finance infrastructure projects and ensure sustainable development of its member states.

The V Summit (2013, Durban) was held under the slogan “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialization”. It approved the feasibility of creating a BRICS Development Bank with an initial capital of \$ 100 billion. The summit also created the BRICS Business Council and the BRICS Think Tank Council.

At the VI Summit (2014, Fortaleza), the slogan was put forward: “Inclusive Growth: Solutions for Sustainable Development”. There were signed the constituent documents of the BRICS Development, was taken the decision to create the Reserve Currency Pool. A Memorandum of Understanding on Technical Cooperation between BRICS Credit Institutions was adopted, as well as an Agreement between BRICS National Development Banks for Cooperation in the Field of Innovation. In 2014, cooperation within BRICS was carried out in 30 different areas, like agriculture, science and technology, culture, space exploration, internet governance and security, social security, intellectual property, healthcare, tourism, etc.

At the VII BRICS Summit (2015, Ufa), was confirmed the decision to establish the BRICS Bank with a capital of \$ 100 billion and the Reserve Currency Pool. It was raised the question of the BRICS Energy Association, a mobile operating system BRICS, and the pairing in the future of two mega-projects: the Silk Road economic zone and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In the adopted “Ufa Declaration”, the leaders of the BRICS “five” raised the acute issue of reforming the UN and the IMF.

Brazilian-Chinese relations have acquired the character of a global strategic partnership based on multilevel dialogue and cooperation in various fields, from the space to the coordination of joint actions on political and economic issues on the world stage. In 2013, the trade between countries reached an amount exceeding \$ 90 billion, which strengthened the PRC as a leading trading partner of Brazil. At the same time, experts noted the “cautious” attitude of Brazil, as the leader of Mercosur, to the conclusion of a full-fledged FTA with China in connection with the fear of further growth of an uncontrolled influx of Chinese goods into the markets of South American countries. Thus, there was a

certain dichotomy in BRICS between the desire for “cooperation of civilizations” on the one hand, and the view of China as an increasingly dangerous competitor, on the other. In this regard, Brazil’s relations with India became more and more important; the trade increased and amounted to \$ 7 billion in 2012.

As for Russia, a full-fledged strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and Brazil, the intention to create which was announced in 1997, was not achieved. The main thing was the lag in trade, economic and investment cooperation, especially noticeable against the background of the unprecedented growth of the Brazilian-Chinese and Brazilian-Indian trade turnover. The maximum turnover of mutual trade between countries was reached in 2008 (\$ 6,7 billion), and later it has not grown. The task of bringing it to \$10 billion was not achieved, despite the fact that the relations of both countries from 2000 to 2012 got a solid legal basis. Mineral fertilizers continued to occupy the leading positions in Russian exports to Brazil. Since 2010, the supplies of Russian ferrous metallurgy products, including rolled products and ferroalloys, have increased, as the export volumes of crude oil and mechanical engineering products.

In the structure of Brazilian exports to the Russian Federation, goods with a low degree of processing also prevailed. Brazil covered 67% of Russia’s import needs for raw sugar, 57% in frozen beef, 47% in pork, 41% in soybeans, 21% in coffee and 12% in poultry. During this period, special attention was paid to the visit of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation S. Shoigu to Brazil in October 2013, where were discussed plans of military-technical cooperation.

Development of strategic partnership relations with the European Union remained an important area of Brazilian foreign policy under D. Rousseff.

At the V EU-Brazil Summit (2011, Brussels), the parties prepared a Joint Action Plan until 2014, which contained specific measures to achieve the set goals:

- Promoting peace and comprehensive security through the creation of an effective multilateral system;
- Enhancing economic, social and environmental partnerships to promote sustainable development;
- Promoting regional cooperation;
- Development of science, technology and innovation;
- Expansion of contacts between peoples and cultural exchanges.

This vision for European-Brazilian cooperation was reflected in a number of new agreements: on air transport, culture, tourism, cooperation in peaceful space exploration, as well as in science, technology and innovation, in the creation of a special EU-Brazil Commission on Climate Change. Brazil and the EU have become leaders in the use of renewable energy sources, regularly exchanging advances in bioenergy in the framework of the G-20, in the Global Bioenergy Partnership, in the International Organization for Effective Energy Cooperation (IPEEC). During the Brussels summit, the European Investment Bank and the Brazilian National Bank for Social and Economic Development (BNDES) signed a € 500 million loan agreement for the implementation of renewable energy and energy saving projects.

Three agreements were signed between the European Commission and Brazil: on the development of tourism between the EU and the countries of South America; on the development of cooperation in the peaceful exploration of space and

on the expansion of scientific cooperation between the EU Joint Research Center and the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation of Brazil in the fields of natural disaster prevention, climate change and the use of natural resources, energy, food security, biotechnology, information and nanotechnology. The Joint Cultural Program 2011-2014 was adopted.

In 2012, Brazil and the EU had the ample opportunities for interaction in solving global problems, such as UN reform, climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, conflict prevention, dialogue on humanitarian aid, etc. This was facilitated by the growth of Brazil's economic and political influence, and the volume of its foreign exchange and financial reserves, which allowed it to turn from a chronic debtor to a creditor to the IMF in 2012. In 2012, Brazil became the eighth trading partner of the EU, which accounted for 2,2% of the total trade turnover of this association (10th among imports and 8th place - for exports).

In 2012, about 90% of EU exports to Brazil were from the automotive, aviation and chemical industries. Transport equipment and machinery accounted for 49% of exports and chemicals for 21%. The main imports from Brazil to the EU were soybeans, cake, iron ore, coffee and crude oil (over 70%). The share of raw materials was 35%, while food products accounted for 28% of Brazilian exports to the EU.

The VI Brazil-EU Summit was held in January 2013 in Brasilia, concurrently with the I-st EU-CELAC Meeting. Brazil and the EU approved the decision to create a commission to promote mutual investment and to intensify negotiations on the creation of an EU-MERCOSUR FTA. In a joint declaration, the parties stated "strengthening their strategic partnership" based on a commitment to democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, promotion of sustainable development, social inclusion

and the protection of peace and security. The Action Plan for 2012-2014 covered 30 areas of cooperation in such areas as trade and investment, energy and climate, security and conflict prevention. Brazil and the EU have increased humanitarian aid and cooperation for development, education, science and technology, as well as migration problem and regional integration.

The VII Summit (February, 2014), adopted the Action Plan for 2015-2017, providing for its implementation through a new EU financial instrument - the Partnership Instrument, which is responsible for allocating the budget for foreign policy activities within the framework of the strategy "Europe -2020", as well as through regional and thematic programs. Brazil took an active part in all European educational programs intended for Latin American countries, in particular under the Erasmus, Alban and ALFA III programs.

The Brazilian National Confederation of Industry within the framework of the AL-INVEST program, continued to participate in international exhibitions, expand advertising activities and coordinate the work of industrial enterprises. The Brazilian National Research Network and the National Telecommunications Agency (ANATEL), under the LIS program, developed projects for the telecommunication systems, information infrastructure and information security.

A number of ministries developed programs for social protection of the population and the creation of new jobs, the development of social infrastructure, projects to combat poverty in cities and in individual prefectures within the framework of various stages of European programs (in particular, URB-AL and EUROsociAL). Brazil's National Secretariat for Drug Policy (SENAD) has worked with the EU under the COPOLAD program, and the Foreign Ministry has dealt with climate projects under

the EUROCLIMA program. In line with the LAIF program, Brazil has paid increased attention to environmental protection, monitored programs to protect and restore rainforests, and made efforts to create transport infrastructure that does not harm the climate and habitat.

Since 2010, LAIF program has launched 20 projects in Brazil with a total value of 4,2 billion euros (the EU allocated 160,6 million) for technical assistance to protect the environment and the development of renewable energy sources (Brazil accounted for 0,9% of this amount).

Since 2012, a program for the development of the energy sector with a total value of 214,5 million euro has been implemented in the country together with LAIF. The development of renewable and clean energy sources became one of the foundations of the partnership between Brazil and the EU. 45% of Brazil's energy comes from renewable sources such as hydro-power and biofuels. Brazil is the largest exporter of ethanol to the EU and has the largest ethanol production potential in the world.

Hence, the strategic partnership between EU and Brazil has steadily expanded, the benefits of mutual cooperation, which extended to all sectors of the economy and social sphere, required its transfer to a higher institutional level. Unfortunately, the favorable trends towards the EU that emerged in 2012 and the outlined plans for cooperation soon came under threat due to the acute economic and socio-political crisis that gripped Brazil. Serious difficulties still stood in the way of concluding a trans-regional FTA, in particular, in the form of a common agricultural policy of the European Union.

Continuity in the country's foreign policy during the presidency of D. Rouseff, of course, was stated almost everywhere

and by everyone. However, it was also noted that this policy was somewhat reactive and more pragmatic in nature, associated with less diplomatic activity. Most observers saw the reason in the personnel decisions of D. Rousseff, who was “cool” about foreign policy in general. The fact of her lack of political charisma, equal to Lula’s unquestionable charisma, and, of course, the objective circumstances mentioned above did not work in Dilma’s favor either.

In general, during the presidency of D. Rousseff, Brazil reduced its activity on the world stage, not taking advantage of opportunities of 2011-2012 to consolidate previous successes. To the end of 2013, Brazil’s foreign policy began to see a departure from the principles of “party membership”, fundament of Lula’s foreign policy. But D. Rousseff failed to observe a reasonable measure between “excessive involvement” in world processes of Lula da Silva’ times and “unjustified detachment”, to which was reduced her foreign policy. This process began with the cooling of relations with Iran, which marked the first year of Dilma’s rule.

Subsequent events only confirmed this. Many observers considered as major mistakes the admission of Venezuela to Mercosur, the deterioration of relations with Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay and the cooling with the United States, the failure to sign the agreement on Mercosur-EU FTA, Brazil’s non-participation in the Munich Security Conference in 2014. Separately, it was worth considering the decline in the prestige and influence of Itamaraty in the country and abroad, the decrease in funding for the Foreign Ministry, which forced the diplomats in

2014-2016 to reduce their participation in significant events (for example, within the BRICS), which seriously undermined the exercise of influence through “soft power”, etc. In the fall of 2015, the rating of Dilma Rousseff fell in Brazil to an incredible 3% (!).

A number of Brazilian researchers, in particular, Oliver Stunkel from the J. Vargas Foundation and José Flavio Saraiva, from the University of Brasilia, believed that the Brazil’s presidential form of government is too restrictive in foreign policy, providing insufficient initiative to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as an institution, responsible for foreign policy. This, in their opinion, reduced its importance in shaping Brazil’s foreign policy.

Already during the presidential campaign in 2014, when many mistakes of the executive power in foreign policy became apparent, the public voiced a proposal to create a Foreign Policy Council, a special foreign trade agency, and to reduce various kinds of restrictions on a diplomatic career. In the appeal of the “Group of Wise Men”, which included representatives of various social movements, political parties, NGOs and academia, the priority strategic goals and those concrete achievements that were made during the years of the PT party’s tenure were noted. This:

1. The acquisition of greater autonomy and influence in the international arena, which manifested in opposition to the invasion of Iraq, in a proposal for mediation in negotiations with Iran, in the recognition of a Palestinian state, in an immediate reaction to the coups in Honduras and Paraguay, in an increase of Brazil’s representation in international organizations (WTO, FAO), speaking in favor of democratizing international relations and expanding the membership of the UN Security

Council, for reforming international financial institutions, for cooperation in BRICS, diversifying partnerships and expanding South-South ties.

2. Strengthening regional integration through UNASUR, CELAC and Mercosur.

Since April 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to make efforts to enhance the exchange of views with civil society in the form of “Foreign Policy Dialogues”. The received recommendations had to form the basis of the White Paper on Foreign Policy. The impeachment of D. Rousseff, however, prevented the implementation of these plans.

“Save and Increase”

Michel Temer, leader of the Brazilian Party of the Democratic Movement (PMDB), who took office on August 31, 2016, immediately faced political instability and deepening economic and social problems caused by the global economic and financial crisis and the impeachment of D. Rousseff. The main task of the new president was to bring the country out of the systemic crisis and stimulate sustainable economic growth by attracting new investments, obtaining advanced technologies and expanding sales markets.

Picture 34 - Michel Temer



Source: Author/photographer - Official photo of President Michel Temer taken at the Alvorada Palace, 2017.

The new Foreign Minister, Jose Serra²⁵ in his first speech made it clear that Brazilian diplomacy will not deviate from the principles of universalism, but will change the orientation of the foreign policy that had been pursued over the past 14 years. Diplomacy, he said, “should serve Brazil as a whole, and not the benefits and ideological preferences of a certain political party and its allies abroad” and “proceed from the interests of the state and the nation, and not the government and, moreover, the party”.

25 José Serra is a Brazilian economist and prominent representative of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB). An experienced politician who has served as Minister of Planning (1995-1996), Minister of Health (1998-2002), Mayor of São Paulo (since 2004). He ran for President of Brazil in 2002.

Picture 35 - Jose Serra



Source:URL: Author/Photographer - Rovena Rosa – 20.jun.2016/ Agência Brasil.

The most significant innovation of Temer government in the Latin American direction was the change of course towards Venezuela, whose “Bolivarian” government until then enjoyed the unlimited support of Brazilian PT. The initial message came from Venezuela, whose president, N. Maduro, reacted negatively to D. Rousseff’s impeachment, calling it a coup d’etat, which was inspired by the United States. Maduro recalled the Venezuelan ambassador from Brasilia and suspended economic ties with Brazil. The Governments of Bolivia and Ecuador have done the same.

In response, Brazil, supported by Argentina and Paraguay, suspended Venezuela’s membership in Mercosur and refused to admit Bolivia. In August 2017, the government of M. Temer supported the initiative of Peru to convene an UNASUR conference in Lima to consider the “Venezuelan issue”. The participants in the conference (members of the so-called “Lima group”- Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru) agreed

not to recognize the Constitutional Assembly convened by the “Bolivarian regime” and its adopted laws.

It had to be admitted that the crisis in Brazilian-Venezuelan relations during the presidency of M. Temer was connected with not only the impeachment of D. Rousseff or some ideological motives. The difficult socio-economic situation in Venezuela began to affect negatively on the situation in the Brazilian state of Roraima, which borders it. The mass exodus of Venezuelans to this underdeveloped Amazonian state, where the population density was only 1,5 to 2,5 people per sq. km., threatened with a humanitarian catastrophe there.²⁶ The Yanomami Indians living in Roraima also displayed secessionist tendencies on several occasions, and the federal government feared that the humanitarian crisis could be exacerbated by an identity crisis. On January 30, 2017, the Brazilian authorities decided to ban the entry of Venezuelan citizens through the territory of Roraima, which did not add warmth to relations between the states.

By that time, in Latin America, appeared the same split between the “left” and “right” governments, which was observed in the 1970s. This split has called into question the existence of collective institutions such as, Mercosur, UNASUR, CELAC, ALBA, whose existence was threatened by the change of government in Bolivia and Ecuador in 2019.

Brazil had not yet fully recovered from a severe internal political crisis, but faced the threat of losing the assets previously accumulated in Latin America. The task of Brazil’s diplomacy was to preserve those South American structures that had been created earlier under its auspices. Previously, however, it

26 According to Human Rights Watch, in 2014 1,340 people left Venezuela there, then in 2016 more than 7,000

was necessary to abandon their “excessive ideologization”. The fatigue of South Americans from excessive declarativeness, which characterized the activities of most left-turn governments in the past years, was well demonstrated by the example of the Pacific Alliance (PA), which includes Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile. The creators of this highly successful association deliberately refused to give it an ideological coloring, focusing exclusively on economic and trade issues.

In October 2016, M. Temer visited Argentina and Paraguay. The main issues during these visits were the strengthening of Mercosur, the development of border areas, infrastructure and trade. In March 2017, negotiations on the conclusion of a trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur intensified in order to expand access of Brazilian exports to the EU market and to increase European investment in the Brazilian economy. M. Temer’s government made the active efforts to bring Mercosur and PA closer. The first meeting of the presidents of the countries of Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, held in the summer of 2018 in Puerto Vallarta (Mexico), contributed to the further rapprochement of Mercosur and PA. M. Temer called this meeting a “historical imperative”, the prospect of uniting “liberal economies open to the world”, which could become “a qualitatively new stage in the development of Latin American integration”.

In its contacts with PA Brazil relied on existing bilateral treaties and new agreements. The agreement on economic cooperation with Mexico (2015) was supplemented by new documents, and by 2018 bilateral trade restored, reached \$ 9,41 billion (2012-2013 - \$ 10 billion).

Mexico and Brazil concentrated 65% of the GDP of Latin America and the largest inflow of foreign investment. Mutual investments of both countries were estimated at \$ 30 billion.

The liberalization of bilateral trade contributed to the conclusion of a new trade agreement between Mercosur and Colombia.

In October 2018, Brazil signed a free trade agreement with Chile, which complemented the economic cooperation agreement between Chile and Mercosur. This led to increase trade and investment flows between the countries, interaction in the science and technology, in the defense sector, in the development of regional infrastructure and common activity in Antarctica. In 2018, the volume of Brazilian-Chilean trade amounted to \$ 9.77 billion. Chilean investments in the pulp and paper industry, energy and trade in Brazil reached \$ 35 billion, while Brazil invested in the food, steel, pharmaceutical industries in Chile more than \$ 4.5 billion.

Relations between Brazil and Peru developed within the framework of a strategic partnership, both countries strengthened trade ties, expanding cooperation for the effective use and protection of the Amazon territory. All these figures and facts refuted the opinion of those representatives of the “left wave” who considered PA an “artificial formation” created by the United States in opposition to Mercosur, with whom they considered “unprofitable” to cooperate.

At first, the future of the PA project was indeed associated with support from Washington. These calculations, however, turned out to be untenable after the Trump administration refused to create the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), where the PA states didn't enter automatically. The US evasion of its promises and increased trade protectionism in Washington's policy towards the Pacific countries of Latin America were criticized at the Mercosur-PA summit in Puerto Vallarta.

Seeking to strengthen Mercosur, in March 2018 Brazil initiated negotiations on FTA agreement between Mercosur,

Canada, and organized summits with Singapore, South Korea and EFTA representatives (Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) to conclude similar agreements.

After the self-dissolution of UNASUR, created under its auspices the South American Defense Council was also frozen. The regional unification - CELAC - the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, where the left governments of Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua and Mexico de facto remained in the minority, was also under threat. Ideological contradictions in CELAC, associated with the “right turn” in a number of countries, were most clearly manifested during the crisis in Venezuela, and then in Nicaragua, which led to a split among its members and almost two years of paralysis of this structure.

In the current situation, the 15th meeting of foreign ministers in New York (September 2018) discussed measures to normalize the activities of CELAC. At the same time, five priority themes were identified: ensuring food security and eradicating hunger, promoting international cooperation, reducing the risk of natural disasters and deepening ties with non-regional partners. Brazil’s role was limited to mediating diplomatic crises.

The successful completion in 2017 of the UN Mission to Stabilize the Situation in Haiti (MINUSTAN), which had been led by Brazil since 2004, strengthened the country’s positive image in Latin America.

Relations with the United States have not undergone a radical improvement. In a special bulletin “United States Relations with Brazil”, compiled in the office of Deputy Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs in February 2018, spoke about the “stable” nature of US relations with the “ninth economy in the world”. It was noted the cooperation of these countries in the UN Commission on Human Rights in ensuring the rights of LGBT

and people with disabilities, protecting a free press, including the Internet, etc.

In March 2017, Washington signed a framework agreement with Brasilia on the exchange of information in the field of research and development of new weapons systems, and the negotiations on nuclear nonproliferation issues were resumed. There was no need to talk about any serious link between Brazil and the American military-industrial complex, because there were no specific agreements on defense reached during that period.

The deepening of American trade protectionism had complicated the development of bilateral trade. The imposition of an embargo on the export of meat from Brazil led to countermeasures: the government of M. Temer imposed tariffs on the supply of American ethanol. Donald Trump's statements about his intention to introduce tariffs on imports of aluminum and steel, which ran counter not only to the interests of Brazil, but also of Canada, the EU and Mexico, further complicated the situation.

Brazil's hopes of attracting American investment in infrastructure projects did not materialize. In this regard, all talk about "right correcting" of Brazil's foreign policy under President Temer should have been abandoned and looked at it from a slightly different angle. The departure from the old ideologized attitudes did not mean a transition to some new ones, but only indicated Brazil's desire to "live within its means" in the face of the struggle against the consequences of an unprecedented internal political crisis.

M. Temer's "presidential diplomacy" was not active (6 visits in 2016, 9 in 2017, 11 in 2018), and this is understandable. The crisis situation in the country required the presence of the head of state. M. Temer preferred to make such international trips

and participate in international forums where could be resolved problems that were directly related to the development of the country. Among the foreign visits to the countries, it should be especially highlight hisvisits to China, Russia, and Japan.

M. Temer made his first foreign visit as head of state to China in September 2016. He participated in the Brazilian-Chinese business seminar, which resulted in the signing of a number of bilateral agreements. A year later, the President made a state visit to the PRC associated with the 45th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Brazil and China. During a meeting with Xi Jing Ping, M. Temer emphasized the role of China as the main investor in the large infrastructure facilities in Brazil: airports, sea terminals, etc.

In 2016, more than 40% of the goods that came to Brazil from China were electronics and equipment. Huawei brand owned 35% in the mobile phone market in Brazil. The task of the president was to channel Chinese investment into those industries that could form the basis of the country's modern economy. Following the visit, 14 agreements were signed in hydropower, railways, the film industry and sports. Chinese technology, investments in infrastructure and assistance in scientific and technological development (space and nuclear technologies) were supposed to help Brazil finally get off the "raw material needle".

In September 2016, the President of Brazil visited Japan for the first time for many years of bilateral relations. The goal was the same: strengthening and developing trade, scientific and technical ties. The task was easier because there were 700 Japanese enterprises in Brazil, and the Japanese diaspora in Brazil is the largest in the world. At a meeting with representatives of Japanese business, M. Temer promised to take measures

to guarantee macroeconomic stability and legal protection to investment. Japan and Brazil signed an agreement on cooperation in infrastructure facilities: airports, railways and energy facilities.

Another area was interaction with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which unites the most developed states of the planet. Brazil became a member of the OECD Development Center in 1997, and in 2015 applied to join this structure, having the status of a “key partner”. Adopted joint work program for 2016-2017 outlined the indicators for Brazil in various areas, necessary for the country to become a full member of the OECD. Membership in this prestigious organization provides quick access to technology, knowledge, information and training.

To this end, in 2017, the structure of the Agency for Cooperation under the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (ABC) was improved: there appeared 10 departments for the implementation of technical cooperation projects with individual groups of countries - with African countries (CGAA), with Portuguese-speaking countries and East Timor (CGPALOP), with international organizations (CGTPI), etc. Over the 30 years of its existence, ABC has carried out more than 7,000 projects in 108 countries around the world, where 124 Brazilian institutions have participated. Since 2016, this agency began to coordinate government humanitarian efforts in emergencies.

The results of the pragmatic policy of M. Temer government in the international arena was evidenced by the fact that the decline in export by 12% in 2011–2014, which negatively affected the economic situation of the country, in 2016–2018 managed to overcome. Export and import of the country during

this period showed progressive growth with a positive trade balance.

Table 3 - Brazil's main trading partners (\$ billions)

	2016	2017	2018	2018		2016	2017	2018	2018
Export (total)	185,2	217,7	242	%	Import (total)	137,6	150,7	173	%
China	19,0	21,8	64,3	26,5	China	17,0	18,1	33,9	19,6
US	12,6	12,4	29,3	12,1	US	17,5	16,6	29,3	16,9
Argentina	7,2	8,1	15	6,19	Argentina	6,6	6,3	11	6,37
Netherlands	5,6	4,2	11,9	4,92	Germany	6,6	6,1	11,1	6,44
Japan	2,5	2,4	4,46	1,84	S. Korea	4,0	3,5	5,05	2,92
Chile	2,2	2,3	6,45	2,66	Mexico	2,6	2,8	4,61	2,67
Germany	2,6	2,3	5,33	2,2	Italy	2,7	2,6	4,56	2,64
India	1,7	2,1	4,02	1,66	Japan	2,6	2,5	4,12	2,38
Mexico	2,2	2,2	4,68	1,93	France	2,7	2,5	5,12	2,96

Source: Compiled from: <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/bra/>

Changes have taken place in the geographic structure of foreign trade. China's share in Brazilian exports in 2018 increased to 26,5%. The share of the USA (12,1%), Argentina, the Netherlands increased, exports to Japan, India, Germany, as well as to Chile and Mexico increased. Exports to Canada (1,43%) and South Korea (1,44%) began increasing. Serious shifts were also observed in Brazil's imports: the share of China (19,6%), the United States (16,9%), Argentina (6,37%) and Germany (6,44%) rose sharply. Imports from South Korea, Italy, Mexico, Japan, France, as well as India (2,0%) and Saudi Arabia (1,32%) grew significantly. In 2018, Brazil was ranked 25th in terms of export and 30th in terms of imports in the world. In 2018, the EU accounted for 31,4% of exports and 29,2% of imports (in 2019, respectively, 32,3% and 26,7%).

A significant part of Brazilian exports were soybeans, iron ore, oil products, raw sugar, and grain. The share of high-tech products increased (from 5.0% in 2015 to 6.8% in 2017), primarily in the category of “vehicles”, which includes cars, aircraft (Brazil ranks fourth in the world in terms of their sales abroad), rolling stock, river vessels and spare parts for them. The finished products accounted for 53-55% of Brazil’s total exports in the first decade of the new century. The imports were dominated by mineral fuels, fertilizers, light ships and dredgers. The share of electrical household goods and modern electronics, including computers and phones, has grown. For Brazil, markets for both industrial and agricultural products are equally important - meat and meat products, ethanol, sugar, soybeans, coffee, corn, milk, rice, fertilizers, and leather.

In the regional, South American market, the country acts as the main supplier of engineering and industrial products. The leading role is played by the export of cars and spare parts for them to the market of Argentina. In recent years, Brazil has switched to the export of technological lines and entire enterprises.

The merit of M. Temer’s government is the growth of FDI in the Brazilian economy. In 2018, the country became the 9th recipient in the world in terms of FDI (\$ 59 billion in 2016, \$ 88,3 billion in 2019). According to UNCTAD data, this volume accounted for 28% of the total FDI in Latin America, which indicated that negative trends in the Brazilian economy were overcoming and that its attractiveness for foreign capital was growing.

Pragmatism in foreign policy M. Temer did not mean, however, Brazil’s refusal to build a global projection. “Preserve and increase” - to preserve the best and increase the achievements

of predecessors, could well be considered the guiding principle of his foreign and domestic policy. Pragmatism in this context should have automatically combined with globalism.

Brazil continued to work actively in the UN and its specialized structures, engage in peacekeeping activities, and attend major international platforms where the main trends in world development were determined. In 2017, the country signed the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty, supported the UN General Assembly resolution against recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, believing that this step can only increase tensions in the Middle East. Brazil advocated a comprehensive political settlement in Syria and ratified the Paris Climate Agreement in 2017.

At the G-20 summits, Brazil took steps to improve its image in the eyes of the world community. At the summit in Shanghai (September 2016), where one of the main topics was innovative economic growth, inclusive development and support for the SDG-2030 agenda, M. Temer spoke about the government's measures to bring the country's economy out of the crisis. Despite the difficult domestic political situation, the President attended the Hamburg summit (July 2017). At the summit in Argentina, (2018), M. Temer supported the need to strengthen the key institutions of global governance, and the overdue reform of the WTO.

M. Temer denied the predictions, that with his coming to the presidency, Brazil will leave the BRICS or its participation in this "polylogue of civilizations" will become purely formal. In 2016, the New Development Bank (NDB) provided Brazil with a \$ 300 million loan to create generating facilities based on renewable energy sources. The country took part in the work of the VIII BRICS Summit (Goa, 2016), where terrorism was condemned in

all its forms and manifestations. The BRICS countries called for the strengthening of international norms conducive to stability and for cooperation on intellectual property and digital economy issues.

At the Goa summit, M. Temer urged his colleagues to invest in infrastructure and energy projects in Brazil, reassuring them that the measures taken by his government ensure the reliability of future investments and a high rate of return. On the sidelines of the summit, M. Temer and Indian Prime Minister N. Modi signed a number of agreements on the development of pharmaceuticals, agriculture, and the development of natural resources.

At the IX BRICS Summit (Xiamen, 2017), the countries noted the revitalization of the NDB, condemned the growth of protectionism in world trade, and spoke in favor of expanding cooperation, overcoming differences and looking for new ways of interaction and coordination on regional and international problems. A few weeks before this summit, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, as part of a dialogue forum held in the PRC, adopted a three-year action plan for 2017-2020 on the development of cooperation in the innovation sphere.

The X BRICS Summit, held in South Africa, was dedicated to African problems. All participants spoke in favor of a fairer formula for economic cooperation with African countries and for the convergence of their positions on the most pressing international problems. Noting the growth in the number of accepted projects within the framework of the general development strategy, the countries spoke in favor of expanding mutual settlements in national currency. Particular attention was paid to the idea of spreading the BRICS + “outreach” system (or integration of integrations), when each country, being a leader in its region,

can invite its neighbors in the region to the BRICS summits or represent their interests.

On June 17, 2017, Michel Temer paid an official visit to Russia. Prior to this, at the end of May, the X meeting of the Intergovernmental Russian-Brazilian Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation took place. It agreed on a large-scale program to increase trade flows and diversify export-import operations with an emphasis on high-tech products. Among the main topics, the partners discussed the possibility of joint launches of space rockets from the Brazilian cosmodrome Alcantara located near the equator. The opening in 2017 in Itazhuba (Minas Gerais state) of a joint optoelectronic complex for detecting and changing the parameters of space debris movement was an example of successful cooperation between countries. At the same time, with the assistance of the Roscosmos corporation, four stations of the “Glonass” (Global navigation system) were put into operation in Brazil.

In Moscow, M. Temer met with the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Chairmen of the State Duma and the Federation Council, and also held several meetings with major Russian investors. During the visit, it was decided to strengthen the strategic foreign policy dialogue, including within the framework of the UN, BRICS, G-20 and other international forums. The leaders of the countries expressed concern about the strengthening of protectionism in international trade and reaffirmed their readiness to promote the increase, diversification and liberalization of trade flows. There were the “Joint Statement of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Russian Federation on Strategic Foreign Policy Coordination”, the Plan of Political Consultations of the Foreign Ministries of two countries, and the Memorandum on Cooperation

in Science, Technology, Innovation and Investment Development among the signed documents. These documents, like a number of those adopted earlier, aimed at further strengthening the strategic partnership and building up mutual trade. The Presidents drew attention to the possibility of expanding cooperation in the energy and nuclear fields, in oil and natural gas exploration, in biotechnology, etc. The readiness to strengthen military-technical cooperation was noted. Separately, it should be noted that Brazil, like other Latin American countries, after 2014 did not join the anti-Russian sanctions and did not withdraw from the visa-free regime in relations with Russia. A positive response to these steps was the increase of Brazilian agricultural exports to our country in 2017 and an increase, albeit small, of Russian investments in the Brazilian economy, which reached \$ 1,5 billion the same year.

Assessing the results of President Michel Temer administration, one cannot but draw parallels with the activities of another former vice-president, Itamar Franco, who also took the highest state post in the country after the impeachment of President Fernando Collor. Their merits as “crisis managers” turned out to be quite high, although they, due to their lack of personal charisma and the very circumstances of getting to this post, did not leave any particularly vivid memories of themselves. I. Franco and M. Temer were able to increase exports in a short time, overcome galloping inflation, cope with the growth of unemployment and partially restore the country’s image abroad. However, if Itamar was able to overcome the moral and psychological crisis in Brazilian society in order to ensure Brazil the next two

steps forward (under the administrations of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula da Silva), then Dilma Rousseff's successor, Michel Temer, did not fully succeed.

The problem lay both in the depth of the new moral and psychological crisis that shook Brazilian society and in its scope. In conditions of almost total awareness of everyone about everything, which has increased many times compared to the 1990s, corruption scandals that have been unfolding almost non-stop since 2005, have seriously undermined the foundations of Brazilian society. The "washing out" of the PT elite during these scandals of the most prepared people to run the state made Lula opt for Dilma Rousseff. Corruption scandals, one after another, continued during the years of Dilma's presidency. Her impeachment did not draw a line under the mass protests of the population, but only opened a new phase of the political crisis.

The measures taken by M. Temer to improve the economy (a moratorium on increasing government spending, curtailing the rights of trade unions, plans for a pension reform, etc.) caused a sharp rejection in society. In mid-2017, corruption charges were brought against him. At the same time, a guilty verdict was passed against Lula, which was soon increased to 12 years. In April 2018, the former president, who managed to lift about 30 million people out of poverty, was imprisoned for acquiring a two-level apartment in the resort suburb of Sao Paulo.

The history of Brazil at the beginning of the twenty-first century has shown that in a number of cases "medicine" ("fighting corruption") turns out to be worse than the disease itself. As a result of this "treatment", Brazil was thrown back in economic development by about a decade ago, with serious damage to its international image. By the date of the new presidential

elections in 2018, society was gripped by a mood of uncertainty and distrust of any well-known political figures.

Against the backdrop of disappointment in the power of those who hold on to the ongoing corruption scandals, an unprecedented rampant crime, the indices of which went off scale and took Brazil to one of the first places in the world in terms of criminal activity, the emergence of a politician who promised to change dramatically the situation and quickly solve all problems became inevitable. Hence the inevitable comparison with the situation of 1990, which brought to life the figure of a “regular” politician - the populist F. Collor, who was able to deftly take advantage of the “anti-system” sentiments of the masses.

Jair Mesias Bolsonaro, a former military man, a member of the lower house of parliament since 1990, became such an “old politician in a new performance”. In the second round of voting, held on October 28, 2018, Bolsonaro defeated PT candidate F. Addad with 55% of the vote to 44.8%.

The Anti-diplomacy of Jair Bolsonaro: An Exception That Proves The Rule.

The coming to power of Jair Bolsanaru on January 1, 2019, dramatically changed Brazil’s foreign policy. For an exhaustive description of his political views, one phrase was enough: “I am a fan of Trump. He wants to make America great again, and I want to make Brazil great”.

During his election campaign, Bolsonaro spoke of the need to fully strengthen Brazil’s ties with the United States and countries such as Israel, Japan and Taiwan. He declared himself an enemy of the left-wing radical regimes - Venezuela and Cuba, advocating a departure from South-South cooperation and for

preferential interaction with Western countries. China, the country's main foreign trade partner, was accused of "not buying from Brazil, but buying it". Latin American integration was no longer considered by him as a special task for Brazil, the emphasis was on cooperation only with those Latin American countries that adhered to a right-wing conservative course - Argentina (under M. Macri), Chile, Paraguay, Colombia and Peru.

J. Bolsonaro appointed a professional diplomat, former head of the Department of the USA, Canada and Inter-American Relations of the Foreign Ministry Ernesto Araujo as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The latter, who was considered an "eccentric personality" in Itamaraty, always diligently emphasized his pro-American sentiments and was even a more ardent supporter of D. Trump's foreign policy than the newly elected president. The ideological "guru" of both was the equally eccentric self-proclaimed "philosopher" Olavo de Carvalho, who lives in the United States. He, in turn, was guided by the views of one of the leaders of the American far-right - Steve Bannon. Araujo's rhetoric was more like an abstract philosophical discourse, not much like the speeches of a professional diplomat. According to one of his ideas, Brazil and the entire Western world are under the threat of "cultural Marxism" - an ideology allegedly founded and propagated by "powerful globalist forces" with "explicitly socialist" goals.

The Brazilian media, hinting at the incompetence of the minister appointed to this post by a narrow circle of people headed by Olavo de Carvalho, called him "the division commander who was appointed commander of the army". Araujo believed that over the past 25 years, Brazilian foreign policy had a consensus based on a political system that threatened to stifle the nation with corruption, economic stagnation, moral crisis and military

weakening, and a diminution of its international role. “President Bolsonaro and I are restoring the true diplomatic tradition of a free country, sovereign, proud of itself, aware of its capabilities and responsibility to improve the good of all mankind”.

Carvalho, Araujo and the president’s sons - federal deputy Eduardo and senator from the state of Rio de Janeiro, Flavio Bolsonaro, formed the backbone of so-called “olavists”, on whom the head of state relied. The ideology of the “Olavists” couldn’t be called “liberal”: following their idol, D. Trump, they opposed globalization, which, in their opinion, brought people only misfortune: poverty, social inequality, destruction of biodiversity, racial and gender discrimination. Here is a deactivation of the course towards regional integration, including to Mercosur and further - towards the creation of South American and transcontinental FTA.

Nevertheless, they could not be called “nationalists” either, since their whole idea of the “greatness” of Brazil was based on the unconditional subordination of Brazilian foreign policy to the interests of the United States. The alignment of the Brazilian leadership with Washington’s opinion was clearly traced in the structural changes of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry: in order to deal with US, there was created a separate department, and Europe was assigned to the jurisdiction of the Department of Africa and the Middle East.

The rhetoric of J. Bolsonaro and the “Olavists” made recall the Doctrine of National Security (DNB) of the Higher Military School and the foreign policy guidelines of the first anti-communist military government of Marshal U. Castelo Branco (1964 - 1967). Bolsonaro himself has repeatedly praised the rule of the military, forgetting, however, about the evolution they went

through from “automatic alignment” with the United States to the policy of “responsible pragmatism” of the 1970s.

Picture 36 - Jair Bolsonaro (left) and E. Araujo



Source: Author/photographer – unknown. Voanews, 2018.

This did not mean, however, that the line of “Olavists” headed by the president did not encounter resistance. Vice-President A. Mourau, head of the presidential administration Braga Netto, secretary of the government Eduardo Ramos and chairman of the lower house of parliament R. Maia adhered to a more pragmatic, moderate line. Many military and businessmen opposed the ideologized foreign policy and preferred a more diversified and multilateral foreign policy, because they had serious economic interests in Latin American and Afro-Asian countries. Many prominent diplomats also spoke out against the boundless “olavism”.

The position of the military deserved special attention. Despite the fact that J. Bolsonaro, a former military man, doubled the number of representatives of the armed forces in the government (in the Presidential Administration and at the head of ministries: science and technology, health and energy), and they often exerted a restraining influence on the president's policy. Perhaps their collective memory still retains the experience of military governments, which has convincingly proved that the United States, despite any concessions from Brazil, will never accept the presence in the Western Hemisphere of any "great power" other than itself. All this was reflected in the country's foreign policy, which both local and international experts began to call "unpredictable", "contradictory" and "improvisational".

The first steps of J. Bolsonaro in the international arena testified that if D. Rousseff sometimes demonstrated a lack of professionalism in foreign policy, then J. Bolsonaro demonstrated "professionalism with a minus sign".

J. Bolsonaro made his first foreign visit to the United States in March 2018. He met with D. Trump and American experts, discussed the situation around Venezuela. One of the main results of this visit was the signing of an agreement under which the United States got access to the Alcantara launch site. They also discussed issues of cooperation in the fight against organized crime and the possibility of concluding an agreement in the field of intelligence.

The first meeting of both presidents (in 2019, J. Bolsonaro visited the United States four times!) was distinguished by the absence of concrete solutions on the most pressing, first of all, trade and economic problems, and an abundance of declarative statements. J. Bolsonaro proposed to D. Trump to develop a joint plan for the development of the Amazon, which immediately

caused a negative reaction in Brazil from environmentalists and representatives of Indian communities. In full agreement with the Middle East “logic” of D. Trump, J. Bolsonaro promised to move the Brazilian Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The desire to “please” Trump made him forget about the possible reaction of Arab countries - importers of Brazilian food. Following D. Trump, J. Bolsonaro intended to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement and the UN Global Pact on Migration, but he was aware that this would seriously complicate negotiations on FTA between Mercosur and the EU.

During J. Bolsonaro’s visit, the question of Brazil’s association with NATO was raised, but no specific agreements were reached, perhaps taking into account D. Trump’s “ambiguous” attitude to this organization. Later, on August 2, 2019, it was announced in Washington that Brazil would be given the status of a “US ally outside NATO”. This uncertain status did not mean, however, any formal linking of Brazil to the American security system, other than already existed the Inter-American Treaty on Mutual Assistance. Talk about Washington’s support for Brazil’s candidacy to join the OECD also did not go beyond promises. Having entered into negotiations on membership in this organization in 2007, Brazil is still outside its framework.

In March 2019, Jair Bolsonaro visited Israel. It is known that, like D. Trump, he received many votes in his favor from the evangelical community in Brazil. In many ways, this explained the original idea of J. Bolsonaro to move the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem²⁷. In addition to religious reasons and the desire to please Washington, the special attention of the Brazilian

27 For evangelicals, Jerusalem is the land of “God’s people” and the very existence of Israel is one of the basic conditions for the second coming of Jesus Christ.

leadership to Israel had a pragmatic motive. For some time now, Israel began to be considered Brasilia as the main supplier of modern weapons. In addition, from 2017 to 2019 the number of Brazilian tourists to Israel increased by 22%, which led to the emergence of a direct flight Sao Paulo - Tel Aviv. However, the phrase of Bolsonaro in Jerusalem that “the Holocaust can be forgiven, but cannot be forgotten,” has received harsh rebuke from the Israeli president and local media.

The promised transfer of the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem never materialized. Under the influence of the Brazilian agricultural lobby, which was concerned about the prospect of a boycott of its products by Arab countries, Bolsonaro had to confine himself to opening a “mission of interests” in Jerusalem. The cancellation of the transfer of the embassy to Jerusalem and the subsequent visit of Bolsonaro in the fall of 2019 to Arab countries could also be considered a partial victory of the “systemic opposition”.

In January 2019, E. Araujo announced the suspension of Brazil’s membership in CELAC, in April - in UNASUR. The reason was the participation in these associations of “non-democratic” states - Cuba and Venezuela. But the most irreconcilable, vividly reminiscent of the policy of the military regime of U. Castelo Branco in relation to the intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965), was the policy of J. Bolsonaro in relation to Venezuela.

In January 2019, 14 states of the so-called “Lima group”²⁸, not recognizing the legality of N. Maduro’s elections, recalled their ambassadors from Caracas. A little earlier, on February 25, at the 9th summit of the “Lima Group” opened in the capital of

28 Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras, Guyana, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, Saint Lucia, Chile Ecuador.

Colombia, US Vice President M. Pence raised the issue of the possible adoption of “more decisive” steps in favor of the self-proclaimed President of Venezuela J. Guaido. Earlier, Bolsonaro did not rule out the participation of Brazilian troops in the military aggression against Venezuela as a sign of support for US policy.

However, at the summit in Bogota, Brazilian Vice President A. Mourao rejected the possibility of an armed intervention, calling for a peaceful solution to the crisis. The other 13 members of the Lima Group agreed with him, despite their call on the remaining Latin American states to recognize the government of Guaido. It became clear that Latin American states did not want to risk the lives of their soldiers in the geopolitical games of the United States.

The countries that left UNASUR, including Brazil, created a new association PROSUR, which, according to Colombian President I. Duque, was based on “the principles of representative democracy and a free market with an emphasis on social justice”. The initiators of PROSUR, who broke off diplomatic relations with the government of N. Maduro, invited the “government” of Venezuela, headed by J. Guaido, to this new association. In connection with the events, former Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim noted that the creation of PROSUR “means a sharp turn to the right in Brazilian policy”, which could “prevent the emergence of new progressive governments in the Latin American region in the future”.

The Venezuelan crisis and the first “hundred days” of J. Bolsonaro as president showed that the foreign policy voluntarism and unprofessionalism of the “Olavists” run up against ever-growing opposition even among the president’s inner circle. This forced him, firstly, to abandon the deployment of American military bases on Brazilian territory, and, secondly, to

“untie” Brazil from participating in a possible US intervention in Venezuela. The resignation in April 2019 of an extreme right-wing figure, the Minister of Education, who was preparing to declare a large-scale hunt for the “left” in Brazil, was a telling fact in this respect.

It seems that the story, which the “Olavists” would like to readily forget, began to enter the “second round”. In 2019, Brazil unilaterally expanded tax-free quotas for imports of wheat and ethanol from the United States, but they still did not remove sanitary barriers that impeded the import of cattle from Brazil. Amid the crisis in the American steel industry, Washington arbitrarily imposed quotas on Brazilian steel imports in August 2020. This measure was intended to strengthen Trump’s position on the eve of new elections. The United States refused to take a definite position on the question of admitting Brazil as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

As for promise to support Brazil’s accession to the OECD, the United States, declaring its unwillingness to “inflate” this organization, according to the principle of “divide and conquer”, supported the candidacy of Argentina. This was done despite the fact that Bolsonaro, in exchange for Washington’s support for Brazil’s candidacy, promised to abandon Brazil’s special status in the WTO. ²⁹“Jair Bolsonaro,” - noted the Brazilian researcher M. Bezerra,-“identifies himself with the years of the military regime, politically marked by the doctrine of national security and its concept of “an internal enemy”. (БезерраМ., 2020) However, in the foreign policy, he denies the paradigms of the regime, for which he himself feels nostalgia. Moreover,

29 This status provides more flexible conditions for developing countries, for example, it allows to extend the terms of trade agreements

the president is dismantling the foundations on which Brazilian diplomacy has been built throughout the entire history of the Republic. The dissonance is especially contrasted in comparison with E. Geisel's foreign policy”.

In November 2019, during a vote at the UN, Brazil for the first time did not support a resolution condemning the economic embargo against Cuba. Despite the fact that Brazil's representative to the UN, Mario Vieira, was against the embargo, the Foreign Ministry, represented by its head, Ernesto Araujo, succumbed to US pressure. A State Department spokesman argued that to condemn the embargo would mean “allowing Cuba to interfere in Venezuela's affairs” and “allowing human rights violations within the country”. M. Vieira believed that support for the resolution would not mean approval of the violation of human rights, but, on the contrary, would express the position of Brazil, whose diplomacy has traditionally opposed the introduction of unilateral economic sanctions.

In addition, in his opinion, a vote against the resolution would harm Brazil if imposed on it possible sanctions due to fires in the Amazon. The Brazilian diplomat suggested at least abstaining, rather than voting against, to avoid international repercussions. But this is just one example of the contradictory and self-destructive nature of Brazilian foreign policy under President J. Bolsonaro.

Another example is relations with Iran after the assassination in Baghdad of General Kassem Soleimani, organized with the help of American intelligence services on January 3, 2020. The day after the attack, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry issued a manifesto in support of the United States, which read: “The Brazilian government expresses its support for the fight against terrorism”. The Brazilian Foreign Ministry has also moved away

from the traditional principle of condemning political assassinations, despite the fact that Iran is Brazil's main trading partner in the Middle East. Brazil exported \$ 2.1 billion worth of goods to Iran between January and November 2019.

Iran is the largest importer of Brazilian corn, a large purchaser of soybeans and cattle meat. Military and economists have warned Bolsonaro of geopolitical risks and economic damage, but in vain. J. Bolsonaro has previously supported the US sanctions policy towards Iran. For example, in the summer of 2019, he banned the Petrobras oil company from refueling Iranian-flagged ships carrying corn from Brazil to Iran, once again putting politics above the country's economic interests.

In 2020, Bolsonaro's "anti-diplomacy" came under increasing criticism both domestically and internationally. In September 2020, the chairman of the lower house of parliament, Rodrigo Maia, sharply criticized Bolsonaro. He contrasted his "diplomacy" with the diplomacy of Rio Branco, "who left Brazil a legacy of stable borders and peaceful relations with South American neighbors," adding that every effort would have to be made to preserve this legacy – "the basis of national sovereignty".

It is no coincidence that the president received the main charge of public criticism from the diplomatic community. In May 2020, six former prominent Brazilian ministers who have led the Foreign Ministry over the years, as well as former Foreign Minister and President Fernando Henrique Cardoso,³⁰ issued a manifesto entitled "Restoring Brazilian Foreign Policy". It stated that "the government is moving away from the universal vocation

30 Among the former ministers who signed the manifesto were: Aloysio Nunes and Joey Serra (in the government of Michel Temer 2016-2018); Celso Amorim, (in the government of Lula da Silva 2003-2010); Celso Lafer and Francisco Rezek (in the government of Fernando Collor 1990 - 1992).

of Brazilian foreign policy and its ability to dialogue and find mutual understanding with different countries, both developed and developing, in favor of our interests". The collective message condemned

[s]upport for coercive measures against neighboring countries, violating the principles of self-determination and non-interference; voting in the UN in favor of unilateral sanctions that violate the norms of international law, the principle of equality of states and the peaceful resolution of conflicts; approval of the use of force against sovereign states without the permission of the UN Security Council; the official approval of the political assassination (General Kassem - Auth.) and the vote against the resolutions of the Human Rights Council in Geneva condemning these violations. ⁽³¹⁾

According to the ex-ministers, the restoration of the Brazilian diplomatic tradition "requires a return to a sense of balance, moderation and constructive realism", as well as to such values as "solidarity and the search for dialogue, on which Brazilian diplomacy was built, becoming the heritage and pride of the Brazilian people."

Obviously, feeling the growing rebuff, Bolsonaro promised to "balance" foreign policy, which was announced during his speech at the General Assembly in September 2020. He managed to win back several "points" in his favor by signing the

31 The manifesto was published on May 8, 2020 in newspapers and news sites in Brazil. Available at : "Brazil: six former foreign ministers condemned Bolsonaro's foreign policy" (Electronic resource) - URL: <http://realtribune.ru/news/world/4241>

long-awaited Mercosur-EU agreement and the harsh reaction that followed shortly thereafter to the comments of European leaders regarding the Amazonian bushfires.

An agreement on a free trade zone between Mercosur and the EU was concluded at the G-20 summit in Osaka at the end of June 2019. Negotiations on a transcontinental FTA began in 2000 and during the first ten years they did not bring tangible results. The contradictions concerned, first of all, agricultural products: the countries of Mercosur demanded large benefits for themselves in the European market. The dialogue was resumed only in 2010 after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The next starting point was 2016, when Brazil embarked on a course of rapprochement with the EU amid growing US protectionism.

Speaking in Osaka, J. Bolsonaro positively assessed the prospects for the ratification of the newly signed document: “This will be one of the most important agreements of all time, which will give enormous benefits to our economy”. “There is no doubt that other countries also will be interested in negotiating with us, including Japan,” he said at a press conference.

For Mercosur, FTA with the EU was the first transcontinental integration agreement. It was designed to open up a new market for Latin American countries, attract European investment, create new jobs, increase the competitiveness of South American goods, and improve Mercosur’s labor and environmental standards.

Nevertheless, according to experts, in addition to the planned economic benefits, the agreement carries with it certain risks. Of particular concern in the EU was the prospect of lowering import duties on beef from the Mercosur countries, the need to compete with which was especially alarming for European meat producers, who are highly dependent on European subsidies. In

addition, subsidizing European farmers is the main stumbling block between the EU and Mercosur countries, which was not completely overcome in the course of negotiations.

The prospects for the ratification of the transcontinental agreement, which Bolsonaro considered his main merit, were almost immediately called into question. France, the largest agricultural producer in Europe, although initially welcomed the agreement with Mercosur, soon, under the pressure of growing criticism from its agro-industrial unions, was forced to reconsider its attitude towards it. The pretext was J. Bolsonaro's refusal to adhere to the provisions of the Paris Climate Agreement, since French President E. Macron stressed that his country would not ratify trade agreements with those countries that refuse to comply with its terms.

The situation was aggravated by forest fires in the Amazon. The difficult dilemma "ecology or development" in relation to seven Amazonian states, J. Bolsonaro tried to solve radically in favor of "development". In the first year of his reign, serious concessions were made to Brazilian farmers, who began to cut and burn rainforests with almost impunity. Barbaric land-use practices and increasing deforestation have resulted in truly catastrophic wildfires in this vast area in the summer and fall of 2019.³² This entailed the most severe criticism not only within the country, from environmentalists and human rights defenders

32 Brazil is one of the top 10 polluting countries due to greenhouse gas emissions from the clearing and burning of Amazonian forests. It accounts for more than 2% of greenhouse gas emissions. In terms of scale, the June forest fires exceeded the figures for the same period in 2018 by more than 45%. Fires in the Amazon reduce the chances of Brazil meeting its obligations under the Paris Agreement: to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 43% by 2030 and restore 12 million hectares of forest. Fires can delay the achievement of these indicators by 10 years.

defending the rights of Indians. The Bolsonaro government has faced unprecedented criticism from the EU countries, primarily France and Germany, which are concerned about the situation. In these countries, there have been more frequent calls for a refusal to ratify the agreement with Mercosur.

The leaders of the “united Europe”, criticizing the ecological policy of Bolsonaro, made a serious mistake. They did not teach the traditionally “reverent” attitude of the Brazilians to such a concept as the sovereignty of their country.

Speaking at the G7 Summit in Biarritz in August 2019, E. Macron said that the problem of fires in the Amazon is a matter that requires “international intervention” and spoke about the possibility of defining the status of the Amazon as “international”. This was immediately followed by a harsh response from Bolsonaro, who accused the French president of “colonial thinking”. He added that the Amazon should not be viewed “as if it were someone’s colony or no man’s land”. During his speech at the UN General Assembly, Bolsonaro recalled that Brazil uses only 8% of the land for agriculture, while Germany and France - more than 50%.

The moment turned out to be very advantageous for the Brazilian leader. Even former head of state Dilma Rousseff supported him. The concept of the “common heritage of humanity”, often applied to the Amazon, should not imply the right to interfere in the internal affairs of Brazil from any side. And if the agreement on a separate issue (“fires in the Amazon”) between such ardent opponents as the Workers’ Party and the right-wing Social - Liberal Party (PSL), from which Bolsonaro ran, could be considered an exception, then the domestic political consensus on the issue of ensuring the country’s sovereignty for a country like Brazil was absolutely typical.

It was obvious that further attempts to put pressure on the Bolsonaro government in this matter may have a negative impact on Brazil's relations with the EU, and in the long term with the United States, given that environmental issues occupy one of the leading places in the politics of the Democratic Party, whose candidate, J. Biden, won the US presidential election in November 2020. Brazil's diplomatic tradition, founded in the days of Rio Branco and persistently pursued by generations of talented diplomats, at the core of which is realism, pragmatism and patriotism, the further, the more it does not fit into narrow political and ideological framework of "olavism". Practice of 2019-2020 years convincingly proved to Bolsonaro the isolation of his ideas from the real interests of Brazil, and simply from real life. Just like the practice of international relations in the 1970s proved this to the Brazilian military, who, like Bolsonaro and his team, came to power with a set of prepared in advance ideas.

Building the relationship between Brazil and the United States was extremely difficult from the outset due to the same systemic error that the military made in 1964-1967 when they saw the United States as a supporter of their idea: "Brazil is a great power". As well as the military in the 1970-1980s, Bolsonaro failed to resolve any trade and economic contradictions with the United States, nor to provide Brazil with the role of Washington's "privileged ally".

The military managed to do this only for a very short time, in the mid-1960s, and even at the cost of supporting the US intervention in the Dominican Republic, which lowered Brazil's prestige in the region and the world. Bolsonaro was unable to overcome the resistance of the military, neither to the planned intervention in Venezuela, nor to the creation of American

military bases on Brazilian territory, so could he not become Trump's privileged ally, even for a short time.

In addition, the obstacles that Washington erected before the military governments of Brazil on the path of technological development of their country (nuclear missile program, military-technical cooperation, etc.) testified the elementary law of geopolitics: no great power is ready to facilitate the emergence of a new dynamically developing power.

And in purely technical terms, the United States and Brazil are not partners, but competitors in the world arena (both countries are producers of meat, soybeans, ethanol, corn, cars, aircraft, steel, etc.). The United States has FTA agreements with 11 states in Latin America, except Brazil, for one simple reason: their economies are not mutually complementary, which, in addition to geopolitical considerations, makes cooperation between Brazil and the United States as difficult as possible and often pushes these countries to unilateral actions.

From the second quarter of 2017, Brazil began to emerge from the political crisis and the country's economy began reviving. In 2019, its GDP reached \$ 1.847 billion (9th in the world), although public debt, unemployment and inflation remain high. In 2019, Brazil accounted for 1,58% of world GDP, the country ranked 10th in international gold and foreign exchange reserves. Brazil received \$ 75 billion in FDI in 2019, making it the fourth largest capital attraction in the world.

In 2019, President J. Bolsonaro made many trips around the country. He visited 16 states and 35 cities, which should have helped him to form his own, more close to reality, picture of the situation in Brazil. The country was faced with the need to modernize the state apparatus, financial markets and the banking system, reduce government spending, improve living standards

and social security, and fight crime and corruption. To do this, in the opinion of both Brazilian and foreign experts, it was necessary to diversify exports as much as possible, without locking itself into the markets of “selected” countries, to consistently increase domestic demand (and, therefore, to pursue a responsible social policy), to gain a foothold in regional markets (for which stimulate regional integration).

Finally, to act in accordance with the norms of international law and the rules of the international market, build up its “soft power” and a positive international image in order to strengthen security and gain access to international cooperation, loans and investments. The problem was that the philosophy of “olavism” contradicted these imperatives from the very beginning.

At the turn of 2019-2020 there has been a partial departure from the postulates and dogmas of “tropical Trumpism” in Brazil’s foreign policy. The president’s anti-Chinese rhetoric softened, and relations with the PRC returned to the channel of a comprehensive partnership. Brazil became the second country (after Venezuela) to receive a loan from China (\$ 28.9 billion) for infrastructure development. Chinese companies have invested in the construction of ports in the states of Marañon and Parana.

In October 2019, J. Bolsonaro visited five countries in Asia and the Middle East: Japan, China, UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. During the visit to the UAE, was adopted a program of cooperation in the field of defense, as the result of the visit to Saudi Arabia was the signing of an agreement on investments of \$ 10 billion in Brazilian infrastructure. Customs agreements have become possible with Qatar and the UAE, which are major buyers of Brazilian goods. In Japan was discussed the issue of creating an FTA between Mercosur and this country. The rapprochement of Brazil with the countries of the Pacific Alliance continued and

in early 2019, was agreed a timetable for the liberalization of Mercosur' trade agreements with associate members.

In November 2019, Brazil hosted the XI BRICS Summit. On the eve of its holding, there was a lot of speculation about the possible withdrawal of the country under the leadership of Bolsonaro from this dialogue forum, which, despite all the declarations of the founders about its non-direction against anyone else, is still perceived by the United States and Western countries with undisguised hostility. Reality refuted these expectations. Brazil has shown a growing interest in developing cooperation within the BRICS.

Picture 37 - Leaders of China, Russia, Brazil, India and South Africa at the summit in Brasilia



Source: Author/photographer - Mikhail Klimentyev/AFP Via Getty Images, 2019.

As the host country of the summit, Brazil prepared a rich plan of events and directed the meeting of the BRICS leaders towards practical cooperation. The summit was held under the slogan “Economic Growth for an Innovative Future”. The leaders of the “five” conducted negotiations, both in a closed and in an open format, as a result, J. Bolsonaro characterized the climate

that reigned in them as “a meeting of old friends”. Their first part, as Yuri Ushakov, the aide to the President of the Russian Federation, told reporters, was devoted to a discussion of topical issues on the international agenda: stability, regional security, as well as the state of the world economy and of affairs in world trade and finance.

More than a hundred meetings and events of various levels took place at the BRICS summit. “Brazil is proud that our chairmanship has enriched cooperation within the BRICS,”- said J. Bolsonaro. In his speech, he paid special attention to such topics as innovative development and increasing competitiveness, strengthening the interaction of the BRICS in the trade, health and safety. As a result of discussions was adopted the “Brasilia Declaration”, which reflected the issues of security, economy and trade, technology and climate, global governance, anti-corruption and settlement of regional conflicts that are urgent for BRICS. Towards the end of the main negotiations, the heads of state and government of the “Five” listened to reports from the Business Council and the President of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) Kundapur Kamatha. In their comments, they noted the success of the financial institution and suggested thinking about increasing the number of regional branches and expanding the number of NDB participants.

The meeting showed that despite any ideological “nuances”, Brazil’s interest in BRICS remains high. Brazil’s cooperation with individual BRICS countries: China, India, Russia and South Africa remains equally intense. During the visit of J. Bolsanaro to India in January 2020 he signed 15 agreements on cooperation in various fields: from aerospace to agriculture.

During the coronavirus pandemic that swept the whole world, when Brazil was among the worst-affected countries, it,

not fearing a negative reaction from Washington, was one of the first to turn to Russia for help. In response, our country agreed to transfer 50 million doses of the Sputnik-V anti-coronavirus vaccine to Brazil and organize, together with the Brazilian pharmaceutical company “Unyao Kimica”, the production of 8 million doses of the Russian vaccine per month. During the years of Bolsonaro’s rule, Russian - Brazilian relations remained, on the whole, friendly, despite the divergence on the Venezuelan problem. They have retained their dynamism and, which is probably the most important thing, according to the Russian-Brazilian declaration, which for our part was signed by E. M. Primakov in November 1997, their “aspiration to the 21st century”.

CONCLUSION

Time will tell how Brazil's foreign policy will develop further. Today, however, it is becoming clear: every attempt to tear it away from the diplomatic tradition established during the time of Baron Rio Branco and continued by such outstanding diplomats as A. de Melo Franco and O. Aranha, F. Enrique Cardoso and C. Amorim, will be doomed to fail.

The exception, which it could have become, but did not become, under President J. Bolsonaro, ultimately confirmed the rule: 220 million Brazil, the 9th economy in the world, will under no circumstances allow to be turned off the main road for gaining its own powerful regional and global projection. And the country will do it on the basis of protecting its sovereignty and respecting the sovereignty of others, observing the norms of international law and generally accepted rules of human life.

The experience of the 1960s and the realities of our time clearly show that relying on "disinterested help and support" from the northern neighbor in its ascent is not only counterproductive, but also does not correspond to the Brazilian diplomatic tradition. Generating international crises and conflicts has never been a sign of Brazilian diplomacy. Its "trademark" is a peaceful settlement of international disputes. Brazil's "record", set during the Rio Branco era, who in a short period managed to peacefully

settle all the territorial problems of his country, has not yet been beaten by anyone and remains in great demand in our world fraught with dangers.

The principle of voluntary and proportional arms reduction, to which Brazil and Argentina agreed in 1909, and the principle of sovereign equality, which the Latin American countries, led by Brazil, defended at the 2nd Hague Peace Conference in 1907, remain equally in demand. Very important is the experience of mediation in Brazilian diplomacy in post-conflict settlement in South America in the 1930s and its constructive policy in the League of Nations. It should be especially noted its active participation in the anti-Hitler coalition, which crossed out all the calculations of the “Axis” countries that the country, far from the main theaters of military operations, would remain neutral in the face of aggression.

In the postwar period, the efforts of Brazilian diplomats were aimed at substantiating and confirming in practice the inviolable link between security and development and to prevent bipolar confrontation from finally prevailing over common sense in politics. The “first call” for the United States, which was not ready to perceive Brazil as an independent and sovereign state, was the refusal of President J. Vargas to send Brazilians to fight in Korea. The punishment for this was the “color revolution”, which provoked the suicide of Vargas, but failed to reverse the process of the formation of the Brazilians as a nation.

Independent foreign policy, whose foundations were laid by Presidents J. Vargas and J. Kubitschek, continued under J. Quadros and J. Goulart. It reflected what today seems to be immutable: Brazil’s national interests are above any ideological schemes and are not subject to fluctuations depending on the changing political environment. In an era when the country’s

survival sometimes depended on the choice of a side in the conflict, Brazil did, perhaps, the only right thing to do - by joining most of the developing countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa and drawing closer to the Non-Aligned Movement.

The US and domestic reaction failed to forgive Brazil for this choice, because even then it was becoming clear to many that “where Brazil goes, the whole of Latin America will go there”. It seemed that the anti-communist military coup of 1964 would attach “tightly” Brazil to Washington’s global strategy with strong bonds of “national security doctrine” and make it an obedient instrument to suppress any signs of discontent with its policy in Latin America.

But in vain. The “bitter pill” of participation in the intervention in the Dominican Republic fell too far out of the Brazilian diplomatic tradition to avoid rethinking many of the previously unshakable stereotypes. With difficulty, but the military, not having secured support from the United States for their project “Brazil - a great power by 2000”, gradually began to return to the foundations of Independent Foreign Policy. They realized that this ambitious goal could only be achieved through their own efforts in cooperation with Latin American neighbors and other developing states, without relying on help and support from the United States.

The return to democracy was the first step along this path that justified itself. Not the form of government itself, but the possibility of reaching a wider circle of international communication, closed to dictatorial regimes, predetermined the peaceful, conflict-free departure of the military from power. By that time, the foreign policy had already returned to the tracks laid by Rio Branco.

Nevertheless, the restoration of Brazil's international image took a little longer than the initiators of the democratic transition anticipated. It was necessary to abandon not only the untimely ambitions of the departed military regime ("parallel nuclear program") and restart the process of South American integration (Mercosur) on a new, democratic basis, but also get rid of the "excesses of neoliberalism" that turned into corruption and permissiveness (impeachment of F. Collor).

After overcoming the internal political crisis, fighting inflation and returning to the path of diversified foreign policy, which was most consistent with the diplomatic tradition of Itamaraty, the government of F.E. Cardoso created the material and moral prerequisites for Brazil to take two new "steps forward", approaching the status of a great power at the beginning of the 21st century. Today, recalling that period in its history, it is appropriate to note that all these achievements were the result of its technocratic and maximally de-ideologized character.

It is possible that the country that L. Inacio Lula da Silva received from the outgoing president: its powerful economic basis, democratic stability and high foreign policy image, did not allow the "native of the people" - Lula, to start "breaking" it in a socialist way, according to his election slogans. But, most likely, Lula himself had sufficient political intuition and the ability to listen to advice "from the outside", including highly experienced employees of the diplomatic department, so as not to succumb to the temptation to start putting his old slogans into practice. At the same time, the role of Lula, who finally managed to deal a mortal blow to the most acute and long-standing problem of Brazil and all other Latin American countries - poverty and acute social inequality - has yet to be appreciated by descendants. But under him, the seemingly unstoppable process of Brazil's ascent

in the world's "table of ranks" may have had a certain legacy of the past? An element of decadence that will soon again force this country to take a step back.

Ideologies do not give up "just like that", but leave behind a legacy of dogmatism, superficiality and seeming self-sufficiency. This was enough for Lula's successor, Dilma Rousseff, to turn the legacy of her patron into nothing in a short time. It is no coincidence that the first signs of decadence manifested themselves in the prejudiced attitude of Madame President towards the foreign policy department and foreign policy in general, which was pushed into the background. External crises turn into internal ones only when the management ceases to listen to the opinion of professionals, when it believes that its good intentions alone are enough for events to develop according to a predetermined pattern.

Dilma Rousseff's impeachment could have been fatal for Brazil if its story did not have the property of repeating itself. The new "crisis manager" once again managed to pull the country mired in corruption scandals and having lost self-confidence from the edge of the abyss, possibly confirming, thereby, the popular saying among Brazilians that "God is Brazilian".

But the historical XXI century, which, like the last, XX-th, began much later than the calendar, and brought with it new challenges and surprises. How "unexpected" was the appearance in the White House of President D. Trump, and in the palace of Planalto - Jair Bolsonaro, historians have yet to assess. In Brazil, however, the "ironic" (according to E. Hobsbawm) history, apparently, wanted to return the situation again half a century ago in order to force its leadership to "repeat" what the military went through in the 1970s. But the government of Jair Bolsonaro had to do this already in new conditions, which did not allow

excessive voluntarism: that is why the historical experience accumulated by Brazil. The country and society are ripe enough to be guided by their own, and not someone's interests.

The "exception", which could become the presidency of Tropical Trump, only confirmed the rule: there may be deviations from the main trend in the historical development of Brazil towards becoming a great power, the center of the emerging Latin American civilization, but they were and will be of a purely temporary nature.

Looking back at the history of Brazilian foreign policy from the end of the 19th century to the present day, you can see an interesting sinusoid, which it followed, trying on the main events in the general history of this largest Latin American country. This sinusoid, marked, like any other, with ups and downs, as a whole repeated the general sinusoid of the historical development of the "Tropical Giant", however, in a number of cases (beginning of the 20th century, 1930-1940s, mid and late 1950s and, finally, in the first decade of the 2000s), Brazil was ahead of it. This means that, unlike most other states (the most striking example here may be the United States), Brazil's foreign policy in a number of cases did not follow domestic policy, blindly obeyed its imperatives, but directly influenced it and even shaped it.

During the years of activity of the "Golden Chancellor" - Baron de Rio Branco, Brazil behaved in the international arena as if it was already a great power. But this anticipation, which might seem to be "unjustified jumping ahead", set the tone for Brazil's development for all subsequent years, not only laying the foundations of its diplomatic tradition, but defining the entire strategy of its future development. Continued under Getulio Vargas in the 1930s, the "leading" line in foreign policy allowed Brazil for a short time to stand on a par with the "superpowers" of that time

- the United States and Germany in order to achieve the main domestic political goal: to start large-scale industrialization.

Having begun to “discover” the world outside the Western Hemisphere in the 1950s, Brazil by the end of the century managed to diversify its external relations as much as possible, increase exports, accumulate foreign exchange reserves and begin to address the problems of poverty, socioeconomic inequality and scientific technical lag behind developed countries. Oblivion of the importance of foreign policy in the history of Brazil and, moreover, attempts to break its diplomatic tradition, formed at the beginning of the last century, as practice shows, has always been counterproductive and led to a retreat one step back in its progressive development.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 1492 Discovery of America by H. Columbus, rivalry between Spain and Portugal for the development of new lands.
- 1493 The publication of the “Inter caetera” bull by Pope Alexander VI on the approval of the demarcation line that ran from north to south 100 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands. Everything that was and will be open to the west and south of this line, outlined from the North Pole to the South, whether it is the land lying on the way in India or in any other direction, was to belong to Castile from now on.
- 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas. The division of the world took place along the so-called “papal meridian”, which stretched across both poles and crossed the Atlantic Ocean 370 leagues from the westernmost point of the Cape Verde Islands. The zone of influence of Portugal is to the east of the demarcation line, Castilla is to the west.
- 1500 Pedro Alvaris Cabral, at the head of a flotilla of 12 ships, reached unknown land in the area of present-day Porto Seguro, Bahia on 22 April. This is the official date for the Opening of Brazil. He called this land Vera Cruz, then it was renamed Santa Cruz, and then the name Brazil stuck to it.
- 1503 Expedition of Gonçalo Coelho departs from Portugal to explore the coast of Brazil. Amerigo Vespucci took part in this expedition. The beginning of the extraction and use of the precious wood pau-brazil.

- 1507 The new continent was named America after the Latin version of the name Amerigo Vespucci.
- 1521 Fernand Magellan arrives in the Philippines on his first trip around the world.
- 1529 The signing in Zaragoza of an agreement between Castile and Portugal on the division of areas of influence in Asia, in order to solve the “problem of the Moluccas.”
- 1530 Portugal sends a colonizing expedition to Brazil led by Martin Afonso de Sousa. The territory of Brazil was divided into capitals.
- 1535 Beginning of sugar cane cultivation in northeastern Brazil.
- 1538 The first batch of African slaves arrives in Brazil. Portugal monopolizes the African slave trade.
- 1555 French occupation of Bahia de Guanabara with the aim of establishing a French colony in Brazil.
- 1565 The city of San Sebastian de Rio de Janeiro was founded to counter French infiltration.
- 1567 Expulsion of the French from territory in the Rio de Janeiro area.
- 1587 An attack by British pirates led by Robert Whittington and Christopher Lister in Salvador, near Baiek.
- 1595 The attack of the English corsairs on the cities of Olinda and Recife.
- 1602 Creation of the Dutch East India Trading Company (WOC).
- 1621 Creation of the Dutch West Indies Company (WIC), which transported and traded sugar in Europe.

- 1630 50 ships and 7,000 Dutch crews attacked and conquered Recife and Olinda, in Pernambuco, the richest sugar producing region.
- 1638 Portuguese expedition led by Pedro Teixeira along the river. The Amazon made it to Quito (Ecuador). The results of the expedition were used by Portugal to delineate the territory in the Amazon.
- 1649 Creation of the Common Trading Company of Brazil, with monopoly trade in wine, sugar and wheat.
- 1713 Utrecht Peace Treaty. Utrecht Treatise on Portugal's Rights to the Colony of Sacramento.
- 1729 Portugal is sending a mission of mathematicians and astronomers to Brazil, led by Diego Soares and Domingo Capassi, to study and prepare a detailed map of Portuguese America.
- 1750 Madrid Treaty between Spain and Portugal on the settlement of the border of possessions in the territory of modern Brazil.
- 1761 El Pardo Treaty between Portugal and Spain to define borders in South America.
- 1763 The capital of Brazil is moved from El Salvador to Rio de Janeiro.
- 1773 Final abolition of slavery in the Portuguese kingdom.
- 1777 Signing of the Treaty of San Ildefonso between Portugal and Spain on the settlement of territorial disputes in the area of the river La Plata.
- 1792 The defeat of the Inconfidence movement, which advocated the independence of Brazil, led by Tiradentes (Joaquin Jose da Silva Xavier).
- 1799 Expedition of the German scientist A. von Humboldt along the Orinoco River.

- 1799 - 1815 Napoleonic Wars in Europe.
- 1807 The occupation of Portugal by Napoleon's troops.
- 1808 Moving of the Portuguese court to Brazil.
- 1810 In Rio de Janeiro, agreements were signed between Portugal and Great Britain on friendship, trade and navigation.
The beginning of the War of Independence in the Spanish colonies.
- 1815 Congress of Vienna. Portugal agrees to ban the slave trade from the coast of Africa.
- 1815 - 1822 United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarve.
- 1821 King João VI returned from Brazil to Lisbon, leaving his son Pedro in Brazil as prince regent.
- 09/07/1822 Brazilian independence proclamation.
- 1822 Pedro I Emperor of the Brazilian Empire. Don Pedro earns the title of "Eternal Defender of Brazil" when he supported the idea of political independence and severed diplomatic relations with Portugal.
Jose Bonifacio de Andrada and Silva, a renowned politician and scientist, became the Minister of the Interior at the head of the Brazilian government.
- 1823 Proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States.
- 1824 Adoption of the 1st Brazilian Constitution.
- 1825 The signing in Rio de Janeiro of the Portuguese-Brazilian treaty, according to which Portugal recognizes Brazil as an independent state.
The independence of Brazil is recognized by Great Britain, Austria, France.

- 1826 The independence of Brazil is recognized by Sweden, the Holy See, the Netherlands, and Prussia.
- 1828 Establishment of diplomatic relations between Brazil and Russia.
- 1828 Peace Treaty between Brazil and the United Provinces of La Plata. Brazil signs US-Netherlands Friendship, Navigation and Trade Treaty.
- 1831 Abdication of Emperor Pedro 1. Regency in Brazil.
- 1833 Abolition of slavery in all colonies of the British Empire.
- 1836 Brazilian Trade and Navigation Treaty with Portugal.
- 1838 Treaty of Friendship, Trade and Navigation between Brazil and Chile.
- 1841 Boundary Treaty between Brazil and Peru.
Accession to the throne of Emperor Pedro II.
- 1843 Opening of the Brazilian consulate in China.
- 1848 Opening of the Brazilian Consulate in India.
- 1852 Brazilian Treaty of Friendship and Borders with Venezuela.
Publication of the "General History of Brazil" by Francisco Adolfo Varnhagen.
- 1853 The Central Colonization Company was founded in Rio de Janeiro, through which more than 20 thousand migrants arrived in Brazil.
- 1856 Treaty of friendship, trade and navigation between Brazil and Argentina.
Treaty of Friendship, Trade and Navigation between Brazil and Paraguay.

- 1863 The severance of diplomatic relations between Brazil and Great Britain.
Creation of the Brazilian-Portuguese bank in London.
- 1864 The beginning of the Paraguayan War.
- 1865 The triple alliance between Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.
Restoration of diplomatic relations between Brazil and Great Britain.
- 1867 Peace Treaty between Brazil and Bolivia.
- 1870 End of the Paraguayan War.
- 1872 Peace and friendship treaty between Brazil and Paraguay.
- 1876 Peace Treaty between Paraguay and Argentina.
- 1880 A treaty of friendship, trade and navigation between Brazil and China.
- 1888 Abolition of slavery in Brazil.
- 1889 Participation of Brazil in the World Exhibition in Paris.
First Pan American Conference.
- 11/15/1889 The proclamation of the republic.
- 1891 The first constitution of the republic.
- 1895 Treaty of friendship, trade and navigation between Brazil and Japan.
- 1899 The first official visit of the President of Argentina to Brazil.
- 1900 The first visit of the President of Brazil to Argentina.

- 1902 Baron Rio Branco headed the country's Foreign Ministry.
- 1904 Boundary Treaty between Brazil and Ecuador.
- 1905 The beginning of the policy of "unspoken alliance" between Brazil and the United States.
- 1906 The III Pan American Conference held in Rio de Janeiro.
- 1907 Boundary Treaty between Brazil and Colombia.
Opening of the Brazilian Embassy in the United States.
Brazil's participation in the Second Hague Peace Conference.
- 1909 Arbitration Treaty between Brazil and the United States.
Borders and Navigation Treaty between Brazil and Peru.
- 1910 Creation of the Pan American Union.
- 1913 Recognition by Brazil of the republic proclaimed in 1911 in China.
Chancellor Lauro Müller's visit to the United States.
- 1914 Opening of the Panama Canal.
The beginning of the First World War.
- 1915 The ABS Pact (Argentina, Brazil, Chile), aimed at the peaceful settlement of international conflicts.
1st Pan American Financial Conference in Washington.
- 1916 USA becomes Brazil's first trading partner.
- 1917 Brazil breaks off diplomatic relations with Germany.
- 1918 14 points by W. Wilson.

- 1919 Paris Peace Conference.
Treaty of Versailles.
Brazil's participation in the 1st ILO conference (Washington)
- 1920 Participation of Brazil in the I Assembly of the League of Nations (Geneva).
Recognition by Brazil of the independence of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland.
Restoring diplomatic relations between Brazil and Germany.
- 1922 Exhibition in Rio de Janeiro in honor of the 100th anniversary of independence.
- 1923 V Inter-American Conference (Santiago) on arms reduction. Pact of Gondra (on the prevention of conflicts between states).
- 1926 Brazil's veto on Germany's possible entry into the League of Nations.
Brazil's withdrawal from the League of Nations.
- 1928 IV Inter-American Conference (Havana). Codex Bustamante.
Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay.
- 1930 Revolution in Brazil. Coming to power of J. Vargas.
- 1931 International Coffee Conference (Sao Paulo).
- 1933 Signing of the Saavedro Lamas Pact in Rio de Janeiro (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay).
- 1933 VII Inter-American Conference (Montevideo), Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, with the inclusion of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

- 1935 Signing of a trade agreement between Brazil and the United States.
Peace Protocol between Bolivia and Paraguay, end of the Chaco War.
- 1936 Trade agreement between Brazil and Germany.
- 1937 "New State" in Brazil.
- 1938 Diplomatic crisis between Brazil and Germany.
VIII Inter-American Conference (Lima). Declaration of Principles of Continental Solidarity.
- 1939 Mission of Chancellor O. Aranyi to the USA.
First trade agreement between Brazil and South Africa.
- 1940 II meeting of foreign ministers, adoption of the Havana Hemisphere Defense Act.
- 1942 Brazil breaks off diplomatic relations with the Axis countries.
Creation of a joint defense commission between the United States and Brazil.
22. 08. Brazil declares war on Germany and Italy.
- 1943 Brazil signs the Declaration of the United Nations in Washington.
- 1944 Brazil's participation in the Bretton Woods conference, where the IMF and the IBRD were created.
Conference in Dumbarton Oaks, where Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed to include Brazil as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
- 1945 Establishment of diplomatic relations between Brazil and the USSR.
Creation of the Rio Branco Institute.

- 1947 Inter-American Treaty on Mutual Assistance.
The severance of diplomatic relations with the USSR.
- 1948 Creation of the OAS.
Creation of SEPAL.
- 1950 Creation of a joint US-Brazilian economic development commission.
- 1952 Military assistance treaty between Brazil and the United States.
- 1953 Friendship and Consultation Treaty between Brazil and Portugal.
- 1954 Creation of the Brazilian Institute of International Relations (IBRI).
- 1956 Brazil dispatches a military contingent to the Middle East as part of a peacekeeping operation.
- 1958 J. Kubitschek's proposal for the Pan American operation.
- 1959 Operation Brazil-Asia and the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Ceylon.
The visit of the President of Indonesia Suharno to Brazil.
- 1960 The new capital of Brasilia.
Brazil supports UN General Assembly Resolution XV on the granting of independence to the colonies.
- 1961 New Foreign Policy (CWP).
Restoring relations with the USSR.
"Union for the sake of progress."
Opening of the Brazilian embassies in Senegal, BSK, Nigeria, Ethiopia.
Participation of Brazil as an observer in the Non-Aligned Movement.

- 1962 VIII Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers (Punta del Este) on the exclusion of Cuba from the OAS. Brazil supports the principle of non-interference and abstains from voting.
- 1963 The presidents of Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico signed a declaration on the denuclearization of Latin America. Speech by Chancellor A. Castro at the XVIII UN General Assembly on "3-d" - (disarmament, decolonization and development).
- 1964 Renewal of the 1952 military assistance treaty between Brazil and the United States.
Military coup in Brazil.
Venezuela breaks off diplomatic relations with Brazil (until 1966).
Brazil breaks off relations with Cuba.
- 1965 Brazil's participation in the American invasion of the Dominican Republic as part of the Inter-American Peace Force.
- 1967 Brazil signed the Tlatelolco Treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America.
Brazil's new constitution.
- 1968 Signing of a trade agreement between Brazil and India.
- 1970 Brazil unilaterally passes a decree expanding its territorial waters to 200 miles.
- 1973 Signing of a trade agreement between Brazil and the EEC.
- 1974 "Carnation Revolution" in Portugal. Brazil recognizes the new Portuguese government.
Establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC.
- 1976 Opening of Brazilian embassies in Burkina Faso, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe.

- 1977 Brazil denounces 1952 US military aid pact.
- 1978 Amazon Cooperation Agreement.
- 1982 War over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) between Argentina and Great Britain. Brazil's neutrality, condemnation of the use of force and recognition of Argentina's sovereignty over the islands. From 1982 to 1990 Brazil represents Argentina's interests in the UK.
The Museum of History and Diplomacy of Itamaraty opens in Rio de Janeiro.
- 1983 Opening of the first Brazilian mission to Antarctica.
Creation of the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela) to resolve the conflict in Central America.
- 1985 "New Republic" by President J. Sarney.
Contadora's cheerleading team of Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay.
Signing of the Iguazu declaration between Brazil and Argentina on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- 1986 Restoration of diplomatic relations between Brazil and Cuba.
Signing of the Act on the Integration of Brazil and Argentina.
Adoption of the UN declaration on a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic, proposed by Brazil.
Creation of the Rio Group by combining the Contadora Group and the Contadora Support Group.
- 1987 I summit of the heads of state of the Rio Group and the adoption of the Acapulco Compromise on Peace, Development and Democracy.
- 1988 Brazilian Constitution.
Visit of President J. Sarney to the USSR.
Integration, Cooperation and Development Agreement between Brazil and Argentina.

- 1989 I Summit of Heads of Portuguese Speaking Countries (PALOP).
Creation of the International Institute of the Portuguese Language (IILP).
- 1990 US initiative to create an FTA "From Alaska to Tierra del Fuego".
- 1991 Asuncion Treaty establishing MERCOSUR.
I Summit of the Ibero-American Community of Nations (ISN)
(hereinafter - annually).
- 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, (Rio 92 or "Earth Summit").
- 1994 Creation of NAFTA.
I Summit of the Americas (Miami).
Signing of the Ouro Preto agreement on the development of MERCOSUR.
- 1995 Signing of the Framework Agreement between the EU and MERCOSUR.
Creation of the Amazon Pact.
- 1998 II Summit of the Americas (Santiago).
Creation of the Organization of the Treaty of Amazonian Cooperation (OTCA).
- 1999 1st EU Summit - Latin America and the Caribbean.
- 2000 The visit to Portugal of President F.E. Cardoso on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of Pedro Cabral's journey.
Meeting of the Presidents of South America and the development of IIRSA (12 axes of integration).
- 2001 III Summit of the Americas (Quebec).
I meeting of foreign ministers at the Forum for the Development of Cooperation between Latin America and East Asia (WAZLAF).
- 2002 II summit of the EU countries and Latin-Caribbean America.

- 2003 Creation of the IBSA dialogue forum (India, Brazil, South Africa).
- 2004 FTA Agreement between MERCOSUR and the Andean Community of Nations.
 Brazil leads the UN Mission to Stabilize the Situation in Haiti (MINUSTAH).
 Brazil's United Nations Hunger Initiative (Fome zero).
 III EU Summit - Latin America-Caribbean.
 Creation of the South American Community of Nations (SASO).
 Creation of the UNEP office in Brazil.
 IV Summit of the Americas (Mar del Plata).
 Connection of Brazil to the Alliance of Civilizations.
 A Peacekeeping Training Center has been opened in Brazil.
 I summit of the countries of South America and the League of Arab States (ASPA) (Brasilia).
- 2006 Reform of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry.
 IV EU Summit - Latin America-Caribbean.
 I South America - Africa (ASA) Summit (Abuja).
- 2007 1st EU-Brazil Summit (held annually).
- 2008 5th EU Summit - Latin America-Caribbean.
 Creation of UNASUR.
 100th anniversary of Japanese migration to Brazil.
- 2009 II South America - Africa (ASA) Summit (Venezuela).
 I BRIC Summit (Brazil, Russia, India, China) (Yekaterinburg).
 II Summit of South America and the League of Arab States (ASPA) (Doha).
 V Summit of the Americas (Port of Spain).
- 2010 VI EU Summit - Latin America-Caribbean.
 II BRIC Summit (Brasilia).

- 2011 I Summit of the Community of Latin America and the Caribbean (CELAC) (Caracas).
III BRICS Summit (Sanya).
- 2012 III summit of the countries of South America and the League of Arab States (ASPA) (Lima).
UN Conference on the Environment Rio +20.
VI Summit of the Americas (Cartagena).
IV BRICS Summit (New Delhi).
- 2013 II CELAC Summit (Santiago).
1st EU-CELAC Summit.
V BRICS Summit (Durban).
III Summit South America - Africa (ASA) (Malabo).
- 2014 Formation of the MERCOSUR parliament.
III CELAC Summit (Havana).
II EU-CELAC Summit.
VI BRICS Summit (Fortaleza).
- 2015 I Forum China - CELAC (Beijing).
IV Summit South America - League of Arab States (Riyadh).
III CELAC Summit (Costa Rica).
1st EU-CELAC Summit (Brussels).
VII BRICS Summit (Ufa).
VII Summit of the Americas (Panama).
- 2016 VIII BRICS Summit (Goa).
IV CELAC Summit (Quito).
- 2017 IX BRICS Summit (Xiamen).

V CELAC Summit (Dominican Republic).

Creation of the Lima Group to resolve the political situation around Venezuela.

- 2018 X BRICS Summit (Johannesburg).
- II Forum CELAC - PRC (Santiago).
- Brazil leaves UNASUR.
- VIII Summit of the Americas (Lima).
- 2019 XI BRICS Summit (Brasilia).
- 2019 I Summit of the Forum for Progress and Development in South America (PROSUR) (Santiago) The PROSUR includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru and Ecuador).
- 2020 XII BRICS Summit (St. Petersburg).
- 01/14/2020 Brazil announced its withdrawal from CELAC.

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